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Preface
My experiences in Alaska and my introduction to the state's wildlife 
practices began in 1984 when 1 entered the state for the first time to participate 
in a three-month outdoor education program led by the National Outdoor 
Leadership School. Later, as an instructor for tiie school, 1 spent summers 
teaching in Alaska's Chugach, Talkeetna and Alaska mountain ranges. It was 
throughout these summers, which were filled with a myriad of wildlife 
sightings and encounters in the backcountry, that my interest in Alaska's 
wildlife management peaked. These experiences led me to study wildlife 
related topics at the University of Montana while pursuing a Master's degree 
in Environmental Studies.
In the spring of 19921 was asked to be the executive director for a small 
non-profit organization. The Alaska Wildlife Alliance, whose primary issue 
is to oppose wolf control in Alaska. For close to one year 1 held this position, 
and worked almost exclusively to oppose Alaska's wolf control programs. I 
am currently an elected member of the Anchorage Fish and Game Advisory 
Committee and represent the Alaska Wilderness Recreation and Tourism 
Association on a planning team for the Fortymile caribou herd. This paper is, 
in large part, inspired by both my experiences in Alaska's wilderness and on 
the political front lines with The Alaska Wildlife Alliance, campaigning to 
put an end to the state's proposed lethal wolf control programs.
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Introduction
"When men come into a land to "tame" it, they replace wild game 
with domestic animals. The wolves prey on these creatures, the men 
kill them in turn, and reduce the wolf population generally, as a 
preventive measure to secure their economic investment. The two 
just can't live side by side. A  step removed from this, perhaps, in 
terms of its justification, is the action of Fish and Game departments 
that kill wolves to sustain or increase the yield of big game animals so 
human hunters can kill them. This kind of "predator control" has 
historically accommodated economic and political interests ahead of 
ecological interests. And it has acted occasionally from a basis of bar 
stool and barbershop biology, not wildlife science."
Barry Lopez, O f Wolves and Men
Alaska's 1992 wolf control plans, which were the culmination of a long 
public process, failed to be implemented as intended for a variety of reasons. 
The following chapters analyze these failures as they relate to the political, 
biological, and ethical dimensions of policy-making. They also include an 
overview of America's historic relationship to wolf control, helping to place 
Alaska's 1992 wolf plans within their greater context. The main purpose of 
this work is to provide a reference for future wolf and predator management 
policy-makers, and any others who are interested in progressive reform of 
Alaska's wildlife management. The intent of this reference is to better 
inform policy-makers, so that they may more clearly understand the past and 
present failures encompassing this issue, avoid similar dilemmas in the 
future, and break Alaska's negative wolf control cycle. Alaska needs to create 
new and progressive solutions to wildlife management conflicts if wolves are 
to remain a valued and integral part of the state's ecosystems.
The chapters in this paper are organized in the following way:
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The first chapter discusses the history of predator control in the United States 
and Alaska, exposing how deeply embedded predator control has been in 
western culture, western mind-sets and the development of America.
Chapter two reviews the more recent political history of the 1992 wolf control 
controversy in Alaska, identifying the issues and players involved. This 
includes an overview of the state of Alaska's 1992 - 1993 wolf control plans, 
and incorporates a discussion of Alaska's fish and wildlife management 
system. Governor Hickel's administration's influence on that system, and the 
role of the public. Chapter three analyzes and critiques the Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game's (ADF&G's) biological foundations for the 
proposed wolf control in Alaska. Finally, chapter four explores the value- 
based implications of Alaska's wolf control programs and recommends that 
the state look beyond politics and biology to determine what it is that 
perpetuates this debate. Human imposed values relating to wildlife are 
critically intertwined in this controversy, and yet no formal discussion has 
addressed these concerns. In conclusion, this paper makes recommendations 
to the state and future policy-makers for improving future wolf management 
planning.
An additional purpose of this paper is to record some of the voices that 
were deafened during this and other similar debates with Alaska's wildlife 
management system. Those opposing the plan found that not only were 
wolves targeted for control in Alaska's wolf issue, but the majority of the 
public was also undermined — many citizens, scientists, ecologists, natives, 
eco-tour operators, environmentalists, and animal rights activists among 
others. How were these people disregarded by the governing bodies over 
wolves, the Alaska Board of Game and the Department of Fish and Game?
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Their testimony was dismissed as being the result of misinformation. Their 
words were not given thoughtful consideration, and thus they were silenced, 
annulled, rejected. The public was invited to participate in a process which it 
was led to believe was open, but in actuality this was not the case. Therefore, 
this paper records the events of the 1992 wolf issue and some of the opinions 
that were ignored during the controversy, so that those involved in the 
future can help make wildlife policy-making in Alaska and elsewhere a 
better, more enlightened and ethically concerned process.
Since the Middle Ages wolves have been the target of intense, 
diverging opinions and feelings in the western world. Hated, romanticized, 
symbolized, killed and revered — the subject of fairy tales, hunting and 
trapping stories, and pagan and religious symbols — wolves have played a 
significant role in western history. Historically wolf numbers in many areas 
of the world have undergone significant declines, and many countries are left 
with only remnant populations. Centuries of control attempts eliminated 
wolves from fifteen of the twenty-three European states, and several where 
wolves remain contain only a handful of wolves.^ In the United States, 
wolves were extirpated throughout 95 percent of their range in what is 
known as the largest attack ever waged on wolves in western history, 
described by some as a "holocaust.
The state of Alaska has done its share to reduce and eliminate wolves 
in certain parts of Alaska, though wolves continue to inhabit the state 
throughout much of their range. Alaska has experienced a host of wolf
iMonte Hummel, Sherry Pedigrew, Wild Hunters Predators in Peril. (Toronto, Ontario, Key 
Porter Books Limited, 1991) p. 106.
^Barry Holstun Lopez, Of Wolves and Men. (New York, N.Y.. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), p. 
180.
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control programs since the early part of this century, when Euro-Americans 
first began settling this northern region. The state's proposal to begin wolf 
control in three large sections of Alaska in 1992 climaxed an ongoing 
controversy in the state regarding wolf management.
Contrary views and charged emotions continue to surround most any 
discussion of wolves, and Alaska's recent wolf control plans were no 
exception to this pattern. Examples of such perspectives expressed within 
recent years in response to a multitude of Alaska's wolf management plans 
include:
"We're feeding our big game to wolves for the benefit of the Lower 48 
and a lot of carpetbaggers who have come up here to preserve us. 
They've done everything except put us in a bottle of formaldehyde or 
grain alcohol. . . .  The wolf is a cowardly, skulking predator . . . .
People, for some reason or another have fallen in love with a skulking, 
stinldng predator. . . . And I have no respect for a predator, whether it 
be crocodile, wolf or lion...  . And if you really want to get technical, 
we re probably the greatest predator of all. But as long as man is here 
and he was given dominion over the earth, we should use it wisely, 
prevent predators from taking it, and I think we should allow aerial 
hunting on the same day and you don't have to land. "
— Taken from the testimony of Joe Vogler, Board of Game Meeting, 
November, 1989
On the other side of the debate, Kathy Rowe wrote to the Anchorage Daily 
News on December 3, 1992:
I am truly disgusted with the Alaska Board of Game and 
furthermore, the way that this state treats its wildlife. These good ol' 
boys, most of whom were hand-picked by our most wonderful 
governor, and making severely destructive decisions and getting away 
with it!
So, you would like to use radio collars, planes, and any other means 
possible to find a minimum of 500 wolves and shoot their brains o u t . .
. for what? All of this for a special interest group, hunters. These 
people are whining that there are not enough caribou and moose for 
them to shoot. You won't get a shoulder to cry on here! Is the problem 
that you have to walk too far before you can take a shot?
Wolves are endangered in most of the Lower 48 states. Up here 
they are thriving. How wonderful it is that our state can host such 
gorgeous populations of wildlife. Let's treat them with appreciation 
and respect, not an invitation to their own massacre.
If you are as disgusted as I am about the decisions being made for us 
by our Board of Game and Governor, please write . . . .
Unfortunately, it might be too late to save the wolves from the 
onslaught of planes and trigger happy "officials." However, perhaps 
with public pressure we can prevent such horrible management 
techniques in the future.
In 1993, another outraged individual, a New Jersey photographer, threatened
to kill one of Alaska Governor Hickel's family members for each wolf state
game officials killed. His actions brought charges against him, and the man
pleaded guilty to threatening Hickel's family in federal court in March of 1994
(Anchorage Daily News, 3/25/ 94, B-2). The wolf continues to maintain a
polarized thread within the tapestry of contemporary Alaskan and western
culture.
During the past three decades of state wildlife management, Alaska has 
experienced an exhausting list of wolf control programs (either proposed or 
implemented) and court battles over this issue. Discord regarding wolf 
management in Alaska has increased, soaring to new heights with broader 
public awareness, media involvement and successful opposition. In 1987, the 
state reached a stand-still concerning wolf management when Alaska's 
Governor Cowper removed funding for all of Alaska's wolf control 
programs, declaring his administration would instead further efforts to 
survey wolves. His actions crippled those in favor of wolf control.
In the years following Cowper's decision, a statewide planning effort to 
create a "Strategic Wolf Management Plan " which involved public input 
ensued. A team made up of members of the public was formed for the 
purpose of making consensus-based recommendations to the state about how
to create a statewide strategic wolf management plan. This planning effort 
intended to design a wolf management plan which "everyone could live 
with." In the midst of the planning effort, Alaska elected a new Governor, 
Governor Walter J. Hickel. Governor Hickel made appointments which 
changed some of the key players involved with the wolf planning effort. 
Many involved with the process up to this point believed Hickel's new 
administration changed the tenure of the planning process. As part of the 
final efforts of this plan, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G), 
under the new leadership of the Hickel administration, proposed three wolf 
control programs for Alaska in 1992. The three areas targeted for control were 
in the southcentral and interior regions of Alaska, dose to both Anchorage 
and Fairbanks, and totaled approximately 43,000 square miles. Many 
involved with the plan felt the Hickel administration and ADF&G's 
proposals turned wolf management back in time. Some felt ADF&G had, in 
the end, made a mockery of the public process, and the new wolf plans were 
not ones "everyone could live with. "
ADF&G proposed to reduce wolf populations in the control areas by up 
to 81%, which meant likely between 450 and 500 wolves would be killed in 
the first year alone. Prior to ADF&G's release of the new wolf plans, the state 
had spent two seasons radio-collaring wolves in the proposed control areas. 
The control plans, similar to others experienced by Alaska, intended to have 
biologists track the radio collared wolves with planes until the wolves led 
them to their packs. Once packs were located, helicopters transporting 
biologists armed with rifles would fly out to them and extirpate the packs.
The motivation behind these actions was to increase moose and caribou 
numbers for the benefit of human hunters.
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The majority of Alaskans, however, hunters and non-hunters alike, 
oppose such management measures. In addition, state and national 
environmental and animal rights groups, the tourism industry and others 
object to this approach. Thus, when the state decided to go ahead with their 
wolf population control plans, disregarding much opposition from the public, 
a large political battle ensued. Tactics employed by conservation groups and 
the media raised awareness of the issue across the nation and abroad. A 
tourism boycott of Alaska followed, and its pressure was felt strongly by the 
tourism industry and Alaskan politicians. For close to six months Alaska’s 
management plans maintained the focus of state officials, politicians both in 
Alaska and Washington D.C., a coalition of up to fourteen state and national 
conservation and animal rights groups, the media and thousands of 
individuals across the United States, Canada, England, Germany and France. 
Thousands of letters protesting the wolf plans were sent to Governor Hickel.
It was clear that a broad cross section of people felt adamantly opposed to the 
aerial gunning of wolves.
In an effort to try to understand the motivations behind the continued 
systematic killing and suppression of a species which has been eliminated or 
significantly depleted in the majority of its ranges throughout the world, this 
paper argues people must look beyond the political and biological realms of 
this issue. As chapter three will clarify, Alaska's ongoing wolf debate is not 
solely a scientific dilemma. The biological reasoning used by the state to 
support control programs in Alaska is often tenuous and, at times, appears 
lacking. Further, the cost of wolf control deletes any notion that economics is 
a driving force behind the state's programs. An August, 1995 Alaska Public
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Radio Network news report quoted that the state spent close to $3,000 per wolf 
in its control program planned in 1992. It is likely this figure would increase 
if the overhead costs of all those involved in creating these control plans, 
including state officials, staff and the public, were incorporated into the 
equation. Several years of planning, staff time and state meetings went into 
creating the 1992 plans.
In addition, the economic losses incurred by the tourism industry during 
the 1992-3 tourism boycott were substantial. The tourism industry projected 
they lost between 100 -150 million dollars in business as a result of the 
boycott. This loss significantly outweighs the revenue generated by hunters 
(~ 67 million dollars per year) and, one could argue, the value of theoretically 
a few hundred additional moose and caribou resulting from control efforts. It 
is difficult for a state that is faced with declining revenues, such as Alaska, to 
justify spending such significant amounts of money on programs as 
unpopular and contentious as wolf control.
Future policy-makers in situations such as Alaska's wolf control debate 
must begin to address the underlying tenets which motivate politics and 
biology, namely ethics and values. Alaska's wolf control debate actually 
centers around groups of people who possess differing value systems, as is 
evidenced by the testimony of professionals, lay-people and the general public 
at Board of Game meetings. The extirpation of wolves has been part of a 
cultural tradition in America which originates from a value-based 
perspective and approach to wolves. The driving force behind wolf control in 
Alaska is the aspiration to create more opportunity for humans to hunt 
moose and caribou. Many people do not view this devaluation of wolves or 
approach to wildlife management as an appropriate or ethical way to manage
9
this species. This conflict of values must be addressed if future wolf policy 
decisions are to move forward in a productive, meaningful and effective way.
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS BETWEEN THE TIME ALASKA'S 1992 WOLF 
CONTROL PLANS ARE PASSED AND MARCH, 1995:
November 9 -19, 1992 — The Board of Game meets in Fairbanks and votes to 
adopt all three wolf control plans proposed in the Alaska Department of Fish 
and Game (ADF&G) Area Specific Management Plan.
November 19, 1992 — Reporter, Timothy Egan, publishes an article in the 
New York Times informing the nation about Alaska’s wolf control plans. He 
features David Kelleyhouse, Director of ADF&G's Wildlife Conservation 
Department by quoting him saying, "We feel we are going to create a wildlife 
spectacle on a par with the major migrations in East Africa. Mom and pop 
from Syracuse can come up here and see something that they can't see 
anywhere else on Earth." Egan's article is reprinted in newspapers across the 
nation.
November 20,1992 — January 31,1993 — Press from across the world begins 
to cover Alaska's wolf issue. CNN interviews The Aaska Wildlife Alliance 
and others and begins worldwide coverage on November 23. A coalition of 
up to fourteen local, state and national environmental and animal rights 
groups forms.
November 24, 1992 — National Animal Rights groups begin a tourism 
boycott of the state of Aaska, placing ads in the New York Times, L A. Times, 
and U.S.A. Today among other newspapers. The Aaskan tourism industry 
organizes and distributes statements opposing the wolf plans. In addition 
they press Governor Hickel to cancel the plans.
December 1, 1992 — Governor Hickel is inundated with phone calls and 
letters opposing the wolf kill, and will receive over 45,000 such protests 
during Üûs time. He proposes capturing and giving wolves away to states 
who want them as an alternative to aerial wolf killing. No states come 
forward to accept his offer.
December 5,1992 — The Governor yields to pressure from the public and the 
tourism industry, and suspends the wolf plans pending a "Wolf Summit" to 
be held in Fairbanks in January, 1993.
December 12, 1992 — Demonstrations occur simultaneously in cities across 
the country (including Anchorage) in addition to Germany, England and 
Canada.
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December 17, 1992 — The environmental and animal rights groups coalition 
ask the Governor to cancel all wolf control plans in 1993 as a condition for 
their attendance at the Summit.
December 22, 1992 — The state announces the cancellation of the wolf control 
plans for 1993.
January 15 - 18, 1993 — Governor Hickel's summit is attended by hundreds of 
people including the Governor himself, ADF&G current and past 
representatives. Board of Game current and past representatives, biologists, 
tourism industry representatives, environmental and animal rights groups, 
pro-hunting and trapping groups, Alaska natives and individuals from both 
in and out of the state involved or interested in the debate. Professional 
mediators are hired to facilitate the summit which is filled with panel 
discussions, speakers and group discussions. Consensus is not reached 
regarding wolf control, but summary points from discussion groups are 
assimilated and distributed after the summit. They are intended to help 
direct the state in future wolf management decisions.
January 19-28, 1993 — The Board of Game meets in Anchorage and rescinds 
both the Area Specific Wolf Plans and the Strategic Wolf Management Plan. 
This action essentially undoes the consensus-based work of the Wolf 
Management Planning Team and places wolf regulations back in time. 
Restrictions on public aerial-supported hunting are removed, and a ten mile 
wide buffer on the east side of Denali National Park which protects wolves 
whose territory extends outside the Park is removed. In addition, two no­
hunting zones around Anchorage and Fairbanks are removed.
January 29, 1993 — Hunting advocates push for legislation which would 
mandate predator control on lands across the state. Senator Bert Sharp, R. 
Fairbanks, introduces a bill called the "intensive management bill" which 
requires predator control and habitat manipulation throughout Alaska to 
boost hunting opportunity.
February 18 - 19, 1993 — Hunting advocates in and near Fairbanks pressure 
ADF&G to declare an emergency in GMU 20A and begin wolf control 
immediately. ADF&G considers the request, and sends biologists out into the 
field to review the situation, but denies the request on the grounds that their 
biologists determine their is no biological emergency in GMU 20A. Chris 
Smith, ADF&G Fairbanks Regional Supervisor, states in a memo, "While 
snow conditions in the interior are generally more severe than normal this 
winter, there is no evidence that caribou or moose in GMU 20A are suffering 
major losses. Nor is there any basis for predicting that this winter's weather 
will have significant adverse effects. "
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October 1993 — The Board of Game meets and votes to adopt a ground-based 
trapping wolf control program to be implemented by ADF&G in GMU 20A.
In addition, ADF&G begins "trapper-education" classes to encourage 
individual trapping in this area. During the same time, Gordon Haber, 
wildlife scientist, is hired by Friends of Animals, Wolf Haven International 
and The Alaska Wildlife Alliance to be a "watch-dog" by flying and locating 
ADF&G trapping sites and witnessing first-hand how the operation is being 
run. Over tiie course of the winter Haber obtains footage of a lot of wildlife 
caught unnecessarily in traps.
April 1994 — The first year of wolf control in GMU 20A under the current 
plan is completed. A total of 98 wolves are killed in the trapping program, 
and three out of thirty packs are exterminated. Non-target animals killed 
include 12 moose, two caribou, six coyotes, 13 foxes, 1 golden eagle, 1 
wolverine and 1 snowshoe hair. Numerous other animals were caught and 
released unharmed. Private hunters and trappers killed an additional 37 
wolves in the area.
June 1994 — Senate Bill No. 77, the "intensive management " bill, passes the 
state legislature and is signed by Governor Hickel into law. It mandates that,
" the Board of Game shall adopt regulations to provide for intensive 
management programs to restore the abundance or productivity of identified 
big game prey populations as necessary to achieve human consumptive use 
goals of the board in an area where the board has determined that 1) 
consumptive use of the big game prey populations is a preferred use; 2) 
depletion of the big game prey population or reduction of the productivity of 
the big game prey population has occurred and may result in a significant 
reduction in the allowable human harvest of the population . . . . "" As 
outlined in the bill, control of predation and prescribed or planned use of fire 
and other habitat improvement techniques are included in the concept of 
intensive management.
August 3, 1994 — Anchorage Superior Court Judge, John Reese, orders the 
state to pay close to $10,000 in legal fees to animal rights group. Friends of 
Animals (FOA), after Governor Hickel sued the group for what he claimed 
was false advertising. FOA s ad calling for a tourism boycott outlined that the 
state planned to track radio-collared wolves from airplanes and shoot them as 
they returned to their dens. The Judge agreed with FOA s claim that the 
Governor was attempting to halt criticism of the states proposed wolf control, 
and threw the case out of court in April, 1994.
November 9, 1994 — The state continues the ground-based wolf control 
program in GMU 20A and widens the boundaries of the program to include 
an area close to the east side of Denali National Park. The goal of the plan is
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to kill twenty-five wolves, so that wolves are reduced from approximately 100 
to 75 in the area.
November 30, 1994 — Biologist Gordon Haber catches the state bungling the 
wolf control program. The state run program was intended to snare wolves 
around the neck which would kill them quickly and humanely. Haber finds 
this is not the case. Haber witnesses four wolves trapped, one by its neck, one 
by its chest and two by their legs. The wolf trapped around the neck is dead 
and frozen by the time Haber gets to the scene. The remaining wolves stand 
alive, waiting their fate for several hours or more. One wolf has chewed its 
leg off to free itself from the trap, and then stands next to the trap surrounded 
by its trapped pack-mates. When the Fish and Game biologist arrives at the 
scene, Haber films him while shooting the wolves. The first wolf receives 
four shots of the wrong ammunition, then waits passively as the biologist 
goes back to his plane to load his gun with the correct ammunition. The fifth 
shot kills the wolf. The rest are killed with one shot. These wolves were part 
of the Yanert pack, a pack numbering approximately 18-20 wolves prior to 
control. ADF&G believes it has reduced the pack to about 7 wolves.
December 1, 1995 — Three days before Governor elect Tony Knowles takes 
office he asks then Fish and Game Commissioner Carl Rosier to suspend the 
wolf control plan pending an investigation. Stating, "no animal should be 
treated this way," Governor elect Knowles is disgusted and angered by what 
he sees on Haber's videos. Once in office. Governor Knowles hires the 
Alaska State Troopers to conduct an investigation of the GMU 20A wolf 
control plan.
January 23, 1995 — The Board of Game rejects a regulation change which 
would ban same-day airborne hunting of wolves and other fur-bearers.
February 3, 1995 — With the completion of an official investigation and 
report. Governor Knowles cancels the GMU 20A control program, and orders 
a review of the state's predator control policies. As quoted by the Anchorage 
Daily News (2/4/95), Governor Knowles states at a press conference, "The 
report shows the program was professionally mismanaged, caused 
indiscriminate killing of other wildlife and was an unacceptable way to treat 
any animal. " Out of 109 wolves trapped during the program, approximately 
one-third of them were found alive by ADF&G. One-hundred-thirty-four 
wolves total were trapped or shot during the program. Ninety-six other non­
targeted animals were caught in the traps, 62 of which died. These animals 
included: 35 moose, 14 caribou, 2 snowshoe hare, 2 grizzly bears, 3 wolverines, 
10 coyotes, 26 red foxes, 4 golden eagles and 1 raven.
— Three state senators introduce a bill which intends to bring back a wolf 
bounty of $400 per pelt for as many wolves as can be killed. One of the bill's 
sponsors. Sen. Robin Taylor, R-Wrangell, says, "We must take the wolf out of
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Fish and Game's control and treat him like any other predator roaming 
around the house." Bounties were removed throughout most parts of Alaska 
by 1%8.
March 5, 1995 — In a final review of the wolf control program in GMU 20A, 
Fish and Game Commissioner Frank Rue determines that, all senior program 
managers in the Division of Wildlife Conservation, "urged the former 
director and the former commissioner to not implement this program. Their 
advice was not followed. . . . The Department. . . should never have initiated 
a ground-based wolf control program." (Anchorage Daily News, 3/5/95, B-3).
— Since 1992, the Governor's office has received 180,000 letters about 
wolf control. They continue to receive several hundred per week.
March 19-31, 1995 — In their March meeting, the Board of Game votes to 
resume wolf control in GMU 20A, beginning January 1, 1996. GMU 20A is the 
same area that Governor Knowles canceled wolf control in this past 
December, 1994, due to Haber's video tapes of the snared wolves. In addition, 
the Board directs ADF&G to draft "Implementation Plans" for predator 
management in GMU 20D and 19D to be reviewed in the fall.
Chapter 1
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF PREDATOR CONTROL IN AMERICA;
"No other wolf killing ever achieved either in 
geographic scope or economic scale the predator- 
control war waged against wolves in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries in the United States 
and Canada, . . . .  Eric Zimen, a German wolf 
biologist, once remarked that he was utterly unable 
to fathom the relentless carnage. "We killed the 
wolf in Europe, " he said, "and we hated the wolf, 
but it was not anything like what you have done in
America. "
Barry Holstun Lopez, O f Wolves and Men
Alaska's long-standing wolf {Canis lupus) management controversy is 
one in a long line of predator controversies in the United States and Europe. 
Anti-wolf sentiment has existed in western culture for centuries. Historically 
the wolf has been perceived as symbolizing Satan and as a creature waging 
war against livestock growers. As Barry Lopez illuminates in his book Of 
Wolves and Men, negative images of the wolf have been recorded in texts 
since the Middle Ages. In Dante's Divina commedia, which was published in 
1481, the wolf was already depicted as a symbol of greed and fraud, and 
equated with seducers, hypocrites, magicians, thieves and liars destined to 
Hell. These are images that, in certain circles, the wolf has not been able to 
overcome. Negative sentiment regarding wolves built momentum over the 
centuries in Europe, and wolf "battues " or drives were organized, often 
ending in the deaths of hundreds of wolves at a time.^ When Europeans 
settled in American they brought with them their disdain for wolves, which
^Barry Holstun Lopez, Of Wolves and Men. (New York, N.Y., Charles Scribner's and Sons, 
1978), p. 149.
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seems to have escalated on American soil. Some argue that the demonstrated 
hatred and maltreatment of wolves in American history far exceeded that of 
any other creature. For example, Lopez writes:
...the wolf is fundamentally different because history of killing wolves 
shows far less restraint and far more perversity. A lot of people didn't 
just kill wolves; they tortured them. They set wolves on fire and tore 
their jaws out and cut their Achilles tendons and turned dogs loose on 
them. They poisoned them with strychnine, arsenic, and cyanide, on 
such a scale tiiat millions of other animals — raccoons, black-footed 
ferrets, red foxes, ravens, red-tailed hawks, eagles, ground squirrels, 
wolverines — were killed incidentally in the process. In the thick of 
the wolf fever they even poisoned themselves, and burned down their 
own property torching the woods to get rid of wolf havens. In the 
United States in the period between 1865 and 1885 cattlemen killed 
wolves with almost pathological dedication. In the twentieth century 
people pulled up alongside wolves in airplanes and snowmobiles and 
blew them apart with shotguns for sport. In Minnesota in the 1970s 
people choked Eastern Timber wolves to death in snares to show their 
contempt for the animal’s designation as an endangered species.^
While other species, such as the bat and coyote, have certainly suffered from
widespread killing and torture, the wolf elicits unique, extreme and polar
passions, seemingly unlike other creatures.
Federal Control Programs in the Contiguous United States -  a movement 
from wolves to coyotes
For centuries, before the arrival of European settlers to the new world, 
tribal cultures practiced agriculture — forest, grassland and crop 
management, and hunting, using to their advantage what their natural 
surroundings afforded them. They worked within their landscape, not 
against it. The arrival of colonists in the 16th and 17th Centuries, however, 
changed this approach entirely. As Europeans arrived on the shores of the
4lbid., p. 139.
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new world, bringing livestock and a different farming style, a conflict began 
between agriculturists and wildlife — in particular, a conflict between 
livestock owners and predators. A war ensued between settlers and 
wilderness, where the newcomers set out to "tame" America's wilderness, 
suggesting that it was evil, like Satan, that it went against God and His wishes. 
Among other things, taming meant deforestation and subduing the natives, 
civilizing them, their culture and their land. It also meant introducing 
domestic livestock and crop species for farming, and killing the wildlife 
which came into conflict with these goals.
By 1630 the first bounty law was passed in Massachusetts — an indication 
that struggles between predators and livestock owners probably existed before 
that year. Eighteen-eighty-five saw the first federal involvement in control 
work, when questionnaires regarding damage caused by birds were sent to 
farmers. The following year, the Division of Economic Ornithology and 
Mammalogy was created and its primary responsibility was to educate farmers 
about birds and mammals affecting their productivity. This Division later 
became the Bureau of Biological Survey. In 1909, Congress separated out 
funds for the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to conduct 
"experiments and demonstrations in destroying noxious animals. Direct 
Federal control work increased in 1913 when a limited budget allotment 
allowed for the control of plague bearing rodents in California. The first 
congressional appropriations for predator control operations occurred in 1915 
when $125,000 were distributed for wolf and coyote management.
Opposition to Federal control projects was first recorded in 1930 when 
the American Society of Mammalogists issued a strong statement against the
^USDA, "Animal Damage Control Program Draft Environmental Impact Statement," (July 
1990, USDA), p. 1.6.
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existing program. Congress' $1 million appropriation for that year was 
almost canceled. Instead this challenge led to full congressional hearings and, 
ultimately, the Animal Damage Control Act which passed on March 2nd of 
the following year. The Animal Damage Control Act allowed Federal control 
activities to continue, clarified their role, and encouraged cooperative 
agreements with state and local government, land agencies, and other 
entities. This Act is the primary statutory authority for the current Animal 
Damage Control Program, a Federal program directed by the USDA. It reads 
as follows:
The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized and directed to conduct such 
investigations, experiments, and tests as he may deem necessary in 
order to determine, demonstrate, and promulgate the best methods of 
eradication, suppression, or bringing under control on national forests 
and other areas of the public domain as well as on State Territory or 
privately owned lands of mountain lions, wolves, coyotes, bobcats, 
prairie dogs, gophers, ground squirrels, jackrabbits, and other animals 
injurious to agriculture, horticulture, forestry, animal husbandry, wild 
game animals, furbearing animals, and birds, and for the protection of 
stock and other domestic animals through the suppression of rabies 
and tularemia in predatory or other wild animals: and to conduct 
campaigns for the destruction or control of such animals: Provided, 
that in carrying out the provisions of this Section the Secretary of 
Agriculture may cooperate with States, individuals, and public and 
private agencies, organizations, and institutions.^
This significant act paved the way for the "legitimate " eradication of several
species in certain areas, and the deaths of millions of animals annually since
its passage through the Animal Damage Control (ADC) Program.
Specifically for wolves, predator control in the early settlement years 
meant individuals indiscriminately killing wolves through the 
dissemination of poisoned meat carcasses, denning techniques (where wolf 
dens are raided and the pups destroyed), trapping, organized wolf drives,
6lbid.
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hiring professional wolf hunters and various other community efforts. The 
federal approval and support of predator control coupled with an ever- 
increasing hatred of wolves ultimately led to this species near demise in the 
contiguous United States.
Militant anti-wolf sentiment coupled with organized government 
support for implementing predator control gave way to one of the most 
destructive periods in American history — the poison campaign of the late 
nineteenth century. Strychnine-laced carcasses littered the west during this 
time. Aimed at killing wolves, they were indiscriminate, taking anything 
that ate them, including eagles and, occasionally, young children. Other 
species were also targeted during this time. Different methods and reasons 
were used to eliminate bison, antelope, and passenger pigeons. Up to 500 
million animals may have been killed during the latter part of the century. 
One can only speculate about how many wolves were killed between then 
and the late 1930's and early 1940's, when the last wolves roamed the western 
states. Some speculate between one and two million.^
Eerily enough, widespread animal control continues in the contiguous 
United States through the ADC Program, and, as was true during the poison 
campaign of the nineteenth century, substantial numbers of animals not 
targeted are killed or injured regularly. Sixty-three years after the passage of 
the Animal Damage Control Act, the mission of the Animal Damage Control 
Program continues to be to, "provide leadership in wildlife damage control to 
protect America's agricultural, industrial and natural resources, and to 
safeguard public health and safety."* It attempts to fulfill its mission through
^Barry Holstun Lopez, Of Wolves and Men. (New York, N.Y., Charles Scribner's and Sons, 
1978), p.lSO.
*USDA, "Animal Damage Control Program Draft Environmental Impact Statement," (July 
1990, USDA), p. 1.3.
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cooperative programs with Federal, state and private agencies or owners, 
research and evaluation of information, advising, training professionals and 
pesticide registration. The program's primary intent has been to protect 
agricultural interests, "including livestock, crops, aquaculture and 
mariculture, forests and rangelands. In addition, it has provided wildlife 
damage protection for property and public health and safety through the 
control of wildlife borne diseases and wildlife hazards to aircraft."^
More recently, "target species" of the ADC program include the 
following: badger (Taxidea taxiis); beaver (Castor canadensis); black bear 
(Ursus americanus); bobcat (Lynx rufus); coyote (Canis latrans); gray fox 
(Urocyon cinereoargentius); red fox (Vulpes vulpes); mountain lion (Fells 
concolor); opossum (Didelphis virginiana); nutria (Myocastor coypus); 
porcupine (Erethizon dorsatum); prairie dog (Cynomys ludovicianus and C. 
gunnison); raccoon (Procyon lotor); striped skunk (Mephitis mephitis); cattle 
egret (Bubulcus ibis); European starling (Sturnus vulgaris); blackbird 
(Subfamily Icterinae), including red-winged, tricolored, rusty. Brewer's and 
yellow headed, brown headed and bronzed cowbirds, great-tailed, boat-tailed, 
and common grackles. These target species are known to cause considerable 
damage to agricultural interests. They "are regularly killed in high numbers .
. . leading to the potential for substantial impacts; encompass a wide 
geographic range in the United States; [and are the recipients of] a wide range 
of chemical and nonchemical control methods . . . ."10
In 1988 the total number of animals killed by the ADC program was a 
staggering 4,600,717, comprised of 103 different species. Six-thousand, six- 
hundred and forty-two of those killed were non-target animals. The focus of
9lbid.
lOlbid., p. 3.21
21
government predator control efforts in the lower forty-eight states has shifted 
from wolves to coyotes since the wolf's eradication, but the methods used 
have been similar and equally as controversial for this related species. Since 
at least the 1960’s, coyotes have represented approximately three-quarters of 
the animals killed by ADC.^i The methods used by ADC for population 
control include the following:
Population Management -  leghold traps; box traps; live capture (good 
in residential areas); snares; pole traps (effective for hawks and owls); 
quick kill traps; denning; shooting (aerial hunting — common for 
coyotes); hunting dogs; Chemicals: 1) zinc phosphide - metallic 
toxicant; used for rat, vole, muskrat, nutria; 2) anti-coagulant 
rodenticides; strichnine - birds (1988 above ground use cancelled; below 
ground still used); 3) sodium cyanide - M-44: spring activated ejector 
device - coyotes; 4) compound 1080 (sodium fluoroacetate) rodenticide; 
used only in Livestock Protection Collar; 5) fumigants - burrowing 
animals; 6) starlicide baits; 7) avian stressing agent - PA-14; used at 
winter roosts; insulating affect of feathers is lost.i^
The most commonly used methods for killing coyotes involve denning,
shooting, aerial hunting, and spring activated sodium cyanide traps referred
to as M-44's. Between 1986 and 1991, approximately 75% of ADC's operating
budget went to western states, where 90% of their budget was used for lethal
predator control. According to the Humane Society, "less than one percent of
[ADC's] western funds (the largest single allocation of resources) [are used] on
non-lethal damage c o n t r o l .
In areas which historically have suffered agricultural losses due to 
wildlife predation preventive control techniques are used. Restrictions on 
preventive efforts vary state to state. A 1990 General Accounting Office
lljohn Alcock, "The Cost of Coyote Meat;" Wilderness; Spring, 1990; p. 14.
I^USDA, "Animal Damage Control Program Draft Environmental Impact Statement," (July 
1990, USDA), Appendix I.
^^HSUS comments on DEIS submitted to: James W. Glosser, Administrator APHIS; Sept. 4,1990; 
p. 1-3.
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(GAO) report reviewed preventive control efforts in Utah in 1989. Although 
in 1988, on 60% of USFS grazing allotments in Utah no livestock predation 
occurred, aerial coyote hunting nevertheless took place between January and 
March in 1989. ADC literature states that the programs primary goal in lethal 
control is to target problem individuals. However, these winter "preventive" 
control efforts are not aimed at problem coyotes, rather they are non-selective. 
Former ADC trapper Dick Randall writes about preventive control:
Areas of "historic predation" are an ADC loophole through 
which wildlife can be destroyed on public land, using taxpayers' 
dollars to benefit a small group of ranchers. . . . What happens 
when APHIS kills a family of coyotes that was going about its 
business, helping to balance a very fragile ecosystem and not 
eating livestock? Another group of coyotes — perhaps one that 
has a taste for sheep — moves into the area. . . .  To tiiis day 
predator control remains nothing more than a war on whole 
species, and success is measured largely by the body count.^4
Randall's observations and experiences undermine the biological justification
for this program.
ADC bases its coyote control on a 1975 study by Connoly and Longhurst 
which concluded that the "allowable" kill-rate for coyotes is 70% of the total 
population. In other words, according to this study up to 70% of coyote 
populations can be killed yearly without jeopardizing coyote viability. More 
recent studies, however, indicate that while a 70% allowable kill-rate may not 
ultimately undermine coyote population numbers, it does have a significant 
impact on the species. Many ecologists, biologists and researchers are 
beginning to question the scientific legitimacy of ADC's program.
Research regarding the effects of predator control on wolves and coyotes 
has been lacking since the start of government programs, and has not gone
l^Dick Randall, "Decades of Slaughter: A Former ADC Agent Speaks Out"; HSUS News; 
Spring 1991; Vol. 3, p. 20.
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much past determining how quickly these canids repopulate once large 
percentages of their populations have been removed. While opportunity for 
such studies on wolves currently exists in Alaska, neither state, federal or 
private biologists have ever undertaken this type of project. In other words, 
government control programs in Alaska have continued unchecked, without 
any legitimate understanding of how they effect wolf and coyote dynamics. 
Only one Alaskan independent wildlife scientist, Gordon Haber, PhD, has 
suggested that control efforts do impact wolf social behavior and pack 
dynamics and that more study is needed to determine the depth of the effects 
before further control efforts are implemented. He has presented his ideas at 
two wildlife symposiums since 1992 and has been met with lukewarm 
support at best. His suggestions are readily dismissed by Alaskan state game 
officials, and he was recently called a "pseudo-scientist" by the current 
Chairman of the Alaska Board of Game.is Haber's arguments and critiques of 
current wolf management practices in Alaska will be reviewed more 
thoroughly in the third chapter of this paper.
The effects of predator control on coyotes has been a focus for one 
biologist, Robert Crabtree, an assistant professor of biology at Montana State 
University. At this time, Crabtree's preliminary findings are the only bits of 
information scientific literature has to offer regarding more comprehensive 
effects of predator control on canine populations. Crabtree has studied 
coyotes in Yellowstone National Park (YNP), and his research has found that 
predator control programs have profoundly effected coyote populations in 
both social and biological ways.
15"WoIf 'facts' questionable," Anchorage Daily News, 17 April, 1994, p. J-3.
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Crabtree discovered that coyotes respond to disturbance, particularly 
depletions of family numbers, in a couple of ways. For example, hunted 
populations of coyotes increase reproductive rates by 20—30%. The actual 
number of pups per litter will increase from three or four to eight or nine 
when a population is hunted. In addition, yearling females will reproduce in 
a less populated or hunted region, whereas in a more densely populated, less 
disturbed area, one-year old females will wait a second year before bearing 
youngT^ John Alcock, an evolutionary biologist at the University of Arizona, 
states regarding these findings:
Not only are they able to put their evolved intelligence to 
use in dealing with canicidal humans, their great reproductive 
flexibility complements their behavioral ingenuity. Coyotes, like 
many other animals, adjust their reproductive effort in response 
to changes in the density of their local population.
Disturbance of coyotes through widespread hunting significantly impacts 
reproductive rates in coyotes in a density dependent manner. Crabtree's 
findings suggest that coyote responses to significant reductions of their 
population likely render ADC control efforts ineffective.
Crabtree's research in YNP suggests other behavioral impacts on coyotes 
due to hunting pressure. A recent article describing research efforts in YNP 
indicates that decades of hunting pressure has created the solitary coyote 
known well in the west, and that coyotes in stable, undisturbed populations 
may well prefer to stay in packs. It reports:
Using advanced research techniques, the team is finding 
coyotes in Yellowstone very different from those inhabiting 
other western lands, where they are annually subjected to multi­
million dollar, tax-funded killing campaigns. Park coyotes have
l^Michael Milstein, "Yellowstone's Top Dog," National Parks; p. 26.
l^John Alcock, "The Cost of Coyote Meat," Wilderness; Spring 1990, vol. 53, #188; p. 16.
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more stable communities and social structures and hunt in 
packs like wolves. This is probably the normal lifestyle for 
coyotes; not the solitary life coyotes in the west have adopted to 
survive the advancement of civilization.
Coyotes in Yellowstone could be exhibiting stable social behavior due to their
escape of the "tax-funded killing campaigns." They may also form packs in
Yellowstone in response to available food resources (namely large ungulates
and carrion). This could be a return for the coyote to hunting techniques used
prior to Euro-American settlement, when similar food resources were more
plentiful throughout the west. In either case, it is clear that human
encroachment in the United States, either through tax-funded killing
campaigns and/or large ungulate number depletions, has greatly impacted
coyote social behavior.
Yellowstone National Park research further clarifies that hunted coyote
populations not only increase reproduction, but also experience increased
dispersal by young coyotes. These dispersing coyotes take over vacated
territories and are inexperienced, do not have secured social status, hunt
alone, and may be more inclined to kill sheep — "a fast food.' l^
ADC's efforts are probably backfiring. The highest livestock predation
rates occur in the spring, when coyotes are most likely trying to feed pups, and
newborn sheep and calves are most available. Recent studies indicate that
severe culling results in increased litter sizes, and if coyotes are feeding larger
litters, pressure is greater on them to find food. This, in turn, probably creates
higher numbers of sheep losses from coyote predation. Maurice Homocker, a
renowned predator biologist, questions the program, stating:
 ̂̂ Michael Milstein, "Yellowstone’s Top Dog," National Parks, p. 26. 
l^ibid., p. 29.
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We know so little about them [coyotes], and yet we spent 
millions and millions of dollars trying to get rid of them; it's a 
complete fiasco. . . . the best control is no control at all; they will 
limit their own numbers if you just leave them alone.^O
By basing the ADC program on an old study without considering new
research, it is clear that the scientific justification for the program is not
comprehensive. Unfortunately, control efforts promise to continue at their
present rate unless public pressure forces the ADC program to change its
course of action.
It would be difficult to overlook that anger felt for the wolf has been 
transferred to the coyote in the contiguous United States. That the wolf and 
coyote are closely related species, considered by many to be "vermin, " viewed 
as eating off the fat of the land, and waging war against livestock owners 
ultimately has doomed these species to persecution. Once the wolf was 
exterminated, it appears Americans needed an alternative target upon which 
to project their fear, hatred and fury. Coyotes became that next target. Many 
Americans have exchanged the word coyote for wolf in the saying, "The only 
good wolf is a dead wolf!" One sheep herder echoed such a sentiment while 
commenting on the idea of administering contraceptives to control coyote 
populations rather than killing them when he said, "The only pill to give a 
coyote is one that will kill 'em deader than hell."2i
Lopez recognizes the connection between persecuted wolf and coyote 
and also suggests that perhaps as a people we should question our motives
20lbid., p. 29.
Michael Milstein, "A Federal Killing Machine Rolls On," High Country News; January 28, 
1991; Vol. 23, No. 1; p.l4.
27
and take a more profound responsibility for our startlingly oppressive actions 
which continue today toward these canids. He writes:
Incredibly, the unrestrained savagery that was once a part of wolf 
killing in the United States continues with efforts in America to 
control "brush wolves," or coyotes. These animals are hunted down by 
ranchers from helicopters with shotguns. Their dens are dynamited. 
Their mouths are wired shut and they are left to starve. They are 
strung up in trees and picked apart with pistol fire. They are doused 
with gasoline and ignited.
All this was done to the wolf — and more. One of the cowhand's 
favorite ruses was to stake out a dog in heat in hopes of attracting a 
male wolf. During a copulatory tie the animals cannot break apart.
Thus trapped, the wolf was clubbed to death.
It seems to me that somewhere in our history we should have 
attempted to answer to ourselves for all this.22
As Lopez suggests, Euro-Americans should question why it is that this
"unrestrained savagery" has gone on for centuries and continues today. The
acts described in this passage are acts of violence against wild canids. To
suggest that predator control programs are based primarily in science or are
grounded in rational thinking does not appear to be the case. It would be
difficult to justify or rationalize the behavior outlined above on scientific
grounds. The tradition of killing wolves began with a fear and hatred of
wolves, and can be traced as far back as the middle ages. This emotive and
violent approach has been transferred more recently to coyotes in the
contiguous United States, but continues on with wolves in Alaska.
Predator Control in Alaska
While extirpated throughout most of the contiguous United States, the 
wolf somehow survived in Alaska, due in part to Alaska's vastness and
22Barry Holstun Lopez, Of Wolves and Men. (New York, N.Y., Charles Scribner's and Sons, 
1978), p. 196.
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geographic location, the time-frame of its development as a state, its human 
population size and its primarily non-agricultural approach to the land. 
Nevertheless, anti-wolf and predator sentiment has spanned the miles 
between the two regions, connecting their approaches to predator control. 
During the early portion of the 20th century, prior to World War II, there was 
little if any government organized predator control in Alaska. However, 
wolves were viewed as competitors, and private individuals, such as miners 
and trappers, took it upon themselves to control wolves. The methods used 
during this time included the use of poisoned carcasses, trapping, shooting 
and denning. A ten dollar wolf bounty was passed by the Territorial 
Legislature in 1915, the same year Congress appropriated its first funding for 
predator control operations on federal lands. Biologist Victor Van 
Ballenberghe (1988) reported that Kenai Peninsula wolves were extirpated by 
1915. In addition he wrote, "Anecdotal reports suggest that wolves were 
scarce over much of Alaska by the 1920's. It is safe to say that they would 
have been gone had the country not been as vast as it w a s ." 2 3
Up until World War II, the Bureau of Biological Survey's wolf control 
efforts in Alaska primarily accompanied efforts to herd reindeer throughout 
portions of the state. An increase in the number of wolves occurred during 
World War II, but during the 1950's federal poison programs and aerial 
shooting over much of the state reduced wolf numbers a g a i n .2 4
For the decade between 1937 and 1947, the Camp Fire Club of America 
(CFCA), comprised of prominent biologists among others, strongly
23Victor Van Ballenberghe, "Wolf Management in Alaska: Are We At A Crossroads?", 
Institute of Northern Forestry, 201 East 9th Avenue, Suite 206, Anchorage, AK 99501; Paper 
Presented at the lUCN Wolf Specialists Group Species, Survival Commission Meeting, 
Fairbanks, AK, 12 August, 1988.
24ibid.
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encouraged that wolf control be initiated in Mt. McKinley National Park due 
to low Dali sheep (Ovis dalli) numbers. Apparently sheep numbers had 
declined since the mid 1920's, which biologists related to severe w in ters .2 5  
Unclear as to how they should respond, the National Park Service initiated 
Adolph Murie's study of park wolves, which lasted from 1939 to 1944. His 
study was profoundly influencing in that it was the first wolf study to actually 
look at the natural history and habits of the wolf, trying to ascertain a better 
understanding of this creature. Murie concluded that:
. . . First, it seems apparent that the wolf is the chief check on the 
increase of the Dali sheep in Mount McKinley National Park . . .  It 
appears that wolves prey mainly on the weak classes of sheep, that is, 
the old, the diseased, and the young in their first year. Such predation 
would seem to benefit the species over a long period of time and 
indicates a normal prey-predator adjustment in Mount McKinley 
National Park. . . The caribou is the main food of the wolf, and a heavy 
toll of the calves is taken. Yet the park herd of between 20,000 and 
30,000 animals is apparently maintaining its numbers. After the first 
few days in the life of the calves the hunting of them by wolves 
necessitates a chase which usually eliminates the slowest and weakest. 
Since the caribou and the wolf (and also the sheep and the wolf) have 
existed together for many centuries, it is not surprising that under 
wilderness conditions the two species are well adjusted to each other. 
The status of the caribou should be watched because the herds spend 
much time outside the park where they are in territory open to 
hunting. In respect to Üie sheep, the caribou is an important buffer 
species. . . In considering the wolf and the general ecological picture in 
Mount McKinley National Park it must be emphasized that national 
parks are a specialized type of land use. Wildlife policies suitable to 
national parks — areas dedicated to preserving samples of primitive 
America — obviously may differ from those applicable to lands 
devoted to other uses.26
25lou N. Carbyn ed.. Wolves in Canada and Alaska. Canadian Wildlife Service Rep. Ser. No. 
45, Ottawa, 1983,135p.; Samuel J. Harbo and Frederick C. Dean, "Historical and Current 
Perspectives on Wolf Management in Alaska," p. 51 - 64.
26Adolph Murie, The Wolves of Mount McKinley. (Washington, D C., United States 
Government Printing Office, 1944) p. 230 - 232.
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Because Murie did not make clear recommendations supporting or 
condemning wolf control, his study resulted in a flurry of controversy among 
park administrators. Pressure continued to mount regarding park wolf 
control when in 1946, a bill created by the CFCA, was introduced into 
Congress mandating control of wolves in Mount McKinley National Park. 
Though reluctant, the Park Service agreed to kill fifteen wolves, or fifty 
percent of the population during this time.
Organized federal control measures began to increase in the forties. In 
1948 the federal Branch of Predator and Rodent Control (BPRC), Alaska 
district, U.S.F.W.S., acquired a Super Cub airplane for the purpose of 
administering wolf control. This allowed for intensive aerial hunting and 
began a long history and controversial tradition of wildlife management for 
the state. "Operation Umiat" began in 1952, a program dedicated to killing 
wolves through aerial hunting and poison baits on the north slope of the 
Brooks Range. Teams with aircraft covered approximately 65,000 square 
miles, and in total, 259 of the 334 wolves counted were killed^^. National 
outcry brought attention to the state, and the debate over wolf control in 
Alaska was firmly set into motion. In 1953 the "coyote getter," a cyanide bait 
gun, was modified and standardized for summer wolf control.
Overall, the 1950's were marked by controversy over wolf control in 
Alaska. Public opinion began to recognize the benefits of wilderness, and 
attitudes toward wolves — a symbol of the wilderness — became much more 
favorable. The wolf bounty system — which accounted for $1.5 million by 
1958 — underwent scrutiny, though it was often rationalized as a source of
2^Lou N. Carbyn ed.. Wolves in Canada and Alaska. Canadian Wildlife Service Rep. Ser. No. 
45, Ottawa, 1983,135p.; Samuel J. Harbo and Frederick C. Dean, "Historical and Current 
Perspectives on Wolf Management in Alaska," p. 52.
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rural welfare. Many biologists began questioning the need for wolf reduction. 
The general understanding among BPRC officials was that predator-prey 
relationships were not well understood and wolf numbers were on the rise in 
Alaska, despite the wolf control which had been administered up to the 
present. Alaska's approach to wolf control up to this time had been scattered 
and indiscriminate, and an attempt was made to shift control toward specific 
situations. Alaska became its own state in 1959, and on January 1, 1960, the 
newly formed Alaska Department of Fish and Game took over predator 
management for the state.
Much remained unknown about Alaska's wildlife during the first half 
of this century, yet wolf control was pursued nevertheless. For example, it 
was in 1958 that biologists discovered where the calving ground of the 
Western Arctic Caribou herd was located, and there was little if any 
understanding of how wolves in the area affected the herd. Yet, more than 
1,500 wolves had been killed between the years of 1952 -1958 in Game 
Management Unit 26 (appendix 1.1) within the herds range. There are still 
many unanswered questions regarding multi-predator / multi-prey 
relationships in Alaska. For example, to this day there has never been a 
complete census done of wolves or bears in the state. Thus the Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game does not know exactly how many wolves or 
bears currently exist in the state, or, for comparison, how many existed 
twenty-five years ago. The closest current estimates of wolf populations in 
Alaska are between five and seven thousand.
During the 1960's and '70's Alaska witnessed a rise in human 
population, increase in road access and a growing number of hunters. In 
addition, the 70's introduced a new form of off-road, over-land, motorized
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travel — the all-terrain-vehicle (ATV) — which substantially increased access 
to wildlife, many believe improved access created by ATV's has adversely 
affected wildlife populations. Wildlife populations began to show signs of 
impact in the 1970's. For example, in Game Management Unit 20 (a Game 
Management Unit which is close to Fairbanks and accessible by road) the 
moose population occurred in such high density in the 1960's and was so 
difficult to access once off the road, that the Alaska Department of Fish and 
Game (ADF&G) moved to curtail control of wolves in the area. However this 
population declined in the early 1970's. By 1975, after severe winters and 
possible impacts from increased motorized access, the moose population 
declined such that the Board of Game (the governing body over the ADF&G) 
approved immediate wolf control for the area.
The Fairbanks Environmental Center, Friends of the Earth and several 
individuals filed suit in Alaska Superior Court, challenging the Board of 
Game's (BOG) action. This resulted in an injunction, and the control 
program was halted for that year.
The following year, the BOG approved ADF&G's plans to: 1) administer 
wolf control in Game Management Units (GMU) 20A and 5, and 2) remove 
wolves for predator-prey research in GMU 13. The research proposed for 
GMU 13 included eradicating all wolves within an 8000 sq. km. area (which 
ADF&G estimated would be approximately 45 wolves), and then compare the 
moose calf and yearling survival rate in that area with that in a neighboring 
area where wolves were present. The Board directed ADF&G to use fixed 
wing aircraft and helicopters for all three projects, and not remove more than 
80% of the wolf populations in GMU's 20A and 5. The objectives were to 
obtain a ratio of one wolf per 100 moose in both GMU's, because "moose
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populations with ratios of 1 wolf to 20 or fewer moose declined (ADF&G 1979, 
unpubl. issue paper 79-07). Thus the Board determined that a wolf/ moose 
ratio of 1:100 would surely yield an increase in moose. These actions 
heightened Alaska's wolf management controversy.
Defenders of Wildlife, a national environmental group, and other 
associated parties filed two suits over the proposed control and research 
programs in January, 1976. The first was against the Secretary of the Interior 
in US District Court for the District of Columbia (DC), requesting that an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was necessary before beginning wolf 
control on federal lands in GMU 20A, and that wolf control actions be 
suspended until further notice. The second suit was filed against ADF&G and 
several officials in District Court for Alaska, stating that an EIS was necessary 
for the proposed research in GMU 13, because the control efforts involved 
federally managed land by the Bureau of Land Management. The suit also 
requested an injunction. In both cases the courts ruled that ElS's were not 
necessary for wolf control action, but the plaintiffs were successful in stalling 
the programs until mid-March of that year, past the good tracking time for 
effective wolf control. The outcomes of these suits were significant in 
clarifying that: 1) the state does have authority and responsibility to manage 
wildlife on federal and other lands; 2) that Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) approval for wolf control programs on BLM managed land is not 
required (unless poison is used) due to a 1968 Memorandum of 
Understanding between the BLM and Alaska; and 3) that wolf control taking 
place on federal land does not by itself constitute a "federal action."
Efforts to squelch wolf control in Alaska in 1976 did not stop with 
litigation. Four bills were introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives
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during the summer. The bills directed the Secretary of the Interior to 
undertake a comprehensive study of Alaskan wolves to ensure humane 
treatment of them and their conservation, and to halt all large-scale killing 
and aerial hunting of wolves until the Secretary had completed his study and 
made recommendations. The proposed legislation also authorized Congress 
to appropriate $150,000 between 1977-79 toward this end. The bills, however, 
were never passed.^®
Between 1977 and 1987, many wolf reduction programs were proposed 
and implemented, and controversy continued to surround the issue. Fifty- 
five proposals came before the B.O.G. during this decade, thirty-five of which 
were approved. Nine lawsuits, complaints and appeals were filed by 
environmental groups and individuals in U.S District Court for D C., Alaska 
Superior Court and with the State Ombudsman in an effort to put a halt to 
the programs. In 1977, the State of Alaska and a native organization, 
Mauneluk Association, responded to one lawsuit, which had resulted in a 
temporary injunction and stopped wolf control on BLM lands, by filing suit 
against the Secretary of the Interior and Defenders of Wildlife et al. The state 
and Mauneluk Association claimed that the Secretary of the Interior had no 
authority to stop the control. The courts decided in favor of the state's actions 
in this and all but one other case, and these rulings reconfirmed that neither 
Environmental Assessments nor Environmental Impact Statements were 
necessary for state organized wolf control on federal lands.
The one case where the courts ruled against the state occurred in 1983. 
Those opposing wolf control experienced a brief hiatus when the state 
Ombudsman determined that wolf control policies approved by the B.O.G.
28 Ibid. p. 51 - 64.
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that year had not been established under the guidelines of the Alaska 
Administrative Procedures Act. Wolf control proposals for the 1983-4 year 
were therefore considered invalid, and were put on hold until a review of all 
reduction programs was underway.
In addition, seven bills were introduced into the Alaska State Legislature 
in 1985 and 1986. Six of the bills attempted to weaken existing restrictions on 
wolf reduction programs. The seventh bill proposed to prohibit aerial wolf 
hunting. Only one of the bills, which allowed moose and caribou baiting in 
trapping efforts (including aerial trapping), passed both houses of the 
legislature, but it never became law because it was vetoed by the Governor.
In 1987, newly elected Governor Cowper announced that no public 
monies would be spent on wolf control programs and that instead his 
administration would support wolf surveys. Between 1985-86 ADF&G spent 
over $40,000 to track and kill 32 wolves in GMU 20B,^  ̂and Governor Cowper 
indicated the state could not justify this type of use of funds. Wolf control 
was authorized by the B.O.G. in GMU 20B until 1989, but funding was no 
longer available. This meant that environmental groups and affiliated 
parties were successful to a point in their attempts to put an end to the state's 
wolf management methods. First, all the lawsuits filed resulted in enough 
delay of the wolf control programs to curtail much of the wolf killing, and 
second, the state — the Governor and wildlife officials — began to realize 
that a change needed to occur. Governor Cowper stated in an interview, that 
when wolves get killed, "there is a great howl from all over the place and 
there are 49 lawsuits filed and it turns out that we always back away. We say, 
okay we won't do it anymore and I just don't want to repeat that anymore . . .
29"Funding Stopped for Aerial Wolf Hunts," The Spirit, News from The Alaska Wildlife 
Alliance, March/April/May, 1987; Vol.6, No. 2; p .l.
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I've got enough things to attend to without having to become a party to 12 or 
15 lawsuits. . .
While the Governor’s action provided hope for change, the B.O.G. 
worked to dilute his intentions by approving large expansions of land-and- 
shoot hunting possibilities. This meant that private individuals were 
allowed greater access to killing wolves. The B.O.G.'s decision essentially 
instigated defacto wolf control through private hunting means. The Alaska 
Wildlife Alliance Newsletter reported on this expansion:
"As expected, the November, 1989 meeting of the Alaska Board of 
Game was indeed bad news for Alaska’s wolves. After overwhelming 
public testimony opposing the practice of land-and-shoot hunting of 
wolves, the Board expanded this method of "hunting ” to four new 
Game Management Units (it was previously legal in seven GMU's).
The additions include units 11, 12, 13 and 20, totaling approximately 
96.027 square miles! Most of interior and western Alaska is now open 
to land-and-shoot hunters . . . .  The Board also voted to allow 
"subsistence ” hunters to use aircraft to hunt wolves in National Park 
Preserves. As an indication of the change in the Board towards 
increased wolf killing (brought about by Governor Cowper’s recent 
appointments), the Board approved land-and-shoot wolf hunting in at 
least one area where even the Alaska Department of Fish and Game 
said it was not indicated!
. . . Public testimony revealed everything from the fact that land- 
and-shoot is impossible to do legally, to its being the only effective 
"tool ” to "control " wolves. It was repeatedly stated by the Board and 
the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) that land-and- 
shoot is an effective "tool" that must be used to keep wolf populations 
at low levels. One board member even endorsed land-and-shoot 
hunting as the best alternative available for controlling wolves, since 
Governor Cowper opposed state funds for wolf control programs! Yet 
while all its proponents readily admit it is a form of wolf control, land- 
and-shoot hunting is not governed by the same guideline regulations 
covering "official" wolf control programs.""3i
30lbid., p. 2.
31 "Alaska Board of Game Expands "Land-and-Shoot" Wolf Hunting!," The Spirit, News from 
The Alaska Wildlife Alliance, September - November, 1989; Vol. 8, No. 4; p. 1.
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State wolf estimates in 1989 indicated that approximately 75% of Alaska's wolf 
population inhabited the interior areas where land-and-shoot became legal. 
Liberalizing hunting in this manner is a form of population control, and 
though the ADF&G was not formally implementing wolf control programs, 
wolf reduction was still occurring through increased private hunting. The 
transfer from control programs to liberalized private hunting and back to 
control programs is one that occurs repeatedly in Alaska's predator 
management history. The end result is similar in that a large percentage of 
wolves are killed. It is different in that wolf control programs tend to target 
specific areas, where in private hunting wolves are killed indiscriminately.
Meanwhile, in October of 1989, the ADF&G presented a paper to the 
B.O.G. entitled "A Proposal to Develop a Strategic Wolf Management Plan for 
Alaska, " which intended to review and revise Alaska's approach to wolf 
management. ADF&G hoped to put an end to the extreme controversy over 
wolf management by suggesting the creation of a "Wolf Management 
Planning Team" made up of 10 -12 interested citizens. The team, constructed 
of representatives of all sides of the issue, was intended to work through a 
consensus process and make recommendations to the state about how to 
formulate a Strategic Wolf Management Plan. This attempt brought Alaska 
into the next phase of wolf management history.
Conclusion:
It seems evident when reviewing America's approach to wolves that a 
widespread, systematic attempt to extirpate this species has occurred. In some 
instances, such as in Alaska, attempts to radically suppress wolf populations
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continue, and certain individuals would no doubt like to eliminate them 
entirely. The justifications offered for Alaska's wolf control programs are to 
increase prey species for the benefit of human h u n t i n g . 3 2  The 1992 Alaska 
Wolf Management Plan is just another in a long line of acts motivated by this 
proclivity.
European-Americans' approach to wolves has and in some cases 
continues to be an example of a speciesist perspective, where prejudice and 
oppression relating to particular species or other natural phenomenon are on 
par with racism and sexism. Ethicist Deborah Slicer clarifies:
. . . speciesism is an irrational bias toward members of one's own 
species and against members of other species.^3
Certainly America has experienced an "irrational bias" toward humans and
against wolves.
Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Area Specific Wolf Management Plan for South 
Central/Interior Alaska, 1992, p. 9.
^^Karen J. Warren, ed., Hypatia, Special Issue, Spring 1991, Vol. 6, No. 1, Deborah Slicer, 
"Your Daughter or Your Dog? A Feminist Assessment of the Animal Research Issue," p. 110.
Appendix 1.1
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Map of Alaska's Game Management Units
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Appendix 1.2
Table of Alaskan Wolf M anagement Activities: 1976 -1988
(Compiled from information provided by: Harbo, Dean, "Historical and current perspectives on wolf 
management in Alaska;" Richardson, "Wolves in Alaska 1980 -1991;" and newsletters from The Alaska
Wildlife Alliance.)
Year Suits filed 
(favoring)
'76 - '77 1
'77-'78
Suits filed 
(opposed)
2
Bills intro'd Bills intro'd ADF&G 
(favoring) (opposed) Proposed
wolf control
areas
BOG Approved 
& Implemented 
wolf controP 
23; 24;
20A (exp.)
13; 20A
'78 - '79 13; 19A,B; 
20A; 21
'80 19A,B; 20A, 
B,C,D;21
'81 19A,B; 2GA, 
B,C,D; 21
'82 12; 20E; 22
'83
'84*
'85*
6
(4***)
8
12; 20A,B,E 
12;20B
'86 (2GB)*
(20B)*
'88 (20B)*
Total: 55
*  numbers in this column refer to Game Management Units where control was approved; 
FCC ordered ADF&G to stop using radio collars in control work; 
proposed by Advisory Committees;
Trapper Education began to enhance number of wolves trapped; 
proposed by Subsistence Resource Commissionfor Wrangell St. Elias National Park; 
authorized but lack of funds prohibits implementation of wolf control;
Governor Cowper pulls funds for wolf control;
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Chapter 2
ALASKA'S 1992 -1993 WOLF CONTROL CONTROVERSY
"You can't just let nature run wild!"
— Alaska Governor, Walter J. Hickel, 1992
Controversy regarding Alaska's wolves has existed since the early part of 
this century. Prior to Alaska's statehood, the federal government was 
responsible for managing Alaska's wildlife. Debate over wolves in the early 
1930's led the federal government to hire Adolph Murie in 1939 to study 
wolves and their impact on prey species in what was then Mt. McKinley 
National Park. In 1959, when Alaska officially became a state, the state took 
over control of its wildlife management.
THE STATE OF ALASKA'S WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Alaska's fish and wildlife management system prides itself as unique 
and unlike other states because it was set up specifically to provide the public 
access to influence fishing, hunting and trapping regulations. In 1960, when 
the state took over wildlife management from the federal government, the 
Alaskan public wanted to have a voice in management decisions. Today this 
intent continues with a system including a Board of Fisheries, Board of Game, 
Joint Board of Fisheries and Game, Commissioner of Fish and Game, 
Advisory Committees, and the Alaska Department of Fish and Game. These 
offices are charged by the Alaska Constitution, article VIII, Section 2, to ensure 
the "utilization, development and conservation" of resources "for maximum 
benefit " of the public. In 1975 the original, single Board of Fisheries and
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Game became two, separate boards, which still meet jointly to discuss changes 
in regulating advisory committees and subsistence related issues, or other 
mutual concerns.
The Board of Game (BOG) includes seven members who are appointed 
by the Governor for three year terms. These terms are staggered so as to 
provide continuity among the board primarily when state administrations 
change. Each board member must be confirmed by a joint session of the state 
legislature. The state believes that, "the strength of the board system is in its 
broad based public participation format. This forum allows for people with 
divergent views an opportunity to air their ideas about complex allocation 
and management problems before regulatory decisions are m a d e .
The Alaska Administrative Procedures Act mandates that the public be 
notified thirty days prior to any changes in regulations, and action can only be 
taken on topics that are noticed. The public is noticed by a summary of 
proposed Game Board action, and has the opportunity to comment both in 
written form prior to action and through oral testimony during scheduled 
public hearings ("Board Regulatory Process" flow chart. Appendix 2.1). Upon 
hearing and considering public testimony, the boards are responsible for 
making allocations and regulatory decisions. The boards fulfill their 
responsibility by deliberating and voting on proposed policies. The 
Department of Fish and Game must manage fish and wildlife resources based 
on the boards' decisions. The Commissioner is the ex-officio secretary of the 
boards, and the boards have authority to delegate to the Commissioner.
Advisory Committees are intended to provide local, public forums on 
fish and wildlife issues and are comprised of up to fifteen elected members of
“̂̂ State of Alaska, Board of Fisheries/Board of Game New Member Orientation, p. 15.
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the public. Advisory Committees are responsible for reporting opinions 
expressed during the forums to the boards at scheduled board meetings. 
Advisory Committees have distinct authority in certain areas, and have a 
working relationship with both the ADF&G and the Board of Game. For 
example. Advisory Committees can close a fishing, hunting, or trapping 
season if they deem it is necessary. Specific responsibilities of the Committees 
include developing regulatory proposals, evaluating proposed regulatory 
changes, and helping to develop regional management plans, among 
others.35 There are currently eighty Advisory Committees across the state 
with 900 to 1000 members.
THE ALASKA WOLF MANAGEMENT PLANNING TEAM
Since Governor Cowper's decision to halt state funded wolf control 
programs in 1987, Alaska was grid-locked over the issue of wolf management. 
During the years leading up to Cowper's decision, the state had spent a lot of 
energy and resources debating and implementing wolf control, and for many 
the subject was not just going to go away. There existed enough pressure 
from both sides of the issue — those pressuring the state for wolf control, and 
those opposing it and willing to file suits to fight it — that attempting to 
resolve some of the conflict outside of court appeared to be the best way to 
proceed. Discussions about wolf management between ADF&G and the 
Game Board ensued. Talk of forming a citizen's advisory group to resolve 
the wolf management conflict became a reality in 1989, when ADF&G began 
choosing individuals to form a Wolf Management Planning Team. Creating
Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Advisory Committee Manual, September 1993., p. 17.
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the Wolf Management Planning Team (WMPT) was an attempt on the part 
of the state to bring individuals from all sides of the issue together for 
discussion and a consensus-building process. A professional mediator was 
hired by the state to facilitate the meetings. The intent in forming this group 
was to finally resolve some critical issues surrounding wolf management, 
such as: is wolf control ever a legitimate management tool?; if so, when? The 
state's desired goal was to have the team come to some resolve over wolf 
management in the state, and for the team to make recommendations to 
ADF&G about how to manage wolves. The department intended to use the 
recommendations as guidelines for future wolf management. As stated in 
the Introduction to the WMPT recommendations:
The Alaska Wolf Management Planning Team was created in 
November 1990 to try to forge an agreement on new approaches to wolf 
management in the state. Representatives from both the State 
Department of Fish & Game and the State Board of Game indicated at 
the beginning of the process (and reaffirmed often) that it was their 
intent to draft policy, review and, as necessary, redraft regulations, 
based on the consensus recommendations of the team.
It took the ADF&G one year to appoint members to the Wolf Management
Planning Team, but by 1990 the team members were chosen. The Team
represented a broad spectrum of opinion on wolf management, and included:
Bob Ahgook (Eskimo subsistence hunter/ trapper,
Anaktuvuk Pass)
Scott Bothwell (Sportsman, member of the Alaska Outdoor
Council, Fairbanks)
Valerie Brown (Executive Director of The Alaska Wildlife
Alliance, Anchorage)
Dave Cline (Regional Vice President, National Audubon
Society, Anchorage)
Ray Collins (member of the McGrath Fish and Game
Advisory Committee and the Interior Regional 
Council, McGrath)
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Peggy Cowan (Education Specialist, Alaska Department of
Education, Juneau)
John Doore (Self-described "wolf enthusiast," Anchorage)
Robert Heyano (Native hunter and trapper, Dillingham)
Larry Holmes (Member of the Anchorage Fish and Game
Advisory Committee, Girdwood)
Chuck McMahan (Hunting Guide, hunter, trapper and pilot,
Glenallen)
Ann Ruggles (Independent wildlife biologist, Fairbanks)
Dean Wilson (Fur buyer and trapper. Copper Center)
Wayne Regelin (Deputy Director of Wildlife Conservation,
ADF&G Fairbanks)
Connie Lewis (Facilitator, Keystone Center)
The team met monthly between November 1990 and April 1991, for 
periods lasting up to two working days. Meetings involved presentations and 
discussions regarding history, biology, public attitudes and policy relating to 
wolves. Specifically they included:
1) an exhaustive review of information about wolf biology, 
predator/prey relationships, population dynamics, past control efforts, 
hunting and trapping statistics, etc., 2) respectful consideration of every 
team member's interests and concerns about wolf management, 3) 
development of findings, goals and principles 4) two public forums, 
and 5) wide ranging consideration of management o p t i o n s . ^ ^
After six months of formidable work the team reached consensus on enough
aspects of wolf management to make recommendations to the Department.
These recommendations came after many difficult compromises and
discussions among team members. Each member did not necessarily support
each recommendation. The recommendations incorporated many topics
regarding wolf management, including habitat conservation, enforcement,
nonconsumptive uses of wolves and their prey, consumptive use of wolves.
Alaska Wolf Management Planning Team Final Report," submitted to the Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game, June 3,1991, p. 1 - 2.
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operational management plans, wolf control in intensive management areas, 
research, inter-agency agreements, education and information exchange and 
public participation.
With regards to the actual killing of wolves for wolf population control, 
the team made specific recommendations. The Team suggested using a six 
zone management system to define types of management within a specific 
area. The zones were to range from total protection, where hunting, trapping 
and wolf control are not allowed, to a zone where the objective is to 
"maintain a high sustainable harvest of wolves and their prey," where 
wolves can be controlled by hunting, trapping, "land and shoot" hunting, and 
aerial shooting by the public and ADF&G.
As is currently set up, Alaska's wildlife management system utilizes 
Game Management Units (GMU's) which break the state up into different 
management areas (please refer to GMU map, appendix 1.1). Some of these 
areas span large tracts of land; for example, GMU 13 comprises 23,376 square 
miles, approximately the size of the state of West Virginia. The WMPT 
recommendations suggested assigning different zones to Game Management 
Units to determine management within these GMU's (please refer to WMPT 
zone recommendations, appendix 2.2). More specifically, critical delineations 
relating to the killing of wolves in the recommendations included the 
following language:
CONSUMPTIVE USE OF WOLVES
. . . Population goals will be set for game management units or subunits 
through operational management plans that consider all relative 
biological factors.. .  .Wolves can be subjected to control when it is 
needed, under the criteria and methods described in section IV. F of 
this report. These intensive management areas should be no larger 
than absolutely essential to achieve specific management objectives as 
specified in operational management plans. Wolf control is not
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intended to be a common practice. The team recommends that 
intensive management designations will be established only in a small 
portion of most game management units. (Section D, E)
Thus, the Team agreed that there were times when wolf control might be
appropriate, but that implementation of such an act should be in restricted
and specific areas, and only for a short period of time. Wolf control was not
acceptable as a regular management tool according to the team.
HOW THE STATE INCORPORATED THE PLANNING TEAM’S 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Once the WMPT made recommendations, the state identified the 
following succession of events as its intended course of action:
1. Disband the WMPT after its final recommendations are submitted 
to the ADF&G (June, 1991);
2. Create a Strategic Wolf Management Plan which indicates the 
overall guidelines and intent for wolf management in Alaska;
3. Once the Strategic Wolf Management Plan is adopted by the Game 
Board, The ADF&G breaks down the state into areas and constructs 
"Area Specific Wolf Management Plans."
4. The ADF&G devises "Implementation Plans" for areas where wolf 
control is "needed to achieve management objectives."^^
While on the surface the role of the planning team may have seemed 
clear, many details of the process were not carefully worked out. For example, 
mixed messages were sent out by the ADF&G from the start about what the 
specific role of the Team would be and how the ADF&G would incorporate 
their recommendations. In a letter sent out to interested parties soliciting 
nominations for team members, the Department indicated that one of the 
objectives of the Team would be, "To recommend specific management
Alaska's Wolves How to Manage for the 90s ," Supplement to Alaska's Wildlife, Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife Conservation, January - February 1992, p. 
13.
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options for ensuring the long-term conservation of wolves in Alaska and for 
satisfying the greatest variety of public desires for wolf management in the 
state" (emphasis added). Additionally, the minutes of the first Team meeting 
stated:
. . . the planning team will make recommendations that the 
[Department] will use to develop a statewide wolf management plan 
and will make proposals to the Board of Game to change hunting and 
trapping regulations related to w o lv e s .^ s
Yet ultimately, ADF&G chose to limit the objective of the team to,
"developing broad recommendations, which they then turned over to the
department to "pick and choose from" in developing the agency's plan.
However, this is a fundamental difference between traditional advisory
committees and consensus processes. As discussed above, a consensus
agreement is not a smorgasbord. It is a house of cards that must either be
taken as a package or rearranged with extreme care."^^
The decision to limit the team to broad recommendations was reached
because the Department acknowledged that considering the team
recommendations as anything more than just advice would compromise
their authority as an a g e n c y W h a t  this meant in the end was that the Team
would make general recommendations which the Department would
consider and ultimately determine which, if any, of the recommendations to
use. Because the recommendations were general as opposed to specific, the
Department was also left with the job of "interpreting" the recommendations
38state of Alaska, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Wolf Management Planning Team 
Minutes, Nov. 14-15,1990, p. 1.
% usan Todd, Designing Effective Negotiating Teams for Environmental Disputes: An Analysis 
of Three Wolf Management Plans”, Doctoral Dissertation, Natural Resource and Environment, 
University of Michigan, 1995, p. 194.
40jbid. p. 131.
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and incorporating them as it saw tit into spedtic management objectives.
This afforded ADF&G considerable latitude with their interpretations.^^
Strategic Wolf Management Plan
In November, 1991 the Game Board met to deliberate and vote on a 
Strategic Wolf Management Plan drawn up by the ADF&G. The Board 
adopted a zonal management system as the Planning Team had 
recommended, but changed it to a seven zone management system. Wolf 
control was possible in three of the seven zones outlined by the Game Board 
(please refer to State Adopted Zone System, appendix 2.3).
One critical action the Department and Board took was to further define 
different types of wolf control to be used, namely "wolf regulation" and "wolf 
reduction." This action was not based on the Team's recommendations. 
"Regulation," as stated in the adopted Strategic Plan means, "maintaining the 
number of wolves in an area at a moderate size below what the prey could 
support without intervention, either through regular or temporary 
measures." In order to maintain wolf populations below their natural levels, 
wolf control would have to occur, by definition, over a prolonged period of 
time. This approach is not in keeping with the WMPT recommendations, 
which specified that wolf control was not "intended to be a common 
practice." The second approach to control defined in the Strategic Wolf 
Management Plan is "wolf population reduction. " "Wolf population 
reduction" is defined as, "temporarily reducing the number of wolves to a 
lower level to allow a prey population to grow to objective levels." 
Differentiating between these two approaches to wolf control and
41lbid. p. 195.
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incorporating both of them as acceptable approaches in the Strategic Wolf 
Management Plan was a significant turning point away from the 
recommendations of the WMPT. Ultimately this decision may well have led 
to the demise of the Department's plans.
Governor Hickel's Administration
Critics of wildlife management and wolf control in Alaska have long 
held that the state's management system is biased toward people favoring 
wolf control for the benefit of human hunting. For example, many have 
suggested that Advisory Committee and Game Board members should be 
restructured so as to more fairly represent all interests in wildlife 
management. The WMPT recognized this as an issue and recommended that 
for improved public participation it may be appropriate to restructure 
Advisory Committees so that they are "more representative of local user 
groups and g e o g r a p h y .  "42 The following are quotes from two former 
Advisory Committee members discussing inadequacies and biased 
representation on Advisory Committees:
Gina Soltis, Middle Nenana River Advisory Committee 
Member, Testifying at the Board of Game meeting, 11/92:
It has become very obvious that not only the committees but the state 
views those committees as being representative of the citizens of an 
area. And they do not represent the citizens of an area. The citizens of 
the area view the committees as a group of hunters regulating 
themselves. Non-hunters don't go to the meetings. So when you take 
the opinions of the committees and think that you're getting an 
accurate reflection of the people in the area, well it's just plain wrong.43
42gtate of Alaska, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Wolf Management Planning Team 
Minutes, Nov. 14-15,1990, p. 12.
4%oard of Game Meeting, Fairbanks, Public Testimony, Tape 20B, November 9-19,1992
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Jan St. Peters, Healy Alaska, former member of the Cantwell Advisory 
Committee, Testifying at the Board of Game meeting, 11/92:
My experience certainly was a very intimidating one. I am a little 
thicker and hard skinned now than I was then, but after three or four 
meetings of really being harassed and insulted, I chose not to attend 
any more of the meetings. I will say that the leader of that group was 
very supportive, but none of the other people on the advisory 
committee was. I can say that in hindsight and with my experience 
now, I wouldn't let it bother me, like I did then, but I think people feel 
pretty intimidated being a part of that process when the people that are 
on those committees represent just one group of people or one interest, 
and sometimes make it very uncomfortable for people who feel 
another way to be part of that process. And then it was frustrating for 
me too, a couple years ago, when so much testimony at the hearings 
here overwhelmingly were opposed to aerial control hunting of 
wolves. And then the decision of the then board, it wasn't the same as 
here, said well we realize that the public testimony went very strongly 
one way, which was against it both in Fairbanks and Anchorage, but we 
want to weigh heavily the information that we got from the local 
advisory boards. And having been a part of that process for a short 
amount of time, and seeing how that worked, I felt very discouraged 
that the public testimony played such a little role at that time of tiie 
board's decision to make decisions concerning wolves.^^
Roger Huntington, one of the board members listening to the above 
testimony admitted that, at times, he too had problems with the overall 
makeup of the advisory co m m itte e s .4 5  The same bias also exists, however, 
within the Board of Game, and many environmental groups, members of the 
public and tourism industry have gone on record stating this critique. Dave 
Lacey, an individual involved in tourism and rural economic development 
on the Yukon river, stated while testifying against wolf control to the Board 
of Game in November, 1992:
■*̂ Board of Game Meeting, Fairbanks, Public Testimony, Tape 21A, November 9-19,1992 
^%oard of Game Meeting, Fairbanks, Public Testimony, Tape 20B, November 9-19,1992.
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I understand from a historical and even a present day standpoint that 
the board has been dominated by sport and commercial interests, and I 
would hope that you would take that into account.^^
The Alaska Wilderness Recreation and Tourism Association officially
recommended that the Board of Game should, "be better balanced through
the inclusion of board members who represent non-consumptive users of
wildlife. . . ," during the Wolf Summit in January, 1993.
The Board's literature, "Board of Fisheries/Board of Game New Member
Orientation" states:
In the United States we all expect that public policy decisions will be 
"fair," and that our views will be taken into account. This is a 
fundamental tenet of government in this country. We expect and 
demand that our government officials hear us out, take us seriously, 
and treat our concerns fairly.
These expectations are even more intense when the issues are related 
to common property resources like fish and wildlife. The lay board 
system with its advisory committees and extensive public hearing 
process provides the kind of framework where such expectations stand 
a better than average chance of being met.
. . . Although Alaska's regulatory system offers an extremely accessible 
forum, the effectiveness of this forum can only be assured if the public 
views board members as unbiased and fair. Board members are 
appointed by the governor to serve every member of the public.
Political appointments often bear controversy, and, of course, the overall
make-up of the Advisory Committees and Game Board influences the
outcome of the votes. During the 1992 wolf controversy, many members of
the public did not view the Board of Game as "unbiased " or "fair," and this
situation has not changed to date.
During the time the WMPT's work was underway, there was a change in
state administration. The inception of the WMPT occurred under Democrat
'^^Board of Game Meeting, Fairbanks, Public Testimony, Tape 19B, November 9-19,1992
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Governor Cowper's administration, and mid-way through the Team process. 
Independence Party candidate, Walter J. Hickel, was elected Governor. Hickel 
was well known to the state and came to office with an aggressive "pro- 
development’ reputation. He had already served as Republican Governor of 
Alaska in the early 70's, when the Alaska pipeline was created, and went on 
to Washington to fulfill the role of Secretary of the Interior during Nixon's 
presidency. When Governor Hickel took office in 1991, his appointments to 
wildlife posts were very controversial. To many, Hickel's appointments 
seemed to take wildlife management back in time. For example, Hickel 
appointed one of the most visibly extreme wolf control advocates in the state 
as Director of ADF&G's Division of Wildlife Conservation, Mr. Dave 
Kelleyhouse. For many who had been involved in the wolf control debate, 
the delicate, consensus-based maneuverings of the Wolf Management 
Planning Team seemed all but over when Kelleyhouse became the state's 
Director of Wildlife Conservation. Greenpeace Alaska spokeswoman, Cindy 
Lowry, stated in response to his appointment in 1992:
It's our worst nightmare come true. It's pretty unbelievable. It 
certainly doesn't bode well for wolves. It seems to me it's like 
declaring war on w o lv e s .
Commissioner Carl Rosier indicated Kelleyhouse had been appointed because
of his keen "enthusiasm" and "drive" for intensive wildlife management.^®
Kelleyhouse's widely known nickname in the state is "Machine-Gun
Kelleyhouse. " He acquired this nickname when he was a field biologist for
the department after he made an attempt to purchase a machine gun for
aerial wolf control work near Tok in 1981. His superiors approved his plan.
^^"Wolf-hunt advocate takes wildlife post," Anchorage Daily News. 5 April, 1991, p. C-1.
4®"Aerial wolf-hunting proponent named wildlife conservation chief," The Anchorage Times. 5 
April, 1991, p. B-8.
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but once news of the purchase leaked to the press, then Commissioner, Ron 
Skoog, cancelled the purchase.
Controversy flared around Kelleyhouse again in 1987, when the Game 
Board attempted to remove Kelleyhouse from his position as ADF&G area 
biologist after he published an article in the Tok newspaper. The article 
discussed raw and unpublished data from research done by ADF&G and the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service on wolf/prey relations. In his article, 
Kelleyhouse extrapolated the number of prey killed by wolves counted from 
one month's research to reflect the number killed over the entire winter, and 
suggested that up to 3,000 moose and caribou could have been killed by 
wolves near Tok. He compared this number to the 400 moose and caribou 
taken by human hunters, so as to suggest a disproportionate number of prey 
taken by wolves. Kelleyhouse's article sparked much debate. Many thought 
it was an attempt to stir up controversy over wolves with the intent of getting 
residents and advisory committees to propose wolf control in the area. It was 
described as "inflammatory " by U.S. Forest Service biologist and Game Board 
member, Victor Van Ballenberghe.^^ Lew Pamplin, then Director of Wildlife 
Conservation, stated:
My response to that article was that I read that article and tossed it in 
the trash can. It's not good science .. . The data isn't a question. It's a 
question of how the data was used.^o
Board member and wildlife cinematographer, Joel Bennett, responded to the
situation:
^^"Board of game meets privately," Anchorage Daily News. 28 November, 1987, p. A-1. 
SOlbid.
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If I was commissioner, I would know what I would have done with 
Kelleyhouse. 1 would have fired him seven years ago. . . .  He lives and 
breathes predator control.^i
Those who opposed past wolf control programs by the state were concerned
that the relationship between the WMPT and the department would change
with Kelleyhouse's appointment. When questioned about this, Kelleyhouse
suggested he would consider recommendations before suggesting any plans.
In addition he stated:
We'll always have to manage wolves as we would any species. We re 
not living in a park.^2
AREA SFECinC WOLF MANAGEMENT PLAN
Once the Strategic Wolf Management Plan was adopted by the BOG, 
ADF&G set to work out management plans for specific regions of Alaska.
The first areas they concentrated on were the southcentral and interior 
regions of the state. When ADF&G published a second draft "Area Specific 
Wolf Management Plan for South Central / Interior Alaska" in the summer of 
1992, it seemed clear that Hickel's new administration was headed back to 
large scale wolf control programs, and that the attempt to create a plan that 
"everyone could live with" had been undermined. The first draft of this plan 
was adopted by the board in March, 1992. Briefly what the drafts proposed was 
to implement wolf control in three large geographic areas known as the 
Nelchina, the Tanana Foothills and the Upper Tanana / Fortymile areas. The 
following is an overview of what the Department proposed:
"Wolf -hunt advocate takes wildlife post," Anchorage Daily News. 5 April, 1991, p. C-3 
52"Aerial wolf-hunting proponent named wildlife conservation chief," The Anchorage Times. 5 
April, 1991, p. B-8.
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1) Nelchina area (GMU 13A,B,C,D and E):
Historically the Nelchina area (GMU 13) has been a popular hunting 
place in Alaska due to its accessibility from both Anchorage and Fairbanks, 
the two largest population centers in Alaska. It is the largest of the three areas 
targeted for control, spanning 23,376 square miles (as stated earlier, close to 
the size of West Virginia). GMU 13 reaches north/south from the Alaska to 
the Chugach mountain ranges, and east/ west from the Richardson Highway 
(adjacent to Wrangell St. Elias National Park) to the Parks Highway, which 
transects Denali State Park and borders Denali National Park. In 1992 the 
Nelchina caribou herd's population was estimated to be approximately 45,000, 
a level ADF&G biologists considered to be the carrying capacity of the habitat, 
and one which exceeded their population objectives. Their intent was to 
reduce the caribou population by 5,000 through annual harvests. In addition, 
the moose population included 22,000 moose (an overall density of .9 moose 
per square mile), which the plan stated was "a relatively high-density moose 
population for interior habitats. spite of these documented, healthy and
plentiful ungulate populations in the area, the Department proposed to 
decrease the wolf population, from an estimated 223 to between 150 - 200 
wolves, using the "wolf population regulation" method. The Department 
proposed the regulation be done through public "land and shoot " hunting 
and regular hunting and trapping methods.
2) Tanana Flats (GMU 20A):
Including approximately 10,000 square miles, the Tanana Flats area lies 
adjacent to Fairbanks and Denali National Park and Preserve. It is considered
^^Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife Conservation, Area Specific 
Wolf Management Plan for South Central /  Interior Alaska, Draft Plan, p. 15.
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to be one of "the most important areas for use of wildlife in Interior Alaska 
and has a history of high consumptive use of moose, caribou and sheep by the 
p u b l i c . " 5 4  G M U  20A is used extensively by residents of Fairbanks and non­
resident hunters, and therefore has been considered to be a non-subsistence 
use area by the Joint Boards. Justification for intensive management in this 
area is to attempt to produce high ungulate numbers for Fairbanks resident 
and non-resident hunters, so that pressure and conflict with subsistence users 
in other portions of Alaska can be reduced.
The plan under consideration for GMU 20A proposed the following:
a) To increase and maintain the caribou population from its 1992 estimated 
level of 5500 - 6500 at a midsummer population of 7000 - 9000;
b) To increase and maintain the moose population from its 1992 estimated 
level of 5500 - 6500 at an early winter population of 11,000 -15,000;
c) To increase and maintain the Dali sheep population from its 1992 
estimated level of 2000 - 4000 at a mid-summer population of 4000 - 6000.
The 1992 estimated wolf population in the area was 131 - 165, and, 
according to the plan adopted by the Game Board, the Department could not 
reduce late winter wolf numbers below 45. As stated in the BOG findings:
A) for up to 3 years beginning January 1, 1993, the commissioner may 
reduce the wolf population; however, the commissioner may not 
reduce the late winter population within the control area to below 45 
wolves; and
B) Department personnel may take wolves by trapping, snaring, and 
shooting, including shooting from aircraft between October 1 and April 
30.55
3) Upper Tanana/Fortymile Area (GMU 12, 20B, D and E):
54pindings of the Board of Game, No. 92 - 62 - BOG, November, 1992, p. 23.
55lbid., p. 21-22.
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The Upper Tanana/Fortymile Area is situated in the eastern portion of 
the Interior management area, and borders Canada on its eastern side. It 
includes approximately 9,700 square miles. The main impetus behind 
proposing wolf control in this area was to attempt to restore the Fortymile 
caribou herd (FCH). Population estimates suggest that this herd once 
numbered ~ 500,000 animals, and due to over harvesting by past generations 
and other environmental factors the herd was reduced to < 6,000 in the mid- 
1970's. Conservative harvest management increased the herd size during the 
past two decades, and the 1992 population estimate was 20,000 - 22,000.
The proposed management objectives for this area included:
a) To restore the (FCH) to a population of 60,000 by the year 2000;
b) To increase and maintain the early winter moose population from its 
current estimated level of 3400 - 4000 to 9,000 -10,000;
c) To reduce wolf numbers from their current estimated population of 180 - 
225 to between 40 - 70, and maintain this level for five years between 1993 - 
1998. Control was to be implemented by Department personnel by "trapping, 
snaring, and shooting, including shooting from aircraft between October 1 
and April 30, during the term of the p r o g r a m . ^ 6
The Area Specific Management plan differed significantly from the 
recommendations of the Wolf Management Planning Team in the following
ways:
1) The Planning Team recommended that intensive management 
designations would be established only in a small portion of most GMU's and 
that wolf control would not be a common practice. Yet the Department
56lbid., p. 28.
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proposed intensive management areas for entire management units in 
addition to adjacent units:
With regards to zoning, the Area Specific Plan differed radically from the 
recommendations of the Planning Team in that the majority of GMU's zoned 
for wolf control did not have small, specific areas destined for control.
Instead, entire GMU's were zoned for control and in some cases, sections of 
other GMU's were added on to make the control areas larger than the 
parameters of single GMU's (please see map as it appeared in the Area 
Specific Management Plan for South Central / Interior Alaska, appendix 2.4 
and 2.5). In the plan, the majority of the 108,000 sq. mile planning area was 
zoned 5, 6, or 7, where wolf control could take place. Within the proposed 
control areas, the plan prioritized GMU's targeted for wolf control within the 
coming year, which included GMU's 13A, B, C, D, and E (Nelchina Caribou 
area), 20A (Tanana Foothills) and parts of units 12, 20B, D and E (Upper 
Tanana/Fortymile area). These areas combined to total approximately 43,000 
square miles.
2) The Department proposed using wolf control as a regular management 
tool within the largest area targeted for control:
The Department proposed using wolf control as a regular management 
tool by allowing the public to take wolves by the "land and shoot" method, 
and through regular hunting and trapping methods. As proposed, the 
program would be authorized for a five-year term, and then would be subject 
to reauthorization. Thus the Department intended to maintain the wolf 
population below a level the prey base could otherwise support over a five 
year period or longer. This proposal seemed to be in direct conflict with what
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the Planning Team had recommended, which was that "wolf control is not 
intended to be a common practice."
At this stage in the process it seemed clear that Director of Wildlife 
Conservation, Kelleyhouse, was pointing predator management back in time 
— back to when large scale wolf control programs were a routine wildlife 
management tool. Fury was added to the fire! by the fact that ADF&G had 
radio-collared wolves in the proposed control areas during the winter of '91- 
92, and the Department intended to use radio telemetry to locate packs for the 
control work. When interviewed by an Anchorage Daily News reporter, 
Fairbanks regional supervisor of the Division of Wildlife Conservation stated 
there were two purposes for the collaring:
One was to gather additional information on the wolves' movement 
and behavior patterns so we could put the best possible information 
forward to the board for their decision. The other was to have those 
collars on the wolves so that if the board did authorize we could 
conduct the program as best as possib le.^ ^
Needless to say, those opposed to the type of control programs historically
implemented in Alaska were stunned that after the new planning process,
involving a consensus building approach, the state was again confronting the
same kind of wolf control it had battled for the past decades. Those opposed
to past control attempts and who had participated in the Wolf Management
Planning Team felt there worst nightmare had come true. In a letter to
Governor Hickel urging the Governor to intercede in the wolf plan. Regional
Vice President for National Audubon Society, David Cline wrote:
^^"Collars will make the wolf-killing easy," Anchorage Daily News. 25 November, 1992, p. A-
1 .
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. . . After having worked very hard with eleven other Alaskans on the 
State's "Wolf Management Planning Team," I'm appalled at what I see 
a few department hardliners and their limited public supporters trying 
to accomplish. The planning team's principle aim was "to get past the 
controversy (wolf control) and develop a plan everyone can live with. " 
While none of the planning team members were completely satisfied 
with the planning process for wolf management, all agreed that 
everyone should win something. But given what ADF&G is now 
proposing for wolves, I can't see that conservationists got anything. In 
fact, we now have less to show for our cooperative efforts in wolf 
conservation than before the planning team sat down at the 
negotiating table!
The zonal concept to wolf management that several members of the 
team, including myself, reluctantly agreed to, ranged from Zone 1 (full 
wolf protection) to Zone 6 (intensive wolf management). The team 
agreed that ADF&G should seek balance between the extent of the 
zones, and that intensive, ongoing wolf control would never be 
justified over broad geographic areas as an ongoing management 
practice. ADF&G's response to these and other recommendations is to 
essentially ignore them. Not only are their zone I's hard to find on a 
map, but by some accounts not a single wolf pack in the state will be 
protected from being killed by hunting, trapping or wolf control! This 
even applies to wolf packs in Denali National Park that range beyond 
park boundaries. Meanwhile, ADF&G has added a seventh zone and is 
now requesting authorization from the Board of Game to conduct 
ongoing intensive management, including aerial wolf control, over 
vast areas of southcentral and interior Alaska.
By throwing out the planning team's many sensible recommendations, 
department extremists have betrayed the consensus building process 
designed by their own department. They are now making a mockery of 
the public process on this controversial issue by essentially deciding to 
reinstate aerial wolf control before the process currently underway is 
completed. They are also jeopardizing the credibility of the wildlife 
profession and ADF&G by attempting to manipulate the public with 
misleading information. . . .̂ 8
Thus began the controversy which dominated the media between November,
1992 and March, 1993, and led to a tourism boycott of the state.
^^David Cline, Regional Vice President, National Audubon Society, Letter written to Governor 
Walter J. Hickel, 30 October, 1992.
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THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC:
By the time the Area Specific Management Plan came before the board 
for a vote, five out of seven Game Board members had been appointed by 
Governor Hickel. They included: Richard Burley, Fairbanks (Chairman), 
Roger Huntington, Galena; A1 Franzman, Soldotna; Jack Didrickson, Palmer; 
and Ken Johns, Copper Center. Many felt Hickel's board appointments were 
one sided, representing only hunting interests in the state. They proved this 
to be true when all of Hickel's appointees voted in favor of the three 
proposed control programs. Only one member of the board. Skip Wallen, 
who was appointed by former Democratic Governor Cowper, did not vote to 
pass the Department's preferred options in the Area Specific Management 
Plan. The following quotes from the Chairman of the Board indicate his 
contentment with the plan:
Dick Burley Re: Implementation Plan, GMU 13, lll9 2  
. . .  I think that we were able to draft a Strategic Management Plan with 
the idea that it was going to protect the values of a lot of people.. . .  
We've received an awful lot of written testimony, written comments. 
We've sat through several days of public testimony, listening to the 
public trying to find out what they wanted, which way they wanted the 
board to go. Not being surprised by the diversity of that public 
testimony, I think the board tried to be responsive to that testimony 
when we did finally adopt the Area Specific plans. And we tried to 
accommodate that wide range for the public. . . . We now have before 
us an implementation plan for unit 13, which involves probably one of 
the most controversial issues that will come before this board, and 
that's public participation in land and shoot. While I know it's 
distasteful for many people, I also realize that it is a way for the public 
to participate in utilizing the resource.. . . But this is a way for some 
people to harvest some wolves, which is allowed under the Strategic 
Plan that we adopted. And in order for the department to authorize 
that continued harvest by the public with land and shoot, we 
incorporated into our proposal some factors that the department has to 
consider each year to continue authorizing that. They established some 
parameters for minimum wolf populations in subunits of unit 13.
They established prey populations. They established prey/calf
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recruitment rates, and then they established the fact that they were 
going to evaluate the winter severity index.. . .  I believe all of these 
things together will help ensure that the department is managing the 
resources for the people of Alaska and the people of the entire nation. 
While some of them might disagree with the way things are done, 1 
believe that it’s been responsive of the department to come before the 
board with an aggressive management plan for unit 13. . .  . And as we 
vote on this proposal, I am going to vote in support of it. And I'm 
going to vote in support of it because land and shoot in unit 13 is not 
new. It's something that has been going on for years. And it has 
showed that through that method, the public has been able to keep the 
predator level at a desired level — a level which I feel comfortable 
with in this implementation plan.
Dick Burley's quote speaks to two of the most critical complaints of those who 
opposed previous state control programs and the proposed Area Specific Wolf 
Management Plan. The first is that Burley admitted in his quote that "land 
and shoot " has been a common practice in GMU 13 for years, and therefore he 
is in favor of returning to that method of hunting to regulate wolf numbers. 
In other words, the Area Specific Wolf Management Plan did not offer a new 
and progressive wolf plan — something that all interested parties could live 
with — based on the work of the Wolf Management Planning Team. Rather, 
it proposed to turn back the clock and reinstate control programs similar to 
those historically implemented by the state. Returning to a "business as 
usual " wolf control program was not in keeping with the Planning Team 
recommendations. It missed the whole point of the consensus building 
exercise and purpose of the planning team.
The second contentious point in the wolf control debate was that Burley 
stated the Department and Board took all of the public's concerns into 
consideration when passing the plans. Others disagreed. There was an 
enormous amount of opposition to the plan from both Alaskans and those 
from out of state. For example, four to six weeks before the board met, the
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Division of Tourism was notified by numerous individuals and groups 
stating they would cancel their trips to Alaska if the state went ahead with the 
proposed wolf control plans. In addition, written comments from both in 
and out of state sent to the Board of Game were overwhelmingly opposed to 
the proposed wolf control.
In October of 1992, The Alaska Wildlife Alliance and Wolf Haven 
International commissioned Dittman Research Corporation, a reputable 
polling company in Anchorage, to survey the Alaskan public regarding its 
views on wolf control. The survey reflected the interests of 641 rural (defined 
as inaccessible by road) and urban residents from all over the state, of which 
34% had hunted big game during the previous five years. The survey results 
indicated the Alaskan public overwhelmingly opposed the type of control 
program proposed by the state.
The results reflected that 66% of Alaskans were opposed to the public 
shooting wolves from the air through land-and-shoot hunting practices, and 
74% of the public opposed state agency personnel shooting wolves from 
helicopters and airplanes. Only 8% of the overall population and 10% of the 
hunters surveyed supported an increase of the current levels of wolf kills per 
year. Over 1,000 out of an estimated 6,000 - 7,000 wolves are killed annually 
through regular hunting and trapping methods. The majority of Alaskans 
favored a decrease in the amount of wolves killed per year. A strong majority 
of the public — including a clear majority of hunters — did not believe that 
reducing wolf numbers would result in more moose and caribou for hunting. 
The results were consistent across the state. A later survey completed by the 
Alaska Visitors Association found similar results to be true among Alaska's 
public.
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During public testimony at the November Board of Game hearing, a 
letter was circulated to the Game Board that had been signed by seven state 
and national environmental groups opposing all three control plans. Also, 
petitions with signatures of over 6,000 citizens opposing the plan were 
submitted to the Board. There were no petitions in favor of wolf control.
The petitions opposing control were submitted by myself, representing The 
Alaska Wildlife Alliance, and Melodie Bankers, a lawyer and board member 
for Wolf Haven International, testifying on behalf of Wolf Haven 
International, Defenders of Wildlife, Sierra Club, and an Alaskan group. The 
Southeast Alaska Conservation Council (SEACC). Bankers testimony 
challenged Chairman Burley's words regarding public representation. She 
addressed many of the common complaints about the Area Specific plan, and 
emphasized that the board did not take the overall public into consideration, 
but rather catered to a minority interest group. She stated in her testimony;
The combined membership of these [those that she represents] 
organizations exceeds half a million. I'm here to testify on behalf of 
nonconsumptive users as well as hunters who are members of our 
organizations. Petitions have been submitted to the Alaska 
Department. These petitions were signed throughout the United States 
in a limited period of two days and this many were signed only in the 
Tacoma area. In addition, petitions have been signed and submitted to 
you at a meeting of the gathering of original peoples of central, north 
and south America at a pow-wow recently. All of these petitions 
recognize that we are tourists and we come to Alaska and spend our 
tourist dollars here. The issue of wolf control as you're aware is highly 
emotional and deeply divisive. . . . We in the environmental 
community have not changed our minds about wolf control. Most of 
us continue to vehemently oppose state sponsored aerial wolf control 
programs. We do however want to make it clear that we are not 
opposing normal ground trapping and hunting of wolves in Alaska. 
Especially when these activities relate to the legitimate needs of 
customary and traditional subsistence users. What we see now in this 
Area Specific Management Plan is anything but the spirit of give and 
take. The Alaska Department of Fish and Game has attempted to
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interpret and manipulate the team’s recommendations to their own 
advantages specifically to more extensively control wolf populations in 
Alaska under the guise of sound wildlife management.. . . 1 
recommend to you that you remember that tourism is an important 
industry for the economy of Alaska. The opportunity for a chance 
encounter with a wild wolf is clearly among the reasons we come to 
Alaska and spend our money in this state rather than somewhere else. 
. . .  In conclusion, if the plans are not amended before adoption to 
eliminate land and shoot aerial gunning, do not take a broader 
ecosystem protection approach, do not consider the values of the 
residence of this state as demonstrated by the Dittman Research 
Corporation survey, do not down grade artificially high population 
objectives and do not reflect the consensus arrived at over six months 
of give and take by the planning team, we are prepared to take 
whatever steps are necessary to effectuate wolf conservation plans that 
represent the compromises and desires of the residences of this state 
and the rest of the United States. Because most of the wolves we are 
talking about today live on federal land they belong to more than 
Alaska. They are part of the natural heritage of all Americans.
The Wolf Management Planning Team discussed the role of non- 
Alaskans in wildlife management decisions, because this had been a concern 
for many during past controversies over wolf control. The Team 
recommended that the state allow that, "all groups, including those 
representing national interests should have equal access to and consideration 
during the Board of Game process."^^ However, instead of allowing equal 
access to non-Alaskans, the Board chose to dismiss the concerns of 
"outsiders" by suggesting that letters and petitions addressed to the Board 
were the result of misinformation which had been distributed by 
environmental and animal rights groups. For example, Roger Huntington 
addressed the issue of misinformation when he stated:
. . . One thing I'm concerned about is what's going on as far as 
perceptions by the public both in Alaska and nation wide. When 1 read
^^"Alaska Wolf Management Planning Team Final Report," submitted to the Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game, June 3,1991, p. 16.
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letters, you know, calling me as a board member or the state, you know, 
paralleling us to be Nazi's and slaughterer's of wolves, and blood 
thirsty hungry demons, you know. It was stirred up through some 
misinformation. . . .
Later during the Public Testimony Huntington continued:
I recognize the big problem is in the sociological sense, in dealing with 
people.. . .  And . . .  trying to meet the . . .  sociological needs of all the 
people — not only the people of the state of Alaska but throughout 
America — as we re inundated by hundreds of letters from all over the 
world, even Canada and Scotland, and I think somewhere in there, 
generated by what I can call, that you referred to, misinformation.
Chairman Burley's sentiments on this topic came out later in a letter to the 
Anchorage Daily News editor, scolding the editor for printing a press release 
from The Alaska Wildlife Alliance. He wrote:
Once again The Daily News has allowed itself to be tricked by The 
Alaska Wildlife Alliance and its pseudo-scientist, Gordon Haber. By 
unquestioningly printing an Alliance press release. The Daily News 
again has allowed opponents of wolf control to interject erroneous 
"facts " into the d e b a t e . ^ ^
Hickel appointed board member Jack Didrickson stated at one point during
the controversy:
This isn't the first time the public is wrong, and they are wrong. This 
method of taking wolves from the air, it's the only way. Just because 
they're wrong, it doesn't mean the board has to play along with it.^i
The state carried this notion of misinformation so far that Governor
Hickel actually sued Friends Of Animals, a national animal welfare group,
after they placed ads in USA Today and The New York Times indicating that
the state planned to track radio-collared wolves to their dens and shoot them
from airplanes. Hickel claimed the ads had lied about Alaska's planned wolf
^0"Wolf 'facts' questionable," Anchorage Daily News. 17 April, 1994, p. J-3. 
hijack Didrickson, Board of Game meeting deliberations, January, 1993.
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control program. He speculated the ads had cost the state $50,000 worth of 
tourism money. Quoted in the Anchorage Daily News, Hickel stated, "We 
are not going to allow ourselves to be intimidated by an ad like this."^2 xhe 
judge ultimately sided with Friends of Animals stating that Hickel tried to 
fight a political battle through the courts that was, "at best poor judgment, and 
at worst bad-faith litigation. In addition, the judge ordered the state of 
Alaska pay close to $10,000 in legal fees to Friends of Animals. President of 
Friends of Animals, Priscilla Feral, awarded the Governor a lifetime 
membership as a token of the groups' appreciation for Hickel's help with 
their cause. She stated he helped keep the controversy in the press much 
longer than the organization could have hoped to do on its own, and 
indicated they will use the $10,000 to buy more boycott advertisements.^^ 
Anchorage Daily News columnist Mike Doogan summed up the 
opinions of many involved in the wolf issue when he wrote:
The board's policy serves only the narrow interest of the minority of 
Alaskans who hunt.
That might have been OK once. It's not anymore. Life has gotten 
more complicated. Other groups with other values want to have a say. 
Environmentalists. Animal rights groups. Businessmen hurt by the 
tourism boycott that derailed the wolf-ldlling plans.
And this bothers the board. They want to do things the old cozy 
way. Listen only to the insiders: advisory boards full of hunters, fish 
and game managers, hunting lobbyists who used to be fish and game 
managers. You know, science.
. . . Their stubborn refusal to adjust to the changing politics of game 
management plays into the hands of their opponents. If they don't talk 
smarter and act smarter, they simply won't get to make important
^2"Suit Costs $10,000, but Hickel a lifetime Friend," Anchorage Daily News. 1 October, 1994, p. 
A-1.
63lbid.
64lbid.
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game-management decisions anymore. They'll decide, the public will 
react, and they'll be overridden.^^
SPORT VS. SUBSISTENCE HUNTING IN ALASKA
An additional criticized aspect of the 1992 proposed wolf control plans 
was that the control plans were created to primarily benefit urban hunters 
from Fairbanks and Anchorage, Alaska's largest urban centers. The control 
plans targeted areas which historically have received significant hunting 
pressure by Fairbanks and Anchorage resident hunters. The three areas are in 
relative close proximity to the two cities and are accessible by road. One of the 
three areas targeted for control has been designated a "non-subsistence use 
area " by the Alaska Joint Boards of Fisheries and Game, because of its 
extensive use by residents of Fairbanks and nonresident hunters. Rural 
subsistence hunters may have benefited somewhat indirectly from potentially 
decreased hunting pressure in subsistence areas not accessible by road.
Thus the 1992 wolf control debate was not one concerned foremost 
with subsistence, rural hunters; nor was it rooted in multi-cultural 
differences. To the contrary, many believe ADF&G's plans did not effectively 
incorporate native and rural subsistence concerns. Thus the debate was 
principally a single-culture dispute which stemmed from a difference of 
opinion over the treatment of wolves between members of the public at large 
and distinct interest groups, including sport hunting, environmental, animal 
rights, and tourism groups.
While the 1992 wolf control plans did not directly involve native, 
subsistence interests, the plans were part of a broader yet related conflict
^^"Members of the state Board of Game need to grow up, wise up," Anchorage Daily News. 31 
January, 1993, p. B-1.
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brewing in the state between urban and rural hunters. This conflict exists 
between "sport" and "subsistence" hunters over access rights to game for 
hunting. A landmark case in 1989 effectively eliminated a rural, subsistence 
priority regarding use of fish and wildlife in the state, which the state had 
granted since 1978. The Alaska Supreme Court decided that, according to 
Alaska's state constitution, it was unconstitutional to provide a rural 
preference regarding access to fish and wildlife. The court's decision 
eliminated a distinction between sport and subsistence hunters and fishers, 
and, in the eyes of many, including the federal government, directly 
threatened the protection of cultural and traditional uses of fish and wildlife 
by native and other rural Alaskans. Since Alaska's Supreme Court decision, 
the federal government has taken over fish and wildlife management on 
federal lands in Alaska so as to ensure a subsistence and rural preference on 
these lands.
Tension between native leaders and the Hickel administration 
increased during Hickel's tenure as governor. The 1992 wolf management 
plan was one of several examples regarding fish and wildlife management 
where native and subsistence concerns were not necessarily a priority for the 
Hickel administration. Native leaders and organizations never officially 
came out stating whether they were in favor or opposed to the wolf control 
plans, and they kept a low profile throughout almost all of the events 
surrounding the adoption of the plans. Their silence spoke loudly.
When Governor Hickel finally buckled from the pressure of the 
tourism boycott and suspended the wolf control plans, he organized a wolf 
summit in January, 1993. He invited natives to be involved with the 
summit. Chairman of the Tanana Chiefs Conference, Mitch Demientoff of
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Nenana, indicated during the Alaska Perspectives Panel at the summit 
(which both he and I participated in as panelists) that he and those he 
represents were not willing to play along with the Governor. He stated:
The Governor was mad at us because we wouldn't take the heat earlier, 
when they were planning the conference. We wouldn’t take the heat. 
We wouldn't send a large native delegation come out here and say,
"we want wolf control. "
"Well why won't you do it? They do that over in the Yukon 
Territories."
Hell, in the Yukon Territories, they don't mess around with the 
subsistence business. They got native preference over there. Right on 
top. That's what works for them. It's right on top. "
While Demientoff finally chose to be vocal, the Chief of the Athabaskans,
Peter John of Minto, did not speak directly to the issue of wolf control. Hickel
scheduled a visit to Minto, a rural Alaskan village, for those attending the
wolf summit. What individuals found there was a man and a community
desiring to teach and talk to people about their traditional ways, but not a
community wanting to address Hickel's wolf control controversy.^^
Conclusion:
In conclusion, the state of Alaska ignored input by the public and failed 
to incorporate the recommendations of the Wolf Management Planning 
Team, a citizens advisory council, in good faith into their Strategic Wolf 
Management Plan. The Planning Team recommended a six zone 
management system (A-F), where wolf control could occur in two of the six 
zones. Further, the team defined restricted terms for wolf control. They 
recommended that, wolf control should not be a common practice and that
^^"The words he lives by," Anchorage Daily News, 14 February, 1993, p. A-1.
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intensive management designations were to be established only on a small 
portion of any Game Management Unit being considered for control. In 
addition, control methods were to be limited to the minimum amount of 
time necessary to achieve the desired level of wolf control, according to the 
recommendations.
Instead of incorporating the Planning Teams recommendations, ADF&G 
and the Game Board redefined their recommendations such that several 
pertinent aspects no longer represented the work of the Planning Team. For 
example, the state came up with their own seven-zone management system, 
and definitions for two different types of wolf control — wolf regulation and 
wolf reduction. In the plan passed by the Game Board, wolf population 
regulation and reduction would have occurred over vast areas of the 
southcentral and interior regions (43,000 square miles out a 100,000 square 
mile planning area) for a minimum of five years, and possibly for as many as 
ten. This is not necessarily short term, nor is it in the spirit of the Wolf 
Management Planning Team recommendations. The control would have 
reduced wolf populations by approximately 80%, killing between 400 and 500 
wolves.
Doug Pope, Chairman of the BOG when the Strategic Wolf Management 
Plan was adopted, emphasized the state's inadequacies in incorporating public 
input into their wolf management plan when he stated in a recent interview:
Well the reality of w h a t. . . the implementation meant was they 
implemented a different plan then we adopted. . . . The whole 
consensus was that the wolf management zones were going to be very 
small, discrete areas. And as soon as the meetings stopped the 
department started relaying the concept that they had to stick out these 
whole Game Management sub-units rather than do some actual 
zoning where they had planned to do some serious work. Rather than, 
for example, do it in that part of Game Management Unit 20 that they
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ended doing the wolf control in, rather than zoning that particular area 
and taking testimony as to why that particular area deserved to be a 
zone where they were going to implement wolf control. What they did 
is they sort of stampeded the hunting community into believing that 
they had to create these massive zones because if they didn’t then there 
was going to be no opportunity ever to have wolf control in that game 
management unit. And that’s where they really undermined the 
whole consensus. So when I said that they implemented a different 
plan than was adopted, the plan that was implemented didn’t look 
anything like the plan that was adopted...  . The zones were supposed 
to be very small and discrete. In other words confined to the specific 
area of need that they can identify. And that then the idea was that, by 
having the board involved on a regular basis, . . . there would be more 
opportunity for public input. And that’s what we thought was the key 
to the whole thing was that each time they [the Department] wanted to 
implement wolf control in a specific zone, then they’d have to come 
back to the board and say this is why we want to change this zone from 
’x’ to ’y’ . . . and this is the biological justification for it. And then there 
would be an opportunity for public comment. . . .  We felt that that was 
probably the best check on the whole process. If there was an 
opportunity for public input then flaws in the plan would come out, 
and it might be decided by pure power, but the way things have gone in 
the past, because of the large scale plans that had received so much 
public opposition, we thought that if there was an attempt to do that 
again there would public opposition. But what they did was, because 
they didn’t want to come back to the board and they didn’t want to 
have public input . . .  I went to a couple of these Advisory Committee 
meetings and saw their presentation and it was very clever. The whole 
come on was, ’we have to do this, or .. . we re never going to be able to 
kill wolves in this area again. It’s going to be blocked up and we won’t 
have an opportunity to make more for everyone and so therefore it’ll 
all be subsistence. And that was basically the whole thing. So it was 
real predictable what was going to happen. . . .  And Kelleyhouse, at 
that point, when I saw that happen, which was right at the end of my 
term, I concluded that the best tiling to do was just to give him as 
much rope as possible to let them hang themselves. Which they 
almost did.
(Interview in Anchorage, October, 1994)
The state of Alaska’s 1992 wolf management plan is a poignant illustration of 
how historically Alaska’s wildlife management system has allowed sport 
hunters to regulate themselves. While the remaining public may be invited 
to participate in an ’’open ” process, the public often is not involved fairly or
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equally.
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Appendix 2.2
Alaska Wolf Management Planning Team Final Report, June 3,1991 
Operational Management Plans 
Chapter IV. Strategies, Section E
5. Zone areas into various levels of management intensity:
a. Areas where no hunting, trapping, or wolf control is allowed. 
Examples of such areas are long established National Parks (2% of the State). 
These areas may be expanded, through the operational management plans, by 
including portions of new national parks, national wildlife refuges, state 
parks, and road corridors, especially where wildlife viewing opportunities 
exist.
b. National Parks and Monuments established by ANILCA where 
hunting or trapping are permitted only for local residents that qualify as 
federal subsistence hunters. No same-day-airbome hunting of wolves is 
allowed. No wolf control is allowed. These areas cover about 7% of the State.
c. National Preserves created by ANILCA where hunting and 
trapping are allowed for the general public. No same-day-airbome hunting of 
wolves is allowed. No wolf control is allowed. These areas cover about 5% of 
the State.
d. National wildlife refuges where hunting and trapping are allowed 
for the general public. Wolf control is permissible, but only when compatible 
with the purposes for which the refuge was established and under stringent 
conditions. These areas cover about 20% of the State. Same-day-airbome 
hunting should not be allowed.
e. Areas where hunting and trapping are allowed for the general 
public. The Team was divided on the issue of whether same-day-airbome 
hunting of wolves be allowed. No wolf control is allowed except in those 
areas designated for intensive management (under category f). These areas 
include portions of state lands, BLM, private owned lands, and military lands.
f. Areas where the objective is through intensive management to 
maintain a high sustainable harvest of wolves and their prey while ensuring 
their conservation over time. Hunting and trapping are allowed for the 
general public. The Team was divided on the issue of whether same-day- 
airbome hunting of wolves should be allowed. Wolves can be subjected to 
control when it is needed, under the criteria and methods described in section 
IV. F of this report. These intensive management areas should be no larger
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Appendix 2.2 (cont.)
than absolutely essential to achieve specific management objectives as 
specified in operational management plans. Wolf control is not intended to 
be a common practice. The team recommends that intensive management 
designations will be established only in a small portion of most game 
management units. These areas would include portions of state lands, BLM, 
private owned lands, and military lands.
The definition of "same-day-airbome hunting" in current ADF&G 
regulations is: "Not hunt game or help someone else take big game the same 
day airborne until after 3:00 a.m. the next day. However, this section does not 
apply if you have flown on an airplane that is a regularly scheduled jet 
airplane. . . ." As written, this definition includes "land and shoot" which is a 
term in common use (i.e., it is not defined in the regulations) meaning to 
land an airplane as close as possible to the target animal(s) and then to jump 
out and shoot. The Team agreed that land and shoot, as currently interpreted 
by the USFWS, is almost impossible to practice without being in violation of 
the Federal Airborne Hunting Act and could not be permitted anywhere 
except as a means of control in intensive management areas (in which case an 
exemption to the Federal Airborne Hunting Act is provided). The Team was 
divided on whether in categories "e" and "f" to allow same-day-airbome 
hunting with certain constraints (e.g., a requirement for distance from the 
plane, within line of sight, or a certain length of time before shooting). Some 
members of the Team opposed same-day-airbome hunting of wolves, with or 
without added constraints because of problems with enforcement, also that it 
exempts wolves from the same protection given to most big game species. 
Some felt that same-day-airbome hunting will continue to convey a negative 
image of wolf hunting and the Alaska Department of Fish & Game to many 
members of the public. There was a concem among some other Team 
members that without land-and-shoot and/or same-day-airborne hunting 
there would be almost no opportunity for reasonable success for a sport 
hunter, resident or nonresident, to legally take a wolf in the winter when the 
hides are prime.
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Appendix 2.3
STRATEGIC WOLF MANAGEMENT PLAN 
STATE ADOPTED ZONE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, 1992
Zone 1 — Full Protection 
Human use goals in this zone are:
1. to provide areas where wolves and prey are fully protected from hunting and trapping.
2. to provide opportunities to view, photograph, hear, enjoy and learn more about wolves 
and prey in an unaltered environment.
3. to provide opportunities for scientific study of wolves where human influence is 
minimal.
Conditions of use and management:
Hunting or trapping of xvolves or prey is not allozoed. Human activities and developments are 
regulated to keep disturbance of wolves and prey to a minimum.
Zone 2 — Wolf Protection 
Human use foals in this zone are:
1. to provide areas where wolves are fully protected from hunting and trapping.
2. to provide opportunities to view, photograph, hear, enjoy and leam more about wolves 
where they are not hunted or trapped.
3. to provide opportunities for scientific study of wolves where they are not hunted or 
trapped.
Conditions of use and management:
Hunting or trapping of wolves is not allozoed. Hunting or trapping of other species may be 
allozoed.
Zone 3 -  Minimum use / Minimum management 
Human use goals in this zone are:
1. to provide areas where wolves and prey are not significantly influenced by people and 
are affected primarily by natural environmental factors.
2. to provide opportunities to view, photograph, hear, enjoy and learn more about wolves 
and prey in nearly unaltered environments.
3. to provide opportunities for scientific study of wolves where human-caused mortality 
and manipulations are not significant factors.
4. to provide opportunities to harvest a small portion of the wolf and prey populations to 
meet special needs.
Conditions of use and management:
Hunting and trapping of zoolves and prey is allozoed, but harvests will be very lozo in most 
areas. Wolf population regulation and reduction are not allowed.
Zone 4 — Moderate use / Minimum management 
Human use goals in this zone are:
1. to provide areas where wolves and prey are primarily affected by natural 
environmental factors, but some influence by people is permitted.
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2. to provide opportunities to view, photograph, hear, enjoy and leam more about wolves 
and prey in an environment that may be slightly altered.
3. to provide for moderate harvests of wolves and prey by people.
Conditions of use and management:
Hunting and trapping of zoolves and prey are allozoed, but harvest rates zoill be kept law to 
moderate by hunting/trapping regulations or remote access. Wolf popxdation regulation and 
reduction are not allowed.
Zone 5 — Moderate Use /  Moderate management 
Human use goals in this zone are:
1. to provide areas where wolves are influenced by both natural environmental factors 
and by people.
2. to provide opportunities to view, photograph, hear, enjoy and learn more about wolves 
and prey under managed conditions.
3. to provide for moderate harvest of wolves and prey by people.
Conditions of use and management:
Hunting and trapping of zoolves and prey are allowed.
Moderate harvest rates zoill be maintained. Wolf population regulation and reduction may be 
considered at the request or concurrence of the land owner/manager.
Zone 6 — High use/Moderate management 
Human use goals of this zone are:
1. to provide areas where wolves are influenced by both natural environmental factors 
and by people.
2. to provide opportunities to view, photograph, hear, enjoy and leam more about wolves 
and prey under managed conditions.
3. to provide for moderate harvest of wolves and prey by people.
Conditions of use and management:
Hunting and trapping of zoolves and prey are allozoed. Moderate harvest rates will be 
mamtained. Wolf population regulation and reduction may be considered at the request or 
concurrence of the land owner/manager.
High use/Moderate management 
Human use goals of this zone are:
1. to provide areas where wolves and prey are managed for high human use.
2. to provide opportunities to view, photograph, hear, enjoy and leam more about wolves 
and prey under managed conditions.
3. to provide for high harvests of wolves and prey by people.
Conditions of use and managetnettt:
Hunting and trapping of zoolves are allozoed and may be encouraged. Wolves and prey will be 
managed to provide for moderate to high harvests. Land-and-shoot taking of wolves as a 
regulation or reduction measure may be allowed under permit. Wolf populations may be 
regulated at levels below those zohich would occur naturally. Wolf population reductions are 
not anticipated, but may be allowed.
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Zone 7 -  High use/Intensive management 
Human use goals of this zone are:
1. to provide areas where wolves and prey are intensively managed for human use.
2. to provide for high harvests of wolves and prey by people.
Conditions of use and management:
H witing and trapping of wolves are allowed and may be encouraged. Wolves and prey will he 
managed to provide for sustained high harvests. Land-and-shoot taking and aerial shooting of 
wolves as a regulation or reduction measure are allowed under permit. Wolf populations may 
be regulated at levels below those zohich zoould occur naturally. Wolf population reduction 
may be necessary.
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Management 
Zone Map
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Appendix 2.5
Southcentral and Interior Alaska Game Management Units 
and State Proposed Wolf Control Areas
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Chapter 3
A BIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ALASKA'S WOLF PLANS
"Only Recently have we begun to appreciate that 
who does science affects the kind of sciettce that gets 
done. "
Londa Schiebinger, Nature's Body
Just as controversy surrounded the public process regarding Alaska’s 
proposed wolf control programs, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game’s 
biological justifications also sparked much debate. The Alaska Department of 
Fish and Game’s (ADF&G’s) own research has often suggested that, in many 
cases, wolf control does not appear effective in raising ungulate population 
numbers. Wildlife biology is a relatively new field and the interactive 
ecology of wolf, bear, moose and caribou populations is still not fully 
understood. Researchers admit that much remains unknown about these 
populations, and consensus among experts regarding predator/ prey dynamics 
does not exist. Proposing an aggressive wolf control program, such as the 
Area Specific Management Plan for Southcentral, for some wolf experts 
meant putting the cart before the horse. Many independent scientists and 
wolf experts contradicted ADF&G’s justifications for the plan, stating they 
were unfounded, ill-advised or just plain wrong.^^
The purpose of this chapter is to take a closer look at the three areas 
targeted for wolf control in 1992 by analyzing the biological justifications 
offered by ADF&G for their proposed programs. This is accomplished by: 1) 
reviewing the status of those species considered beneficiaries or targets of the
^^"Perspectives on Wildlife Management in Alaska," Compiled by The Alaska Wildlife 
Alliance and Wolf Haven International, January 16, 1993.
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control — caribou (Rangifer tarandrus), moose {Alces alces), wolf {Canis 
lupus), and to some extent grizzly bear {Ursus arctos) — in the three Game 
Management Units (GMU's 13, 20A and 20E) charted for wolf control, and 2) 
discussing results of existing studies and other available information 
regarding these populations. This chapter also analyzes pertinent ecological 
information of the three control areas. The purpose of this analysis is to 
reveal the 1992 wolf control programs within their larger context, and allow 
those individuals entering the debate to determine whether or not the 1992 
wolf control programs are appropriate. A closer look at the dynamics of 
wildlife populations within the areas targeted for control will uncover 
substantive discrepancies between published ADF&G research results, 
opinions of many experts in predator and prey ecology and the proposed wolf 
control programs.
BACKGROUND AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS:
Years of widespread wolf control programs has led some wolf 
researchers to criticize ADF&G for being "anti-wolf." For example, John 
Theberge, Professor of Ecology at University of Waterloo, who has spent more 
than twenty years conducting wolf research in Ontario, and has published 
works on wolf-ungulate relationships, wolf control and wolf predation, stated 
in a review of ADF&G’s wolf control plans:
While I have attempted to approach this review impartially, that is not 
entirely possible as human psychologist research attests. The same, of 
course, holds true for biologists of ADFG who have been known to 
hold pro-wolf killing views for many years, and always argue facts 
from that side to do the same. I object vigorously to the ADFG 
statement at the end of Appendix IV to any connotation of impartiality 
of ADFG biologists because they "work closely with federal and
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Canadian wildlife biologists." You pick your colleagues just like you 
pick the references you want to support the conclusions you want in 
this highly complex and controversial area of applied ecology. I note 
no reference to any of my publications in this ADFG document, 
although some are most certainly relevant.^^
Wildlife scientist and long-time critic of ADF&G, Gordon Haber, Ph.D., called 
the state's proposal, "voodoo biology," and published a lengthy critique of the 
plan. Wolf ecologist Paul Joslin wrote that poor science was used to justify 
the wolf kill. Another scientist suggested Alaska's wolf control plans were, 
"not fully justified."^^
In fairness to ADF&G, wildlife management is a relatively new field, 
and there are still many unanswered questions regarding multi-prey/multi­
predator systems. National Park Service biologist, Layne Adams, discusses 
the complexities associated with managing Alaska's wildlife in the following 
passage:
Wildlife management is a relatively young discipline that got its 
start in the 1930's. Up until the last decade or so, wildlife management 
was truly an art. Wildlife biologists had limited field "data" on animal 
abundance, species interrelationships, and human harvest. They 
applied what they could of general ecological principles, theories, and 
hypotheses (many were untested and a few were dead wrong) to pick a 
course they hoped would maintain reasonable wild populations and 
provide for sustained human harvest. The chances of being "right" 
were not very great, particularly in the vast and complex environment 
of Alaska. It is amazing to look back and realize that research into 
wolf/ prey relationships did not really get started until the late 1950's. It 
wasn't until the late 1960's that wildlife professionals and the public 
alike were beginning to realize the complexity of predator/ prey systems 
and the important role of predators. The importance of bears as 
predators of ungulates did not come to light until the late 1970's — 
early 1980's!
^®John B. Theberge, PhD, Professor of Ecology, University of Waterloo, "Brief Comment on 
G.C. Haber's "Wildlife Management in Alaska ", January 14, 1993, p. 1.
^^Carl Walters, Professor, Fisheries Centre, U.B.C., Vancouver, B.C., Letter to Paul Joslin, 
Wolf Haven International, January 11,1992, p. 1.
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Since the mid-1970 s, wildlife management has become more of a 
science and a little less of an a r t.. . . Still, the species’ interactions are 
highly variable and factors that affect them can be subtle. Even today, 
many of the tools regularly used in wildlife biology are "blunt " and can 
only provide general answers to our research / management questions. . 
. . Alaska is big and diverse and we will never have the manpower or 
money to gather, analyze and digest all the information that could be 
used to help with wildlife management d e d s i o n s . ^ ^
One must realize, then, that often wildlife managers operate without
knowing exactly what end products their actions will yield. Efforts should
continue to gain more knowledge about these complex systems.
One example of an area of wildlife management which is not well 
understood involves multi-predator/ multi-prey systems. Alaska is 
composed of many multi-predator/multi-prey ecosystems, which present 
complexities and challenges for wildlife managers. Several conceptual 
models have been presented to better understand the dynamics between 
multi-prey and predator systems (Haber 1977, Messier and Crete 1985). One 
model used to try to explain the situation in the Tanana/Fortymile area is the 
" low-density dynamic equilibrium" (Messier and Crete 1985), where,
" combined predation by wolves {Canis lupus) and bears (grizzly bears Ursus 
arctos, and/or black bears, U. americanus) can maintain moose populations 
within a low-density dynamic equilibrium (LDDE) for extended periods in 
unexploited and lightly harvested systems. . . Determining which if any 
of the predators are the primary predators of a given population is the first
^^Layne G. Adams, "Summary of Wolf-Prey-Human Relationships in Alaska," National Park 
Service, Alaska Region; 2525 Cambell Street, Room 107; Anchorage, AK 99503-2892; submitted 
to Alaska Department of Fish and Game for the Alaska Wolf Management Planning Team, 
January, 1991.
William C. Gasaway, Rodney D. Boertje, Daniel V. Grangaard, David G. Kelleyhouse, 
Robert O. Stephenson, and Douglas G. Larsen, "The Role of Predation in Limiting Moose at Low 
Densities in Alaska and Yukon and Implications for Conservation," Wildlife Monographs, Vol. 
56, No. 1, January, 1992, No. 120, p. 6.
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challenge to wildlife managers. Once that information is clear, then 
appropriate management decisions can be made accordingly.
Layne Adams, discusses multi prey and predator systems, and the 
challenges they pose to biologists in the following passage:
Areas of the state where wolf management is the most 
controversial have two or three large predators (wolves, brown/grizzly 
bears, and black bears) and either primarily moose as prey or several 
prey species (moose, caribou, and Dali sheep). These multi-predator 
and multi-predator/multi-prey systems are obviously more complex 
than systems with one predator and one large prey species. For 
example, a second prey species can either increase predation on the 
initial prey species . . .  or reduce predation. Also, bears and wolves vary 
in their importance as predators on ungulates with age of the prey, 
season of the year, density of prey, and density of the predators. The 
effects of these predators on tiieir prey can be additive to each other, 
replacements for each other or anything in between.
. . .  In places where wolves and bears occur together, predation can 
maintain moose populations at low levels, but apparently this does not 
apply to caribou.. . .  It is not clear whether moose populations can 
"escape" from this limitation by predators on their own, but in some of 
Interior Alaska nearly two decades of low moose abundance have gone 
by, with no indications of change in the near future. On the other 
hand, several caribou herds in the state are increasing even though 
they are faced with both bear and wolf predation. Where moose and 
caribou overlap, increasing caribou herds may divert predation 
pressure from these low-density moose populations and give them the
opportunity to i n c r e a s e . ^ ^
Other factors to consider are the effects of management actions on these 
multi-predator/multi prey systems. For example, possible wolf-bear 
competitive releases may occur in these systems, and social fragmentation of 
wolves during wolf control may effect the amount of predation in a system. 
Gordon Flaber explains these phenomena in the following passage:
^^Layne G. Adams, "Summary of Wolf-Prey-Human Relationships in Alaska," National Park 
Service, Alaska Region; 2525 Cambell Street, Room 107; Anchorage, AK 99503-2892; submitted 
to the Alaska Department of Fish and Game for the Alaska Wolf Management Planning Team, 
January, 1991.
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Wolf control applied unnecessarily to a wolf/bear-moose system 
could end up prolonging a moose recovery and necessitating heavier 
bear control, because of a potential for wolf-bear competitive release: 
Under natural conditions, wolves frequently harass bears that hunt 
moose in the same areas; removing wolves via control may allow 
some of these bears to increase their predation activities. Furthermore, 
partial, random wolf control does not necessarily result in a 
proportionate reduction in wolf predation and could lead to more of it, 
because of increased social fragmentation of the wolf population, 
exaggerated kill rate changes (e.g., pairs may end up killing as often as 
groups of 6-7), and other nonlinear effects involving not only the 
relationship between wolf numbers and wolf predation but also 
between both of these variables and ungulate numbers. . . .
For these and other reasons (including access, size and vastness of the state,
and resulting difficult enforcement dilemmas), the challenges accompanying
wildlife management in Alaska are unique in the United States.
One other area relevant to this paper which continues to puzzle 
biologists involves caribou ecology. Caribou and their dramatic population 
fluctuations have left biologists pondering many unanswered questions, and 
subsequently exploring differing theories and management approaches 
regarding caribou population dynamics. For example, an ADF&G study by 
Davis et al. (1991) reported:
We possess only rudimentary understanding of the relationship 
between movements and distribution and the demography of caribou 
herds. . . Opposing views are emerging among caribou biologists 
regarding basic social organization of caribou, including herd identity, 
definition, and fidelity to calving areas and seasonal ranges (Bergerud 
et al. 1984, Carruthers 1985, Martell and Russell 1985).^^
In spite of the opposing views, it does appear widely accepted that caribou
populations fluctuate from extremely high numbers to low-density
^^James L. Davis et al., "Demography of the Delta Caribou Herd Under Varying Rates of 
Natural Mortality and Human Harvest and Assessment of Field Techniques for Acquiring 
Demographic Data," Alaska Department of Fish and Came, Division of Wildlife 
Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Research Final Report, January 1991, 
Projects W-22-5 through W-23-3 Study 3.33, p. 5.
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populations, the latter which can last for extended periods of time. Davis et 
al. (1991) stated:
Empirical data from individual case histories suggest that recurrent 
fluctuations are the only model supported. It can be argued 
theoretically that this is an artifact of several of the models working 
interactively. The empirical evidence suggests that low, relatively 
stable equilibria densities of caribou are frequent for periods of time, 
but there is growing evidence that caribou frequently escape predation
and attain h i g h  d e n s i t i e s . ^ 4
For example, in one of the areas targeted for wolf control in 1992, the 
Fortymile caribou herd is thought to have numbered between 500,000 and 
one million animals during the 1920’s, and was considered one of the largest 
herds in the world. It then decreased in size during the 1930's and reached a 
low of about 10,000 - 20,000 animals during the 1940's.
In lieu of these apparent natural population fluctuations, ADF&G's 
ultimate goal in their 1992 Area Specific Plan regarding caribou is to stabilize 
caribou populations so that they maintain specific population levels over 
prolonged periods of time. Haber suggests the Department's orientation is, "a 
farming' approach [which] seeks to maximize annual yields . . . with little if 
any concem for the natural patterns of change, behavior, movements, etc. of 
the target population or its natural interactions with other populations and 
s p e c ie s .W h ile  the Department seeks to create a stasis among certain 
caribou herds, Haber suggests allowing natural population fluctuations to 
occur, which he believes will ultimately benefit caribou, other wildlife 
affected by caribou and Alaskans in general — both hunters and non-hunters 
alike.
7 4 l b i d . ,  p .  4 9 .
75Gordon C. Haber, Ph.D., "Wildlife Management in Alaska: Southcentral-Interior Wolf 
Control and Related Issues, Wolf Haven International, Tenino, WA and The Alaska Wildlife 
Alliance, Anchorage, AK, November, 1992, p. 15.
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There is substantial evidence suggesting that caribou expand their ranges 
as their numbers enlarge, and some have been known to mix with other 
herds as a result. For example, the Mulchatna caribou herd in southwestern 
Alaska, which has grown from approximately 1,000 caribou in 1949 to ~
110,000 in 1993, 6̂ is presently moving into areas it has not entered for 
between fifty and one-hundred years. Also, populations considered to be 
remnants of once larger herds, are still part of an unsolved puzzle. The Delta 
and Yanert herds in interior Alaska, for example, are thought to be remnants 
of the Fortymile caribou herd, and were considered distinct herds until 1987. 
Distinct herds are defined by many caribou biologists as those which are 
believed to remain faithful to specific birthing areas, and therefore are unique 
or separate from other herds. In 1987, the then increasing Delta herd 
overlapped the Yanert range, and has continued to share habitat and birthing 
grounds with the Yanert herd. These two populations are now considered a 
single herd, and their union begs many questions, including: 1) what would 
happen to this combined herd if the Fortymile herd reached peak numbers 
again? and, 2) would it intermingle with the Fortymile, becoming part of it, 
and lose its distinct identity? These and many other questions about caribou 
remain unanswered.
One theory, which originates primarily from R. O. Skoog's research 
during the 1960's and '70's and is supported by Haber, suggests that, left up to 
natural fluctuations, caribou herds in Alaska and the Yukon's interior 
interact with each other as a single system, oscillating between high and low
^^Susan M. Abbott, ed.. Caribou. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife 
Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration, Management Report of Survey - Inventory 
Activities, 1 July 1990 - 30 June 1992, Projects W-23-5 & W-24-1, Study 3.0, December 1993, p. 15 • 
17.
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population levels with accompanying range shifts and dispersals. Haber 
clarities:
System-wide (Alaska-Yukon) caribou changes are driven primarily 
by long term variations in the 6-7 major herds. . . . Per details given in 
Haber (1977,1990,1991a, 1991b) and Haber and Walters (1980) - i.e., 
emphasizing a continuing rapid increase of the Western Arctic Herd 
toward a range-limited peak and simultaneous temporary suppression 
of the major central herds, it should be possible to restore the 
dominant pre-1960's Alaska -Yukon pattern of asynchronous peaks, 
lows, and region-to-region shifting. A return to this more natural 
system behavior could result in much larger (system-wide) numbers of 
caribou and a higher average annual statewide caribou yield - perhaps 
as much as double or triple the present harvest, without a need for 
wolf control. . . . The major centers of harvesting would shift from 
region-to region (at intervals of decades), much the same as they did for 
at least 8,000 years prior to the mid 20th century, when Alaskans 
apparently were able to hunt caribou nomadically on a large scale even 
without the benefit of the airplanes, highways, ATV's, snowmachines, 
and other advanced technology that are now available to assist us.^^
Some caribou experts have criticized this theory and approach to
management for lack of evidence. While at this time it certainly is not clear
whether or not Alaska-Yukon caribou actually can operate as one system
given the right set of circumstances, it seems premature to rule out all aspects
of this theory given our "rudimentary" knowledge of caribou, and the
relatively short time biologists have gathered more accurate information
about these ungulates. In support of Haber's theory, Theberge writes:
There is no reason to suppose that ecological and evolutionary 
processes do not operate over such a broad scale. The fact that we do 
not understand these operations is a constraint imposed by the spatial 
and temporal scale of scientific inquiry which we can conduct. Yet a 
sensitivity to the existence of these mega-pattems is important if there 
is any desire to manage wildlife within any semblance of an ecosystems 
and landscape context. To try to stabilize naturally fluctuating systems, 
over any extended periods of time, is simply ecologically w rong.. . . 
From a political standpoint you may feel compelled to spend public
77lbid., p. 21.
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money to speed things up. From an ecological standpoint, a rapidly 
increasing ungulate population has a different effect on vegetation 
than does a more moderately expanding one.̂ ®
It is also quite feasible that, even if the type of interaction Haber and others
suggest existed between the major herds at one time, this interaction may
never resurface due to human encroachment and impacts on caribou ranges.
^®John B. Theberge, PhD, Professor of Ecology, University of Waterloo, "Brief Comment on 
G.C. Haber's "Wildlife Management in Alaska", January 14, 1993, p. 1.
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While it is true that many questions remain unanswered within the 
field of wildlife management, there appear to be some clearer paths wildlife 
managers and policy-makers can take which, considering the body of 
knowledge already available, seem more appropriate than others.
NELCHINA/SUSITNA BASIN IN SOUTHCENTRAL ALASKA, GMU 13;
Bordered by the Alaska range to the north, the Chugach range to the 
south, the Wrangell Mountains to the east and the Talkeetna range to the 
west. Game Management Unit 13 includes 23,376 square miles (45,000 square 
kilometers), the largest of the three areas targeted for control. This area 
consists of a large basin which is drained by the Matanuska, Susitna, Copper, 
Nenana and Delta river systems, and is spotted by spruce forests, lakes, 
streams, muskegs and ponds in the lowlands. Alpine tundra and shrub lands 
are important to wildlife at slightly higher elevations. Approximately 31% of 
the unit is above 4,000 feet elevation, and consists of rock, glaciers and 
snowfields. Currently there are healthy populations of moose, Dali sheep and 
caribou in the area. Wolves and grizzly bears populate this unit, and have 
been heavily hunted and controlled in this area since the 1940's. Eighteen 
percent of the annual statewide harvest of caribou and moose takes place in 
GMU 13.
Nelchina Caribou Herd:
The Nelchina caribou herd finds its home range within this area, a herd 
currently numbering approximately 45,000. The Nelchina herd's habitat
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includes the Copper River and Upper Susitna River basins and the 
mountains found within and bordering the region (please see appendix 1 and 
2 for home range of the Nelchina caribou herd). Calving occurs in the eastern 
portion of the Talkeetna mountain range.
Researchers believe that the Nelchina herd has peaked twice in the past 
100 years, once in the mid - 1800's and again in the early 1960's^ .̂ After its 
first peak, the herd is thought to have declined for close to seventy years, 
finally increasing again between 1942 and 1962. Biologists suggest that the 
herd numbered up to 70,000 at its peak in the 1860’s, and then declined for 
seventy years following, until it reached a low of approximately 10,000. 
Between 1848 and 1885, the population was considered very abundant, and 
ranged from the Talkeetna Mountains eastward over the whole Copper River 
basin (Skoog 1968). In later years, when the herd size had decreased, the 
caribou population was found to remain closer to the Talkeetna m o u n ta in s .^ o
There are discrepancies regarding population estimates throughout the 
literature discussing the Nelchina caribou herd. Censusing techniques have 
only recently become more accurate, and, therefore, many previous attempts 
at estimating herd sizes were inadequate. The first aerial survey completed 
for the Nelchina herd was in 1948, when approximately 4,500 - 5,000 caribou 
were counted. The technique used in this initial survey was later questioned 
regarding accuracy. It is now thought that a more valid assessment of the 
herd would have numbered 10,000 for that year.®̂
E. Hemming, "Population Growth and Movement Patterns of the Nelchina Caribou Herd," 
U.S. Bureau of Land Management, Anchorage, AK, Biological Papers of the University of 
Alaska, Special Report Number 1, September, 1975, Proceedings of the First International 
Reindeer and Caribou Symposium, 9-11 August, 1972, University of Alaska, Fairbanks, AK, 
edited by Jack R. Luick, Peter C. Lent, David R. Klein, Robert G. White, p. 162 - 169.
SOfbid., p. 163.
SlJbid., p. 163.
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In a paper presented to the First International Reindeer and Caribou 
Symposium, Bureau of Land Management biologist, J. E. Hemming (1972), 
indicated the following population estimates for the Nelchina Caribou herd 
between 1948 and 1967:
1948 10,000
1956 45,000
1957 48,000
1958 53,000
1959 59,000
1960 64,000
1961 69,000
1962 71,000
1967 46,00082
Researcher R. O. Skoog (1968) believed the Nelchina herd likely exceeded
80,000 in the early 1960's, whereas Hemming above estimated the herd at 
approximately 70,000. Van Ballenberghe (1985) believes, "the evidence 
indicates that the autumn 1964 population was larger than that of any 
preceding year and likely exceeded 90,000 animals.83 During the late 1960's, 
the Nelchina herd began a dramatic decline, and again how much the herd 
actually declined is not clear. By 1972, photocensus estimates indicated the 
herd had crashed and numbered a mere 8 ,0 9 4 ,however other ADF&G 
biologists have indicated it dropped only to about 10,000.®̂  Discrepancies 
embracing as large a margin of error as between 2,000 and 10,000 animals can 
significantly change the outcome of wildlife management decisions and 
seriously impact wildlife populations.
®^Ibid., p. 163.
Victor Van Ballenberghe, "Wolf Predation on Caribou: The Nelchina Herd Case History, 
"Journal of Wildlife Management 49(3):1985, p. 716.
84lbid., p. 712.
®^Warren B. Ballard, Jackson S. Whitman, and Craig Gardner, "Ecology of an exploited wolf 
population in south-central Alaska," Wildlife Monographs, Blacksburg, VA, July, 1987, No. 98 
p. 7.
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While biologists continue to disagree about which factors most 
significantly affect caribou demographics, it is generally accepted that the 
Nelchina herd probably experienced its radical decline in the 1960's due to a 
combination of over-hunting and severe winters. Other possible causes of 
decline include: 1) egress, where potentially large numbers of Nelchina 
caribou moved to other ranges, such as to the Fortymile area; 2) lowered 
recruitment, which has decreased since the mid-1960 s due to hunter 
selectivity and a decline in the number of females in their prime 
reproductive years (ages 2 - 5). The percentage of females found in the kill 
steadily increased overall from 25% in 1957 to 53% in 1971; 3) calf production, 
which may have been lowered due to range degradation; 4) calf mortality, due 
to weather and predation. 1972 was the worst winter on record and resulted 
in the latest recorded spring migration of the Nelchina herd. In addition, the 
wolf population had increased since 1963, perhaps because it was shadowing 
the increase in caribou numbers; 5) increased adult mortality, due to hunting 
and wolf predation.®^
Hunting pressure increased on Nelchina caribou after 1954, when 
harvest levels rose both absolutely and proportionately.®^ Between 1955 and 
1962, it is estimated that an average of 8% of the adults were harvested. 
Harvest levels were consistently higher during this period due to longer 
hunting seasons, greater use of off-road-vehicles and snow machines.®®
®̂ G. N. Bos, "A Partial Analysis of the Current Population Status of the Nelchina Caribou 
Herd," Biological Papers of the University of Alaska, Special Report Number 1, September, 
1975, Proceeding s of the First International Reindeer and Caribou Symposium, 9-11 August, 
1972, University of Alaska, Fairbanks, AK, edited by Jack R. Luick, Peter C. Lent, David R. 
Klein, Robert G. White, p. 170 -180.
®^Victor Van Ballenberghe, "Wolf Predation on Caribou: The Nelchina Herd Case History," 
Journal of Wildlife Management 49(3):1985, p. 713.
®®G. N. Bos, "A Partial Analysis of the Current Population Status of the Nelchina Caribou 
Herd," Biological Papers of the University of Alaska, Special Report Number 1, September, 
1975, Proceeding s of the First International Reindeer and Caribou Symposium, 9-11 August,
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During the years between 1964 and 1972, the hunting season was extended 
three months, and harvest levels averaged 6,300. This harvest level occurred 
during the period of dramatic decline for the herd. A record harvest occurred 
in 1971 - 1972, when greater than 9,000 caribou were taken. This harvest was 
larger than the estimated population size the following fall.®̂  Between 1972 - 
1981 harvest rates were drastically reduced when the hunting season was 
shortened, bag limits were reduced and a permit system initiated in order to 
reduce the number of hunters participating. Over the following decade, the 
herd began to increase, and by 1981 it was thought to contain 20,730 caribou 
During the last decade, the herd continued to grow, and in 1992, when the 
ADF&G's Area Specific Management Plan for South Central/ Interior Alaska 
was released, the herd numbered approximately 45,000.
As stated in the plan, the ADF&G's population objectives for the 
Nelchina caribou herd were to:
. . . stabilize the herd at about 40,000 total animals in 1992 with a 
minimum of 40 bulls/100 cows and 40 calves/100 cows; and to 
maintain 1990 - 92 levels of animal growth and condition. Herd size 
and the bull: cow ratio presently exceed population objectives.^!
ADF&G, then, wanted to reduce the number of caribou in the herd because at
that time, the herd exceeded population objectives by 5,000 animals. Further,
ADF&G stated in a report about the Nelchina caribou herd between 1990 -
1992:
1972, University of Alaska, Fairbanks, AK, edited by Jack R. Luick, Peter C. Lent, David R. 
Klein, Robert G. White, p. 170 -180.
®^ictor Van Ballenberghe, "Wolf Predation on Caribou: The Nelchina Herd Case History," 
Journal of Wildlife Management 49(3):1985, p. 713.
90ibid., p. 712
Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife Conservation, Area Specific 
Wolf Management Plan for South Central /  Interior Alaska, September 9,1991; p. 14.
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Currently, wolf predation does not present a biological problem in the 
Nelchina herd as it is not resulting in a population decline. . . Wolf 
predation on Nelchina caribou is u n k n o w n . ^ 2
ADF&G information regarding wolf predation and its effects on the 
Nelchina herd does not build a strong case supporting wolf control. To the 
contrary, ADF&G biologists have concluded that wolf predation does not 
present a biological problem in the herd and wolf predation effects on the 
Nelchina herd are unknown. ADF&G's proposal to manage by killing 
wolves for no substantiated biological reason did not serve to win over public 
support. It served only to heighten controversy and further erode the public's 
confidence in ADF&G's professional expertise and decision-making abilities 
regarding wolf management. The Strategic Wolf Management Plan was 
intended to be a plan everyone could live with. If the Department was 
seeking public backing for its wolf plan, it should have presented better 
information and a stronger case supporting the need for wolf control.
Moose in GMU13:
In the Area Specific Plan for South Central / Interior Alaska (January 
1992), ADF&G reports that the moose population numbers approximately
22,000 in GMU 13. This number translates into a density of 1.4 moose per 
square mile of area below 4,000' in elevation in this unit. Moose density has 
hovered between 1.4 and 2.0 moose per square mile between 1986 and 1 9 9 2 .̂  ̂
ADF&G also indicates that the current population size, "is a relatively high-
Susan M. Abbott, ed.. Caribou. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife 
Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration, Management Report of Survey - Inventory 
Activities, 1 July 1990 - 30 June 1992, Projects W-23-5 & W-24-1, Study 3.0, December 1993, p. 92- 
95.
^%usan M. Abbot, ed.. Moose. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife 
Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration, Survey-Inventory Management Report, 1 
July 1989 - 30 June 1991, Projects W-23-3 and W-23-4, Study 1.0, February 1993, p.l07.
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density moose population for interior habitats."^^ According to ADF&G, 
GMU 13 moose increased during the 1950's, reaching a peak in 1960. The 
winter of 1961- 62 was severe, and precipitated a moose population decline.
In addition, severe winters in 1965-66 and 1971-72 are also thought to have 
decreased the moose population. The winters of 1972 through 1975 were 
relatively mild; however the GMU 13 moose population remained low, 
according to the ADF&G, with a calf : cow ratio of 15 :100 in 1975. A study 
was initiated by ADF&G to try to determine what factors were affecting moose
numbers.95
Wolf predation was believed to be the reason moose numbers were not 
increasing. However, food habit research on the wolf in GMU 13 concluded 
that, "moose comprised the bulk of the year-round diet [of wolves], but rates 
of predation on calves were not sufficient to cause the low moose calf : cow 
ratios in the basin."^ In addition, moose pregnancy rates were normal (88%), 
and the physical condition of moose in the Nelchina Basin rated, "high, and 
indicated that deteriorating range conditions probably were not the cause.
The Department began a close study of moose calf mortality in three 
areas of the Nelchina and upper Susitna river basins. This study assessed the 
effects of wolf predation on moose calf survival in part by eliminating wolves 
from certain areas and lowering wolf densities. The first area, "Area 1, the 
Susitna River Study Area (SRSA), was chosen because the gray wolf 
population was already low (1 wolf / 567 sq. km), compared to the two other 
areas where wolves occurred on the average every 277 sq. km. The low wolf
Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife Conservation, Area Specific 
Wolf Management Plan for South Central /  Interior Alaska, September 9,1991; p. 15.
^%allard et al., "Causes of Neonatal Moose Calf Mortality in South Central Alaska," Journal 
of Wildlife Management 45(2);1981, p. 335.
96ibid., p.336.
97jbid., p. 336.
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density in the SRSA, an 8,000 square mile area, was the result of a wolf 
elimination program by ADF&G five years earlier (1976-77)98** During this 
study (Ballard et al, 1981), 136 moose calves were radio-collared in the three 
study areas during 1977 and 1978. Ballard et al. (1981) were able to determine 
the fate of 96% of the calves radio-collared, and lost contact with three radio­
collared calves. Thirteen calves, or 9.5% died as a result of abandonment 
from radio-collaring activities. Sixty-six (55%) of the remaining 120 calves, 
died during their first six months of life from natural causes. Eighty-six 
percent of those naturally caused deaths resulted from predation. The 
biologists found that, in all three study areas, the most significant predator 
impacting moose calves was the brown bear. Brown bear kills accounted for 
79% of the natural mortality of radio collared moose calves. Further, the 
researchers learned that, "the differences in wolf density among the study
98lbid., p. 336-7.
**Predator control literature suggests, and ADF&G often justifies its wolf control programs by 
stating, that exploited wolf populations restore themselves within a couple of years. Here is 
one example found in ADF&G's own literature where this simply is not true, where perhaps 
unknown environmental or human-impact factors are limiting the wolf population. There are 
other areas in Alaska where wolves appear to have never completely recovered after wolf 
control programs, including the Arctic (Van Ballenberghe, "Wolf Management in Alaska: Are 
We At A Crossroads?", Institute of Northern Forestry, 201 East 9th Avenue, Suite 206, 
Anchorage, AK 99501; Paper Presented at the lUCN Wolf Specialists Group Species, Survival 
Commission Meeting, Fairbanks, AK, 12 August, 1988.), northern Bristol Bay Area(ADF&G, 
Wolf Survey Inventory Report, 1 July, 1991 - 30 June 1992), Denali State Park, where wolves 
have been virtually eliminated for almost 15 years (Dan Elliot, State Park's Citizen Advisory 
Board member, "Crying Out For Denali State Park Bears!", The Spirit, News from The Alaska 
Wildlife Alliance, Vol 12, No. 1 January - February, 1993, p. 9.) and some areas of the 
Fortymile country (an individual from the Tok area wrote to the Board of Game during the 1992 
wolf controversy expressing his concern over certain areas in the Fortymile area where wolves 
had not repopulated since the last round of wolf control). Also, wolves have successfully been 
depleted or removed from regions where reindeer herding currently is practiced in Alaska. 
ADF&G divulges no information regarding the loss of wolf populations in certain parts of 
Alaska. Since there has never been a complete census done of wolves in Alaska, there has never 
been, and still is no concrete point of reference for wolves in many given areas of the state. Most 
of ADF&G's literature suggests the wolf population in Alaska is healthy and totals between 
five and seven thousand. There are no indications that wolf numbers have fallen in certain 
pockets of the state, and the situation remains that population trends cannot be effectively 
monitored across the state due to current lack of information.
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areas did not appear to be an important factor affecting calf mortality."^^ 
Preliminary data indicated that either small or no increases occurred in the 
calf : cow ratio following wolf population reduction. Ballard et al. concluded 
that, "no substantial increases in calf survival were observed following 
reductions in wolf densities. The hypothesis that wolf predation was the 
main cause of moose calf mortality in the Nelchina Basin (Bishop and 
Rausch 1974) is not supported.”̂ *̂®
In other words, ADF&G's own data, biologists and published literature 
conclude that wolf control in GMU 13 has little or no effect on moose calf 
survivorship. More importantly, Ballard et al. (1981) found that brown bears 
were the most significant predator of moose calves. All other things being 
equal, calf survivorship is one of the most critical components in herd 
growth, as long as the habitat and environment (both external and internal) 
of the herd is healthy and can withstand growth. This information does not 
support a measure to implement wolf population reduction in order to 
increase moose population numbers.
Wolves in GMU 13:
Since the 1940's, when the federal and later state governments got 
involved, wolves in GMU 13 have been subject to exploitation and 
population control. Little is known about the status of wolf populations in 
GMU 13 prior to 1948. Early reports by explorers suggest that both wolves and 
ungulates were scarce in this area in the late 1800's.ioi During the 1930's, wolf
^^Ballard et al., "Causes of Neonatal Moose Calf Mortality in South Central Alaska," Journal 
of Wildlife Management 45(2):1981, p. 339. 
lOOibid., p. 342.
lOlwarren B. Ballard, Jackson S. Whitman, and Craig Gardner, "Ecology of an exploited wolf 
population in south-central Alaska," Wildlife Monographs, July, 1987, No. 98, p. 23.
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sightings increased and wolves were considered to be more common, as was 
documented in Murie' reports (1944) and indications from a local resident 
and p i l o t .  ^ 0 2  Federal programs to eliminate wolves began in the 1940's in this 
area. Using poisoning and aerial gunning, the federal government reduced 
wolf density in GMU 13 significantly between 1948 and 1953. It is believed 
that only twelve wolves were left in the area by 1953 (Rausch 1969)A^^ In 
1957, biologists estimated the Nelchina caribou herd to be close to its carrying 
capacity, and the Secretary of the Interior stopped all wolf hunting in GMU 13 
in order to allow for research on undisturbed predator-prey interactions. Also 
increased predation was desirable because the herd may have been nearing 
carrying capacity.i04 ADF&G biologists believe that wolves increased to 
approximately 125 by 1961, after the federal control program was stopped and 
when the moose population was thought to be at its peak. Biologists then 
thought that wolf numbers, "may have increased to a peak of 350-450 by 1965 
when the moose population was declining (Rausch 1967, 1969; Bishop and 
Rausch 1974)."i05
During ongoing predator/ prey relationship research in this unit between 
1975 and 1984, wolf densities in GMU 13 (not including the Susitna River 
Study Area (SRSA) and areas above 1,220 meters in elevation) varied from 
10.3 wolves/1,000 sq. km in autumn 1975 to 2.6/1,000 sq. km in spring 1982.̂ 06 
By extrapolating wolf density estimates to available wolf habitat in GMU 13,
102ibid., p. 6.
p. 6.
104lou N. Carbyn, ed.. Wolves in Canada and Alaska. Canadian Wildlife Service Rep. Ser. 
No. 45, Ottawa, 1983,135p.; Samuel J. Harbo, and Frederick C. Dean, "Historical and Current 
Perspectives on Wolf Management in Alaska," p. 51 - 64.
lOSyvarren B. Ballard, Jackson S. Whitman, and Craig Gardner, "Ecology of an exploited wolf 
population in south-central Alaska," Wildlife Monographs, July, 1987, No. 98, p. 6. 
lO^Ibid., p. 24.
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including the SRSA, GMU 13 biologists estimated that wolf populations 
ranged from 426 wolves in autumn 1975 to 109 in spring of 1982.
It is thought that wolf numbers reached their peak in 1975 -1976, but 
declined each year after as a result of aircraft-assisted ground shooting and 
state wolf control programs. Ballard et al. found during their studies between 
1975 - 1982 that trapping and aircraft assisted hunting were responsible for up 
to 61% of the mortality of wolves. Natural mortality was in addition to 
hunting and trapping, and was responsible for 20% of wolf deaths. State wolf 
control between 1977 -1978 accounted for 6% of wolf mortality. Ballard et al. 
(1987) concluded that the wolf population was being controlled primarily by 
human hunting and trapping. They found that, "mortality levels and rates of 
increase were inversely correlated, indicating that this wolf population was 
being controlled primarily by human harvest."^07 Ballard et al. (1987) 
indicated that an overall mortality rate of 50% would keep the wolf 
population in GMU 13 stable.
This information is curious in light of the fact that wolf densities overall 
in Alaska are low when compared with other wolf densities in North 
America, and wolf populations throughout much of Alaska are limited by 
human harvest. A table of reported wolf densities (published in 1987) 
indicates that during the 1970's and 1980's the reported wolf densities in 
Alaska were as follows:
Area (wolves /1,000 sq. km)
Tanana Flats, AK (Stephenson 1977): 11
Nelchina Basin, AK (Ballard et al. 1975-82): 3-10
Brooks Range, AK (Stephenson 1975): 3-6
Kenai Peninsula, AK (Peterson et al. 1984): 11-20
107ibid., p. 28.
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Reports from other parts of North America included:
Superior Nat'l Forest, MN (Van Ballenberghe et al. 1975): 42
Bel tram Island State Forest, MN (Fritts and Mech 1981) 7-30
Algonquin Park, Ontario (Pimlott et al. 1969): 39
West Canada (Carbyn 1975) 4
Baffin Island, Canada (Clark 1971) 3
Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Northwest Territories (Parker 1973) 21̂ 8
These numbers suggest that portions of Canada and Alaska have similarly
low wolf densities.
While it may perhaps be argued that overall Alaska and Canada’s
habitats do not allow for densities as high as other parts of America, it is
important to realize that parts of Canada and Alaska have undergone similar
wolf management approaches. Wolves can and have reached higher
densities in Alaska than are indicated in the majority of areas above, and
Alaska's habitats and certainly GMU 13 can withstand greater densities of
wolves than exist there now. However, since the federal government began
wolf control programs, and subsequently since the state took over the
stewardship of wildlife in Alaska, management approaches in general have
been to maintain wolf populations below what the habitat and prey species
can support. The 1992 Area Specific plan is a perfect example of this type of
practice. The goal for wolves in GMU 13, as stated in the Area Specific Plan,
is, "maintaining wolf numbers substantially below their potential."i09
Wolf densities in GMU 13 have been significantly limited without state
sponsored control, due to heavy exploitation of wolves through regular
hunting and trapping practices. In GMU 13 and in other GMU's in Alaska,
wolf control programs are an additional pressure to wolf populations which
lOSlbid., p. 25.
^^^Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife Conservation, Area Specific 
Wolf Management Plan for South Central /  Interior Alaska, September 9,1991; p. 52.
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are already being maintained at a significantly reduced level. Wolf specialist, 
Paul Joslin, stated regarding wolf density in Alaska:
Only now is the public coming to recognize that, while Alaska could at 
one time boast that it had the highest density of wolves to be found 
anywhere in America, today it is a poor second, falling far behind 
Minnesota.110
A recent letter to the editor in the Anchorage Daily News, written by J.
Michael Devitt, echoed Joslin's comments:
Surely in a state the size of Alaska, which has far fewer wolves per 
square mile than Minnesota; which has far fewer people per square 
mile than Minnesota; and which has a hunting population similar in 
size to Minnesota, we should be able to co-exist witii a few thousand 
wolves.Ill
Wolves in GMU 13 and the Alaskan wolf population overall are undergoing 
continuous human harvest pressure and exploitation. This pressure is 
similar to current practices regarding coyotes in the contiguous United States 
referred to in chapter one.
Ballard et al. (1987) learned that moose composed approximately 70% of 
wolf kills in GMU 13. During May and June, 30% of moose killed by wolves 
were moose calves, which was less or in proportion to the calf : adult ratio. 
This changed during winter months, when 40% of the kills were calves, and 
calves represented only 12-20% of the population. This information suggests 
that moose calves were perhaps more vulnerable than adults in winter due to 
environmental factors such as snow cover. Adult moose were the most 
common prey for wolves, composing 38% of the observed kills (total of 
439).ii2
l^Opaul Joslin, PhD, Director of Research and Education, Wolf Haven International, Letter to 
Governor W. J. Hickel, January 16,1993, p. 3.
m  'Room for Alaskans, wolves," Anchorage Daily News. 13 February, 1995, p. B-7 
ll^Warren B. Ballard, Jackson S. Whitman, and Craig Gardner, "Ecology of an exploited wolf 
population in south-central Alaska," Wildlife Monographs, July, 1987, No. 98, p. 31.
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Ballard et al. (1987) concluded that wolves were not inhibiting the 
growth of the moose population in GMU 13. Based on a model created by 
Keith (1983), where a "ratio of 132 moose : wolf prior to calving would be 
sufficient to produce a stationary moose population if kill rates equaled 8.1 
adult m o o s e / w o l f / y e a r , " i i 3  Ballard et al.'s (1987) study ascertained that 
moose : wolf ratios between late spring 1980 through late spring 1984 were too 
high to stabilize growth of this moose population. They determined that:
Comparison of yearling moose recruitment rates in 1980 - 81 and 1983 - 
84 with estimated mortality due to wolf predation indicated that wolf 
predation was not preventing moose population growth at that 
time.
It seems quite possible that even with a higher wolf density, wolf 
predation would not have impeded the increase of the moose population in 
GMU 13. Data that Ballard et al. (1987) presented regarding their study 
illustrates that, in 1980 - 1981, wolves were estimated to have killed 78 adult 
and yearling moose in a 2,435 - sq, km. portion of the SRSA. This was the 
equivalent of 6% of the adults and yearlings present on June 1, 1980. The 
following year's recruitment rate totaled 24% of the population. Likewise, in 
1983-4 wolves were estimated to have killed 97 adults and yearlings in a 3,735 
sq. km. area of the SRSA, which represented approximately 4% of the adults 
and yearlings present on June 1, 1983. The following year's recruitment rates 
were estimated at 19%. Thus Ballard et al. (1987) concluded in both instances 
that wolf predation during low wolf densities (the wolf population was 
decreased by approximately 50% in the 7,262 sq. km SRSA in GMU 13 from
ii3lbid., p .  4 2 .  
p .  4 4 .
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approximately 425 in 1975, a pre-control level, to approximately 109 by 
1982115) did not prevent the moose population from increasing.
In either of the above mentioned kill estimates, if one imagines that 
wolf numbers had not been reduced (making them 50% higher than they 
were for the above results either before or after the control period), and if 
subsequently the moose kill rates doubled for '80 - 81 and '83 - 84, the 
following spring recruitment rates still would be significantly higher: 12% 
moose killed out of 24% recruitment rate in 1981, and 8% moose killed out of 
a 19% recruitment rate in 1984. Doubling the kill rate for a 50% increase in 
the wolf population is likely greater than a realistic proportional increase 
would be because wolves in larger packs do not necessarily kill 
proportionately more.ii^ This could suggest that even at higher densities, the 
predation rate by wolves may not impede the moose population from 
increasing.
ADF&G's research regarding wolves in relation to both caribou and 
moose in GMU 13 does not suggest that wolves are limiting either 
population. To the contrary, it indicates that wolves, at either low or higher 
densities are taking well below recruitment rates for either moose or caribou. 
There is no apparent support in ADF&G literature for implementing wolf 
control.
The type of wolf control proposed for GMU 13 was very controversial 
and did not gain support from the majority of the public. ADF&G 
recommended that the public be involved in fixed-wing aircraft-assisted 
hunting, or "land-and-shoot" hunting or "aerial trapping" ( "land-and-shoot "
p. 24.
^Gordon C. Haber, Ph.D., "Wildlife Management in Alaska: Southcentral-Interior Wolf 
Control and Related Issues, Wolf Haven International, Tenino, WA and The Alaska Wildlife 
Alliance, Anchorage, AK, November, 1992, p. 37-38.
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hunting and "aerial trapping" are identical practices, only implemented 
under different permits). This type of hunting allows individuals to be 
airborne the same day they shoot wolves (which is illegal for most species 
because it easily leads to harassment, violations of the Federal Airborne 
Hunting Act and excessive killing), and also allows for planes to track wolves 
from the air. This practice is very controversial for Alaskans, and was banned 
in 1991 after an incident involving gross violations and illegal wolf hunting 
practices by an Anchorage orthopedic surgeon that attracted national media 
attention. Some background information about this practice may put it into 
perspective and illustrate the ephemeral nature of the state of Alaska's 
wildlife management decisions:
Dr. John ("Jack") Frost was a known wolf-hunting advocate in 
Anchorage, and had testified before the Board of Game in favor of aircraft 
assisted hunting and trapping. In 1991, Frost, was arraigned on charges that 
he violated the Airborne Hunting Act, the Lacey Act, and participated in 
illegal hunting and trapping in a National Wildlife Refuge in 1991. Radio 
transmissions recorded by the National Park Service were submitted as 
evidence against Jack Frost in court, and excerpts of these tapes are as follows:
"They're right under my right wing right now, heading the same way I 
am, so I'm going to ride over this way a little more."
"The front two are considerable bigger."
"OK . . . they're doing good right now. "
"Well. . . I'm north of you . . .  is that the way you're going to push 
them? "
"Shot at wolves twice . . .  let him go for now."
"We had five on the run, shot two. "
"Jimmie got one. "
"He wasn't completely dead . . . We'll go back later. The damn thing 
jumped up and bit my wing."
"It's always fun. Yes, Jimmie saw them. "
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"I wasn't paying attention too much, except for tree tops and trying to 
move him back on to the lake."
"Hello Jack."
"Is this Bill?"
"Skipper said, thank you. Jack."
. . . "Jimmie stuck three arrows in him."
"He was still blinking his eyes at us, so I didn't want to take a chance of 
getting bit, so we'll go back a little bit later."
"He had an arrow up his ass and he didn't like that one bit."^^^
The Alaska Wildlife Alliance reported more on the case:
Further investigation on the ground in this area revealed wolf tracks, 
within the Kanuti National Wildlife Refuge, that showed abrupt 
changes in direction, including sharp reversals in course, periodically 
intersected by aircraft ski tracks in a snaking pattern atypical of a 
normal landing, taxiing or take-off pattern. The snow was three feet 
deep and the wolf tracks "showed a wolf falling down occasionally and 
between leaps were spots of urine, indicating the wolf to be exhausted 
and under stress." Aircraft and wolf tracks of this nature at five 
different sites indicated aircraft on the surface had been chasing wolves. 
Several skinned wolf carcasses which had apparently been shot with 
rifles and/or bow and arrow were found in the area.^i*
Alaska is a vast state with limited funds for enforcement personnel. The state
cannot ensure that hunting, especially aircraft-assisted hunting, is practiced
legally.
In an interview in the spring of 1991, before same-day airborne hunting 
and trapping was banned, former ADF&G biologist and Board of Game 
member, and current United States Forest Service biologist, Victor Van 
Ballenberghe, stated about "aerial trapping" and land-and-shoot " hunting:
I think that we probably ought to eliminate land-and-shoot hunting.
It's something that's been done for quite some time; it's a tradition and 
it has a lot of supporters. But to me, it is fraught with problems and, to 
me, the only way to solve those problems is really to prohibit the
117wayne Hall, ed., "Alliance Interview With Dr. Vic Van Ballenberghe Continues . . .," The 
Spirit, News From The Alaska Wildlife Alliance, March - April, 1991; Vol, 10, No. 2; p. 3. 
ll^ibid.
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practice. I don't think we can solve the problems and still permit the 
practice.ii^
When asked if he thought aerial trapping and land-and-shoot hunting had 
been used in such a way that the public was actually involved in ongoing 
wolf control, just not control which was so deemed officially by the state. Van 
Ballenberghe responded:
They have been in the past, in my opinion. I'm not sure about the 
present. In some of the areas where land-and-shoot was resurrected at 
the November, 1989 Board of Game meeting, there was no need to 
resurrect it for control purposes because the number of wolves in 
relation to the prey there was so low that the wolves really weren't 
having any impact on moose and caribou populations, or the harvest. 
As I say. I'm not sure what the situation is now, but in the past, in my 
opinion, land-and-shoot was endorsed by a lot of people who felt that if 
land-and-shoot went away, that wolf populations would go sky high 
and impact moose and caribou.^^o
The plans for GMU 13 seemed to be repeating history in Alaska. Wolf control
was not warranted biologically, but was nevertheless promulgated based on
tradition and an unfounded fear that if wolves are not removed, wolf
populations will multiply in an unlimited fashion.
ADF&G's published literature for GMU 13 indicates that the Nelchina 
caribou herd has exceeded the Department's population objectives, that wolf 
predation is neither limiting nor presenting a biological problem for the 
Nelchina herd, and that wolf predation effects on the Nelchina herd are 
unknown. In addition, the moose population is reported to be healthy and at 
a "high-density level" for its habitat. Long term studies in the area which 
compared lower and higher density wolf populations and their varying effects
ll^Wayne Hall, ed., "Alliance Interview With Dr. Vic Van Ballenberghe Continues . . .," The 
Spirit, News From The Alaska Wildlife Alliance, March - April, 1991; Vol, 10, No. 2; p. 2. 
l^Olbid.
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on moose yielded that no significant increases in calf survival were observed 
following wolf reduction. Wolf predation was found not to limit or hinder 
moose population growth in this area.
In spite of these conclusions, the ADF&G proposed wolf control for this 
area. The justification given for this action was:
Moose and caribou are abundant in GMU 13. The wolf population is 
highly productive because of the plentiful prey base. Annual pup 
recruitment can account for 30-40% of the population. At current 
population levels, unless a significant proportion of annual 
recruitment is harvested, wolf numbers will increase. Only by 
maintaining wolf numbers substantially below their potential can 
human use objectives for moose and caribou populations be
a c h ie v e d .121
This justification, however, is not supported by ADF&G’s own literature, and 
wolf control does not appear to be justifiable. ADF&G information indicates 
that brown bears are playing a significant role in predation of moose, and that 
killing wolves is not likely going to lead to the Department's desired results. 
Many involved in the debate questioned the intent of the plan and the 
integrity of the Department. Is this an example of the Department’s "anti­
wolf" mentality that Theberge speaks of? To many ecologists and scientists, 
environmentalists, animal-rights activists and general members of the public, 
the answer is, ’yes.’ Director of Wildlife Conservation, Mr. Kelleyhouse, 
seemed to be pushing his own agenda through the public process.
121 Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife Conservation, Area Specific 
Wolf Management Plan for South Central /  Interior Alaska, September 9,1991; p. 52.
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TANANA FOOTHILLS AND FLATS AREA IN INTERIOR ALASKA,
GMU 20A:
The Tanana Foothills and Flats area (GMU 20A) is located in east-central 
Alaska, south of Fairbanks. Geographically, this area experiences an abrupt 
change from the lowlands (Tanana Flats) in the northern portion of this unit 
to the northern foothills and mountains of the Alaska range (Tanana 
Foothills). Elevations rise up to 4,000 meters, though ungulate populations 
generally are not found above 2,000 meters. The Tanana Flats area lies above 
permafrost with primarily poor drainage, many shallow ponds, bogs, and 
some clear streams flowing into large glacier-fed rivers. There are some 
scattered hills in the Flats as well. Fire has played a significant ecological role 
in the Tanana Flats area, resulting in vegetation consisting primarily of 
shrubs, young forests and mature black spruce stands. The Tanana Foothills 
vegetation includes: white spruce, black spruce, paper birch and quaking 
aspen at lower elevations. Shrub communities including willow and dwarf 
birch give way to alpine tundra at higher elevations. Winter remains in the 
region from October through April, with temperatures frequently hovering 
between -10 to -40 C during those months. Snow levels usually remain below 
80 cm.
GMU 20A's proximity to Fairbanks has created high public use and 
interest in this area. GMU 20A is considered one of interior Alaska's most 
important moose hunting areas. It has also supported caribou, sheep and, in 
some parts of the area, aerial wolf hunting activities (much of GMU 20A is 
forested and therefore does not provide good aircraft-assisted wolf hunting 
opportunity). Because GMU 20A is primarily used for sport-hunting
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activities from residents of Fairbanks and individuals from out of state, this 
area is considered by the Joint Boards to be a "nonsubsistence use area." 
ADF&G has targeted this area for intensive management of its wildlife.
Delta Caribou Herd:
Not much information on the Delta Caribou Herd (DCH) exists prior to 
the 1950's. Caribou ranging between the Canadian border and the Nenana 
River have been documented since at least 1918 (Murie 1935), though their 
herd identity has not been well understood. Some researchers suggest that 
the Delta herd and others in proximity to it are remnant populations of the 
once expansive Fortymile Herd.^22
A handful of separate herds were thought to inhabit areas close to the 
Delta herd, including the Mentasta, Chisana, Macomb and Yanert herds. 
Initially, biologists spent time trying to identify distinct herds, using Skoog’s 
(1968) definition which delineates, " . . .  a herd becomes an entity 
(subpopulation) when it establishes a calving area distinct from that of any 
other herd and uses this area repeatedly over a period of years."i23 Prior to 
1987, the Delta herd was considered a distinct herd (please refer to appendix 3 
for range of Delta herd). Early reports suggested that the herd contained no 
more than three hundred caribou during the 1940's - 1950's. During the late 
1950's and 1960's it was thought that the herd rapidly increased from
l^^Gordon C. Haber, Ph.D., "Wildlife Management in Alaska: Southcentral-Interior Wolf 
Control and Related Issues, Wolf Haven International, Tenino, WA and The Alaska Wildlife 
Alliance, Anchorage, AK, November, 1992, p. 64.
^^^James L. Davis et al., "Demography of the Delta Caribou Herd Under Varying Rates of 
Natural Mortality and Human Harvest and Assessment of Field Techniques for Acquiring 
Demographic Data," Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife 
Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Research Final Report, January 1991, 
Projects W-22-5 through W-23-3 Study 3.33, p. 8.
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approximately 1,500 - 3,000 caribou to about 5,000. The herd apparently 
declined in the 1970's and by 1973 was thought to include 2,400 animals.
Between 1973 - 1979 there were no population censuses done for the 
Delta Caribou Herd, even though wolf control was either implemented or 
proposed during these years. Population trends during this time, therefore, 
are based in part on conjecture. By 1976, biologists thought the herd 
contained between 1,500 - 2,000 caribou, based on aerial surveys and 
extrapolations from recruitment rates. During this year, "the population 
probably began to increase when recruitment increased during 1976. This 
change coincided with wolf removal and began 3 years after hunting had
ended."124
By 1979 population estimates suggested the herd numbered 4,191 
caribou. The herd continued to grow exponentially (at a rate of r = 0.18) 
between 1979 - 1982. Once hunting increased, the growth rate slowed, leaving 
the average growth rate between 1979 and 1989 at 0.10.125 In 1987, a growing 
Delta herd overlapped the Yanert range during all seasons, and since 1988 
there has been no biological basis for distinguishing the herds. The Delta 
herd reached a population high in 1989, when population estimates suggested 
the herd numbered approximately 10,700. Poor summer calf and adult female 
survival rates between 1989 and 1991 apparently catalyzed a decline. The 
Delta herd continued to decline through 1992, at a rate of 40% between 1989 
and 1992. Population estimates in 1991 and 1992 indicate the herd now 
numbers approximately 5 ,800.126
124ibid., p. 33.
125lbid.
126Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife Conservation, Area Specific 
Wolf Management Plan for South Central /  Interior Alaska, September 9,1991; p. 28.
115
Some researchers speculate that the Delta herd's suggested range, habitat 
and climactic conditions found within its range limit the herd to low 
numbers (between approximately 3 - 5,000). A number of researchers indicate 
that high numbers in the herd (between 7 - 10,000) can only be maintained for 
short periods due to these environmental limitations. Haber indicates that 
the known history of the Delta caribou herd suggests that it experiences, "a 
variety of prohibitive "population responses" and "precipitous declines" 
[which] are likely to occur at herd sizes above ~5,000-6,000."^27
Dry summers and harsh winters are also recognized by ADF&G and 
many others as factors potentially impacting Delta herd growth. ADF&G 
biologists, Valkenburg et al. (1992), began a study of the herd to try to 
determine the reasons for its decline. Their study hypothesized that,
"warmer and perhaps drier than normal summer weather played a key role 
in reducing parturition, and probably conception rates of adult females and 
reducing body condition in calves and adults. The relatively severe winters 
of 1989-90, 1990-91, and 1991-92 probably contributed to increased adult, 
yearling, and winter calf mortality,""i28 which Valkenburg et al. (1992) 
attributed primarily to wolf predation. Valkenburg et al. (1992) outlined that 
the Delta herd decline was caused by, "poor calf survival from birth to 
October, increased mortality of adult females during winter and summer, and 
lower May parturition rates in females > 36 months old.""i29 it is interesting
^^^Gordon C. Haber, Ph.D., "Wildlife Management in Alaska: Southcentral-Interior Wolf 
Control and Related Issues, Wolf Haven International, Tenino, WA and The Alaska Wildlife 
Alliance, Anchorage, AK, November, 1992,p. 68.
128patrick Valkenburg, "Investigation of Regulating and Limiting Factors in the Delta Caribou 
Herd,” Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife Conservation, Federal Aid 
in Wildlife Restoration Research Progress Report, Project W-23-5, Study 3.37, Juneau, AK, 
November 1992, p. i.
129patrick Valkenburg, "Investigation of Regulating and Limiting Factors in the Delta Caribou 
Herd," Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife Conservation, Federal Aid
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to note that other herds declined during the same period, including the 
Denali, Chisana, Fortymile, Macomb, and Mentasta herds.
Other significant information from the Valkenburg et al. (1992) study 
includes: 1) the pregnancy rate of radio-collared caribou cows > 36 months old 
declined significantly in 1990 and 1991, from a mean rate of 87.7% between 
1984 and 1989 to 71.6% in 1990 and 1991;̂ 30 2) the fall ratio of calves : 100 cows 
declined steadily and drastically from 65 in 1979 to 8 in 1991, with a significant 
drop between 1989,1990 and 1991 when the ratios were 36,17, and 8 
respectively (the average ratio between 1979 and 1989 was 39.9, with the 
lowest recorded ratio during that decade being 29 in 1982);i^i 3) the mean 
weight of 10-month-old Delta caribou herd calves fell steadily from 62.3 in 
1983 to 54.0 in 1992 — the lowest recorded ever (records date back to 1979).i32
Valkenburg et al. (1992) suggested that perhaps a combination of snow 
depth and dry, warmer summers have affected herd growth. Between 1980 
and 1989, the average snow fall recorded was 9.6 inches, with the highest 
snow fall at 25 inches in 1985. In 1990 and 1991, snow fall increased 
dramatically with 43 and 41 inches recorded respectively. A correlation 
between calf : cow ratios and snow depth based on preliminary data appears 
evident. Between 1981 and 1989, the average calf : 100 cows ratio was 35.4. 
When snow levels leapt to 43 inches, the calves : 100 cows ratio dropped to 17 
in 1990, and 8 in 1991. In addition, the mean summer temperature has 
increased steadily from 56.5 in 1980 to 59.5 in 1991.
in Wildlife Restoration Research Progress Report, Project W-23-5, Study 3.37, Juneau, AK, 
November 1992, p. i.
1 3 0 ib id ., p . 5 .
I31lbid.
I32jbid., p. 17.
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Furthermore, in September of 1992, the Delta herd made an unusual 
northeasterly movement toward Fairbanks, perhaps indicating 
environmental limitations of their range had forced an exit. ADF&G 
reported:
On about 20 September, most of the herd was in the western foothills 
of Subunit 20A. However, by 28 September, the herd had made a 
highly unusual northeasterly movement from their normal rutting 
area in southwest Subunit 20A, and virtually the entire Delta herd was 
on the Tanana Flats. On 5 October we estimated that 1,600 Delta herd 
caribou were within 10 miles of Fairbanks based on the distribution of 
radio-collared caribou. Approximately 700 of these had crossed the 
Tanana River and were west and north of Fairbanks. Record-breaking 
snow and cold in September probably precipitated this unusual 
movement. Twenty-four inches of snow fell in September which is 
more than three times the previous record snowfall. Temperatures 
were 13 degrees F colder than average, making it the coldest September 
on record.
This highly unusual movement suggests something significant occurred 
between the herd and what is considered its normal range.
Based on the data thus far, Valkenburg et al. (1992) concluded that:
The fact that there was a significant reduction in pregnancy rate of 
adult (4 years and older) females in 1990 and 1991 and a significant 
reduction in mean body weights of 10-month-old females in 1990 - 92 
indicates that nutrition of DCH caribou has been relatively poor in 
recent years. Whether the effects are primarily from poor winter or 
summer nutrition is still unclear; however, summer nutrition is 
generally agreed to be the primary factor influencing pregnancy rate.i34
Similar problems affecting the Delta herd were determined to exist in 1974,
when reproductive failure was found to be a significant contributing factor to
the decline of the herd in the early 1970's. Declining caribou calf/ cow ratios
133susan M. Abbott, ed.. Caribou. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife 
Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration, Survey-Inventory Management Report, 1 
July 1990 - 30 June 1992, Projects W-23-5 & W-24-1, Study 3.0, December 1993, p.l31.
3̂‘*ibid., p. 9
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suggested that calf mortality increased steadily between 1970 -1974, and by 
1974 almost all calves died prior to winter.^ 35
In spite of existing data suggesting climactic and habitat condition 
limitations on Delta caribou, ADF&G has continued to focus much of their 
research efforts on wolves and their impact on this herd. Predator impacts on 
ungulates have been the focus of many ADF&G ungulate related studies 
throughout the state. Van Ballenberghe (1985) pointed out that:
. . .  of the factors that influence the demography of caribou and affect 
their rate of increase, predation, principally by gray wolves, has 
received much attention. Despite this, caribou biologists disagree on 
the relative importance of predation as a regulation factor for
caribou.136
The most recent and complete study of the demography of the Delta herd, 
which synthesizes information from the past ten years, is a good example of 
how wolf predation remains a focus of ADF&G ungulate studies. Several 
objectives of the Davis et al. (1991) study on the Delta herd, for example, 
surrounded wolves and their potential impact on the herd. Their objectives 
included to determine: ". . .  caribou : predator ratios in the range of the DCH 
and YCH [Yanert Caribou Herd];. . .  the correlation between wolf abundance 
and the number of caribou killed by wolves; [and]. . .  if caribou killed by 
predators are taken in proportion to their representation in the population in 
terms of sex and age."̂ 37 while many other objectives were listed in the
135\Yiiiiam c . Gasaway, Robert O. Stephenson, James L. Davis, Peter K. Shepherd, and Oliver 
E. Burris, "Interrelationships of Wolves, Prey and Man in Interior Alaska," Wildlife 
Monographs, Vol. 47, No. 3, July, 1983, No. 84, p. 3, 25.
136yictor Van Ballenberghe, "Wolf Predation on Caribou: The Nelchina Herd Case History," 
Journal of Wildlife Management 49(3): 711-720,1985, p. 711.
^37james L. Davis et al., "Demography of the Delta Caribou Herd Under Varying Rates of 
Natural Mortality and Human Harvest and Assessment of Field Techniques for Acquiring 
Demographic Data," Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife 
Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Research Final Report, January 1991, 
Projects W-22-5 through W-23-3 Study 3.33, p. 6.
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study, habitat, range limitations and climactic considerations, which seem to 
be significant limitations on this particular herd, were not included.
If ADF&G's aim is to try to present clear data on how wolves limit 
caribou populations, Davis et al. (1991) did not produce those results. Davis et 
al. (1991) found that the wolf ; caribou and wolf : caribou equivalent ratios for 
1975 (prior to wolf control in 1976 - 1982 and 1984) and comparison ratios 
from 1985 are as follows:
1975: 239 wolves, 2,900 moose, 2,000 caribou = 1 wolf : 45
caribou equivalents 
1985 195 wolves, 8,500 moose, 8,000 caribou = 1 wolf : 172
caribou equivalents! ̂ 8
These ratios indicate that there were less wolves per ungulate in 1985 than in 
1975. Using a model designed by Keith (1983), Davis et al. (1991) determined 
that in order for the Delta caribou herd to be stabilized by wolves, one-third of 
their diet would have to be caribou, an equivalent of eight caribou per wolf 
per year. However, they discussed the results of a study by Gasaway et al. 
(1983), which revealed that out of 156 wolves taken between 1975 - 1979 
throughout GMU 20A, stomach contents occurrence indicated frequencies of: 
55% moose and 12% caribou.!^^ Wolves were apparently preying 
significantly more on moose than on caribou in the area, and caribou did not 
approach the one-third level needed in the wolf's diet to stabilize the herd. In 
1977, the ratio of caribou to moose was ~2,000 : 3,300, and, in 1991, it was 
~5,700 :11,072. Given the high percentage of moose Gasaway et al. (1983) 
found in GMU 20A wolf diets, and that currently there is a larger proportion 
of moose to caribou than there was in 1977, it seems unlikely that wolves 
would be preying more on caribou now. It also seems unlikely that wolves,
!38lbid., p. 42.
139lbid., p. 43.
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either in 1977 or now, are stabilizing or significantly decreasing the Delta 
Caribou herd. Further, Valkenburg et al. (1992) found with regard to 
recruitment that, ". . . 10 month-old calf weight was the most important 
variable in predicting fall calf : cow ratio, and the caribou : wolf ratio did not 
explain significant additional variation."140
Still, ADF&G's focus on wolves in its research continues to highlight the 
wolf as a primary negative factor on the herd, and arguably perpetuates a 
negative image of the wolf. The following passage regarding wolves and the 
Delta herd is an example of this:
Throughout the history of the DCH there has been a negative 
correlation between wolf abundance and recruitment rate of caribou; 
the correlation has been positive between wolf abundance and the 
natural mortality rate of caribou. Determining if this relationship is 
one of cause and effect is confounded because of unknown density- 
dependent relationships within the caribou p o p u l a t i o n . i 4 i
While computer generated graphs may well indicate that such a correlation
exists between wolves and the Delta herd, this relationship may not be
relevant when determining current problems within the herd. Given that
the herd is presently experiencing stresses related to health, nutrition and
recruitment rate, highlighting the wolf correlation appears misleading. Many
feel that continuing to focus on wolves as the primary negative influence on
the Delta herd is misdirected. At present the "high " number of wolves is not
what seems to be limiting the herd.
^40patrick Valkenburg, "Investigation of Regulating and Limiting Factors in the Delta Caribou 
Herd," Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife Conservation, Federal Aid 
in Wildlife Restoration Research Progress Report, Project W-23-5, Study 3.37, Juneau, AK, 
November 1992, p. 8-9.
141james L. Davis et al., "Demography of the Delta Caribou Herd Under Varying Rates of 
Natural Mortality and Human Harvest and Assessment of Field Techniques for Acquiring 
Demographic Data," Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife 
Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Research Final Report, January 1991, 
Projects W-22-5 through W-23-3 Study 3.33, p. 58.
121
Julie Kitchens, a Ph.D. candidate in Wildlife Biology at the University of 
Alaska, Fairbanks, spoke in support of a change of focus within ADF&G 
research when she testified at the November, 1992 Board of Game meeting. 
She testified:
"I am a PhD student at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, working on 
caribou.. . .  I have worked with the Central Arctic Herd, and the Delta 
caribou herd. I want to talk specifically about the Delta caribou herd 
since we're talking about intensive management in area 20A. I’m 
going to go through some history I'm sure that most of you guys know 
already. Bear with me; it will be short. The Delta caribou herd had
6,000 animals in the '70 s before wolf control. At the time they had a 
70% pregnancy rate in two-year old caribou, suggesting high nutrition 
and a very healthy herd. They implemented wolf control, and over a 
number of years, 80% of wolves were removed. The herd began 
increasing, but the pregnancy rate for two-year olds dropped to 10%.
The herd peaked at 12,000 three or four years ago, and wolves are back 
to the numbers they were prior to wolf control. In the last three years, 
the herd has declined by 50% to about 5 or 6,000 animals. The calves 
are small. The cows are small. The animals are small suggesting that 
nutrition may be involved, and that it may not be a simple cause and 
effect relationship between wolves and caribou. The point I want to 
make is that 1 would like to see Fish and Game look closely at all 
parameters: habitat, pregnancy rate, body condition, bull/cow ratios, 
etc.. If these variables are at a healthy level, and it is concluded that the 
herd and habitat are in good shape, but that the animals are in a 
predator pit, I would then support temporary wolf control measures.
The reality of the situation is that ADF&G has not thoroughly researched
these other factors; nor have they attempted to educate the public about them
as much as they have wolf predation. Rather than trying to figure out what
really is ailing the herd and representing a clear picture to the public, ADF&G
is once again focusing on wolves. The Department is offering to sacrifice
wolves as a "quick-fix" remedy and hoping their efforts will achieve some
results. If there is any effect from wolf control on the Delta herd, it will likely
be a band-aid cure that is very short lived.
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While wolves may hold prey species down at low-density levels for 
extended periods of time in some situations, such as in a "predator pit"*** 
scenario, this phenomenon is not completely understood. Van Ballenberghe 
elaborates:
While the literature contains examples of healthy North American 
wolf populations keeping suppressed prey populations at low levels for 
periods of time, the literature also contains examples of healthy wolf 
populations doing essentially nothing to prevent the natural rebound 
of depressed prey populations of both moose and caribou, including in
Alaska.142
Fred Harrington, Ph.D. and Professor at Mount Saint Vincent University, 
Canada, further clarifies the Delta area situation regarding wolf control, the 
predator pit theory and how this relates to ADF&G' proposal:
Immediate action (i.e., increased predator control) may temporarily 
restore the prey, but it may take a long period of habitat recovery before 
past conditions can return. It would be much better for the ADF&G to 
educate its public (and its politicians) to the fact that there are often no 
short term fixes when it comes to wildlife management, particularly in 
northern latitudes. The public must leam that patience is often 
necessary in order to maintain healthy wildlife habitat. Quick fixes oft 
times backfire.. ..  However, predator control is not a necessity to 
release caribou or moose populations from the predator p i t , as has 
been shown by decades of wolf-moose research on Isle Royale or the 
example of the George River population in Labrador/northern Quebec.
*** The term "predator pit" was introduced into caribou ecology through discussion of multiple 
equilibria theory. The predator pit involves the theoretical concept that an upper-level stable 
equilibrium exists (e.g., from intraspecific competition for food) until disruption by 
"catastrophe" occurs. For example, densities can be lowered by events such as emigration, 
severe weather, or excessive hunting. Because of a lowered density, a population would crash 
because of heavy predation, despite high natality. Theoretically, a lower, stable equilibrium 
(the predator pit) would occur as predators switched to alternate prey. Unfortunately, use of 
the term predator pit has been expanded to include situations where caribou populations are 
low or reduced and predation identified as a significant limiting factor." (James L. Davis et al., 
"Demography of the Delta Caribou Herd Under Varying Rates of Natural Mortality and 
Human Harvest and Assessment of Field Techniques for Acquiring Demographic Data," Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife 
Restoration Research Final Report, January 1991, Projects W-22-5 through W-23-3 Study 3.33, p. 
44.)
I'^^victor Van Ballenberghe, "Effects of predations on moose numbers: a review of recent North 
American studies," 1986. Inst. N. For., USFS. Ibid. p. 6.
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In fact, P. Valkenburg, J.L. Davis and D.V. Granggaard, all with the 
ADF&G, concluded that there "is mounting evidence that caribou 
herds frequently escape the "predator pit" without man's intervention, 
(p. 282, Proc. 4th N.Am. Caribou Workshop, St. John's Nfld., \99\)M ^
ADF&G's proposals for the Delta area elicited a great deal of controversy and
criticism from both professional biologists and the public at large.
As a result of the Delta herd's decline to an approximate population of
5,800, the 1991 - 93 winter hunting seasons were closed. For many familiar
with the history of the Department's management of this herd, this action
seemed curious, considering that, ten years prior, ADF&G set out to decrease
the Delta herd, which numbered 6,500, to an objective of 4,000. At that time,
they reduced caribou numbers through human harvest. Gordon Haber writes
regarding this:
Finally, the management objectives and alleged user demand for GMU 
20A caribou have been rather fickle and elusive over the years, in a 
manner reminiscent of the objectives and alleged demand for GMU 
20A moose. In ADF&G (1983), a herd size objective of 4,000 caribou was 
specified for the Delta Herd. The herd had increased to ~6,500 as of 1982 
(following wolf control), so ADF&G (1983) concluded that ". . . steps to 
decrease [the] herd size . . . "  should be taken. In ADF&G (1991c), the 
objective for the Delta and Yanert herds combined was specified as 
"6,500 or more. " This objective was almost certainly met by summer 
1992, but it has now been replaced by yet another objective - 7,500 - 
8,500.144
What the Department's actions over the past ten years suggest is perhaps a 
lack of understanding of what the Delta herd's habitat can sustain, especially 
given the climactic conditions of the area. ADF&G admits that, in 1976, it 
was, "uncertainty about the optimal population level [which] prompted
143pred Harrington, PhD, Review of 1992 ADF&G wolf plans, Haber critique and Dittman 
Survey, Mount St. Vincent University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, January 14,1993, p. 2-4. 
144Cordon C. Haber, Ph.D., "Wildlife Management in Alaska: Southcentral-Interior Wolf 
Control and Related Issues, Wolf Haven International, Tenino, WA and The Alaska Wildlife 
Alliance, Anchorage, AK, November, 1992, p. 68.
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managers to allow the herd to continue growing. "145 Almost twenty years 
later, ADF&G still has not determined what the "optimal population level " is 
for the herd — one which is based on realistic limitations of their habitat.
Critics of the Department's proposals to try to inflate the Delta herd 
emphasize the short-sightedness of these actions. Albert M. Man ville, Ph.D. 
and Senior Staff Wildlife Biologist and Director of Science Policy for 
Defenders of Wildlife, who has studied Alaska's wolf programs since at least 
the mid-1970 s, wrote in 1992 regarding the Delta herd:
In the Xanana Flats, Division of Wildlife Conservation Director 
Kelleyhouse describes the ungulate situation there as "a real 
emergency " because the caribou herd, now numbering 5,750, has 
declined by 50% since 1989. Yet Mr. Kelleyhouse fails to acknowledge 
that the herd has seen wide fluctuations, from a low of 2,000 in 1976 
with subsequent increases to over 10,000 in the presence of wolves. In 
fact, over the past 50 years, herd size there has averaged between 3,000 
and 5,000. Dry summers and harsh winters will likely prevent the 
Department from reaching a goal of maintaining a population of 7,5000 
- 8,5000 heavily hunted caribou — even if there are only a few
wolves.146
Former Commissioner of Fish and Game (1972 - 1977), Dr. James W. Brooks, 
questioned the Department's actions when he wrote:
Three or four smaller herds can be recognized, being relics of past 
expansions of one or another major herd. These lesser herds occupy 
marginal ranges that have sustained them for several decades, but 
which seem to limit their capacity to increase. The Delta herd is a good 
example, originating from the Forty Mile herd about 1930 or 1931. No 
good record exists of the size of the Delta herd until 1964 when the 
Department estimated that it contained 5000 animals, about the same 
number that exists today although it has varied in size during the
I45susan M. Abbott, ed.. Caribou. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife 
Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration, Survey-Inventory Management Report, 1 
July 1990 - 30 June 1992, Projects W-23-5 & W-24-1, Study 3.0, December 1993, p. 123. 
146]Defenders of Wildlife, The Sierra Club, Southeast Alaska Conservation Council and Wolf 
Haven International, "Statement of and Recommendations for the Management of Wolves in 
Alaska," Wolf Summit, Fairbanks, AK, 1/16, 1992, Presented by Albert M. Manville, Ph D., 
Senior Staff Wildlife Biologist/Director of Science Policy, Defenders of Wildlife, p. 6.
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interim. The wisdom of trying to increase the size of this herd might 
well be questioned, given its reasonable stability under the scope of 
weather conditions, predation and hunting pressure endured over the 
past half century or more.1^7
Convincing evidence and testimony suggest that ADF&G needs to refocus its
research on the Delta herd away from the realm of wolves and toward
determining the actual needs of the Delta herd in relation to its environment.
This should be done to ensure the health, safety and conservation of the herd.
Without an attempt in this direction, the herd will continue to be
compromised by management actions, such as the one proposed in 1992,
which tries to increase a Delta herd, which is clearly showing signs of
climactic and nutritional stress, up to 7,500 - 8,500. Given the current status of
the herd, this management objective appears to be based more on political
pressure originating from hunting-advocate demands — "the major driving
force in most wolf management controversies in Alaska"^^® — and less on
the conservation of the herd.
Moose in GMU 20A:
While little quantitative data exists for the moose population in GMU 
20A prior to the 1970's, biologists believe that moose were increasing in this 
area during the 1950’s. Moose in GMU 20A are thought to have reached a 
peak in the early 1960's, with an estimated population of approximately
^^^James W. Brooks, "Perspectives on the Forty Mile and Delta caribou herds relative to 
predation by wolves for discussion at the Wolf Summit Conference," Fairbanks, AK, January 16- 
19,1993, p. 2.
'̂^^Layne G. Adams, "Summary of Wolf-Prey-Human Relationships in Alaska," National 
Park Service — Alaska Region; 2525 Cambell Street, Room 107; Anchorage, AK 99503-2892; 
submitted to Alaska Department of Fish and Game for the Alaska Wolf Management Planning 
Team, January, 1991, p. 2.
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23,000.149 During the late 1960's and early 1970's, moose numbers declined 
rapidly, and researchers believe that by 1975 the population reached ~ 2,800.
In 1976, the moose population began a steady increase which has lasted to the 
present. By 1988, ADF&G estimated there were 9,296 moose in GMU 20A, and 
11,072 by 1991, which is an average density of 2.2 moose per square mile. The 
average density of moose in GMU 20A in 1991 was relatively high for interior 
Alaskan habitats.
In a study begun in the mid-1970 s, Gasaway et al. (1983) set out to 
determine what the limiting factors were for this moose population. They 
ascertained that a severe winter and heavy browsing began the downward 
trend in 1965-66, which was perpetuated until 1976 by additional harsh 
winters, over-harvesting by humans and predation by wolves.^^o Between 
1970 - 74 specifically, hunting was the primary cause for decline in the moose 
population. Gasaway et al. (1983) stated:
Beginning in 1970, the number of moose and the percentage harvested 
by hunters rapidly escalated because of increased numbers of hunters, 
improved access, and increased use of snow machines and aircraft. 
Rapidly rising meat prices and a beef shortage also resulted in increased 
hunting effort, and we estimated that 19% of the moose population 
was harvested in 1973.. . During this period [1970 - 74] the mean 
estimated annual percentage of standing stock harvested was 10% . . .  
which equaled the mean rate of yearling recruitment during May. . .
Errors in harvest management during this time, reduced this population to
dangerously low levels. Reduced harvest rates starting in 1975 helped ease
pressure on the moose population. Gasaway et al. (1983) concluded:
149\Yijiiam C. Gasaway, Robert O. Stephenson, James L. Davis, Peter K. Shepherd, and Oliver 
E. Burris, "Interrelationships of Wolves, Prey and Man in Interior Alaska," Wildlife 
Monographs, Vol. 47, No. 3, July, 1983, No. 84, p. 16.
ISOibid., p. 1.
ISlibid., p.22.
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In retrospect, errors were made in managing the moose, caribou, and 
wolf populations in our study area during the early 1970's. Moose 
population size was not estimated accurately enough, and its rate of 
decline was initially underestimated. Consequently, appropriate 
hunting regulations were implemented belatedly. Also, biologists 
underestimated the combined impact of wolf predation and hunting 
on moose and caribou during the early 1970's and did not adequately 
manage wolves. During this period of intense hunting, biologists 
patiently awaited a compensatory rebound in yearling recruitment 
from improved range that would offset harvest. However, it was a 
futile vigil — calf moose and caribou became increasingly scarce 
through 1975. Mortality from severe winters, hunting and wolf 
predation were largely additive. Underestimating the direct impact of 
man's harvest on moose and caribou populations and its
compounding effect on predation led to a grave management situation.
. . 152
Further, Gasaway et al. (1983) identified other forces affecting the herd, 
including: 1) browse availability, which during and after the climax-level 
population likely inhibited moose population growth when "heavy browsing 
reduced plant vigor and killed willow (Salix spp.) in areas where moose 
concentrated (p. Shepherd and O. Burris, pers. observ.) High moose density 
and reduced browse availability probably contributed to the extensive die-off 
during the severe winter of 1965-66 (Bishop and Rausch 1974); " 2) deep snow 
and severe winters in 1965-66, 1966-67, and 1970-71 were, "particularly 
important in causing the decline of the moose population," and effected 
moose survival and abundance; 3) age demographics, which indicated that 
high calf numbers in the 1960's resulted in a lot of mature moose in the 70 s 
(during 1972-74, 41% of the cows in the population were > 11 years) which 
consequently were dying, and likely added to the downward trend of the herd; 
and 4) prey : predator ratios were steadily falling with the herd, and, "thus the
152ibid., p. 46.
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kill by hunters, like that of severe winters, increased the potential effect of 
predation on m o o s e .  "153
In addition, the existence of both migratory and non-migratory moose in 
GMU 20A were discovered by Gasaway et al. (1983). Migratory moose, they 
found, spend every summer in the Tanana Flats area, where they calve, then 
travel to adjacent hills and foothills for the winter months. The Tanana Flats 
area is the primary summering and calving ground for GMU 20A moose. 
Non-migratory moose in this area are the only year-round, big-game prey for 
wolves. Unlike in GMU 13, where grizzly bears are the primary predator of 
moose, and the Kenai Peninsula, where black bears are responsible for the 
majority of moose predation, Gasaway et al. (1983) found wolves to be the 
primary predator of moose in the Tanana Flats. The Tanana Flats area is not 
prime bear habitat, though black and grizzly bears are present, but not 
abundant.
As part of their research, Gasaway et al. (1983) reduced the wolf 
population (estimated at ~239 in 1975) by more than two-thirds in GMU 20A 
between 1976-79. After the initial year of wolf removal, Gasaway et al. (1983) 
found that higher calf : cow ratios existed the fall of 1976. They reported:
All indices of calf and yearling moose survival abruptly increased in 
the experimental area beginning in 1976. This increased survival 
coincided with the reduction of wolves. During summers 1976 - 78, 
survival of calves of radio-collared cows was more than twice that 
during summers of 1974 - 75. Improved calf survival resulted in an 
average of 500 more calves present during November 1976 - 78 than 
during November 1973 - 75.̂ 54
Though not discussed in this context by Gasaway et al. (1983), mild to
moderate winters also must have played an important role in turning the calf
153ibid., p. 23, 21, 28, 29.
154ibid„ p. 19.
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survival rate around. Predator control in GMU 20A was accompanied and 
followed by relatively mild and moderate winters with low snow 
accumulation. This combined with improved habitat quality and reduced 
human harvest likely aided the recovery of the moose population. Manville 
wrote:
While the extermination of the wolves in this area coincided with an 
increase in moose, that increase was also due to mild winters, 
improved carrying capacity of the habitat, and reduced public hunting 
of moose. Moreover, the data from studies on wolf control in the 
Nelchina Basin and the Fortymile area unquestionably do not 
scientifically support this program. The benefits of wolf control to 
moose have been minimal. The classic wolf control failure was 
conducted in the 3,200-square-mile Susitna River study area from 1976 
- 1978 where all wolves were killed (Ballard et al. 1987, Wildl. Mono. 
98). This resulted in no net increase in moose there since wolves 
turned out not to be the major predators of moose.^^s
ADF&G's 1992 Area Specific Plan indicated the moose population in 
GMU 20A was somewhere between 9,700 and 12,300. In the plan it was clearly 
stated that population objectives for the GMU 20A moose population were 
being met. ADF&G outlined:
Current management objectives for Unit 20A call for a population of
11,000 to 13,000 moose and a minimum bull : cow ratio of 30 bulls : 100 
cows. Past harvest goals call for an annual harvest of up to 400 bulls 
until these management objectives are reached. These objectives are 
currently being met.^56
In spite of the fact that ADF&G moose objectives were already being met,
ADF&G proposed wolf control to benefit the moose population. The
^^^Statement of and Recommendations for the Management of Wolves in Alaska, by Defenders 
of Wildlife, The Sierra Club, Southeast Alaska Conservation Council and Wolf Haven 
International, Wolf Summit, Fairbanks, AK, 1/16, 1992, Presented by Albert M. Manville, 
Ph.D., Senior Staff Wildlife Biologist/  Director of Science Policy, Defenders of Wildlife, p. 4- 
5.
I Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife Conservation, Area Specific 
Wolf Management Plan for South Central /  Interior Alaska, September 9,1991; p. 32.
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Department divided GMU 20A into two separate planning areas, the Tanana 
Foothills and the Tanana Flats areas. The proposed management focus in the 
southern, mountainous portion of GMU 20A, or the Tanana foothills, was on 
caribou, because the Delta herd primarily inhabits this portion of GMU 20A. 
The Department identified th a t, "a reduction in wolf predation in only the 
foothills and mountains of the Alaska Range should be sufficient for 
management of the Delta caribou herd, since the herd spends most of its time 
in this portion of the unih' î  ̂ An added benefit of wolf reduction in this area 
would have affected resident moose, and incidentally benefited moose 
migrating through, though moose increases were not the priority. Wolf 
reduction in the Tanana Flats area, on the other hand, was proposed 
specifically to benefit moose.
Departing from the published plan which had been available to the 
public for comment for eleven months, ADF&G introduced a last-minute, 
more aggressive proposal for GMU 20A during the 1992 November Board of 
Game hearings. In their new proposal, they offered two new alternatives 
which intended to raise the moose population from its then current level of 
-11,000 to between 16,000 - 23,000. Needless to say, this action created even 
more controversy at the Board of Game meetings. In the end, the Board 
adopted a plan which would raise the moose population from between 11,000 
- 15,000. With this alternative, the Boards approved a harvest objective of 800 
-1,500 moose per year, a leap which at the very least doubled, and at the most 
more than tripled the 1991-2 harvest rate.
Between 1970 - 74, when the population was declining from 
approximately 20,000 to 2,800, the annual harvest was ~ 600, and this level of
157ibid., p. 35.
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hunting led to the near demise of this moose population. Average harvests 
over five-year periods up to the present have not exceeded 617 moose. 
Between 1963 - 69, the average harvest was 311. From 1969 - 74, the average 
harvest totaled 617, though in 1972 and 1973, when the population was being 
grossly overharvested, there were 699 and 964 moose harvested respectively. 
Starting in 1975, harvests were drastically reduced due to the moose 
population decline, and since 1982, harvests have averaged 370 bulls.^^^ This 
average harvest of 370 bulls has adversely affected the moose population, for 
starting in 1988, "moose hunters in southwestern Subunit 20A were required 
to take only bulls with > 50-inch antlers. That regulation was imposed in 
response to declining bull: cow ratios in areas where numerous trail systems 
allow motorized access."i59 Thus the 1992 last-minute, proposed harvest 
objective of 800 -1,500 moose per year is unprecedented in this area, and 
comes at a time when the moose population is already suffering effects of 
hunting pressure.
The history of moose in GMU 20A leads one to question whether or not 
this aggressive harvest objective, with a total population numbering between
11,000 - 15,000, is truly sustainable. It appears evident that, if it is in fact 
possible to harvest at this level in GMU 20A, the only way for it to be 
sustainable is if the high harvests are done in conjunction to ongoing, long­
term, aggressive wolf control. The action by ADF&G and the Board of Game 
to drastically raise harvest objectives and manage toward that goal, revealed 
perhaps more than any other action the strong political allegiance state 
wildlife managers have with the sport hunting community. This aggressive
I58susan M. Abbot, ed.. Moose. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife 
Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration, Survey-Inventory Management Report, 1 
July 1989 - 30 June 1991, Projects W-23-3 and W-23-4, Study 1.0, February 1993, p. 230.
15%id„ p. 232.
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management approach happened as a result of pressure from the Alaska 
Outdoor Council, Alaska Wildlife Conservation Association (both influential 
sport-hunting advocacy groups) and some local advisory groups who lobbied 
the Department for greater hunting opportunity. Critics of the action 
outlined that: 1) it would unnecessarily compromise the moose population 
and it appeared to be irresponsible management to hunt at such high levels, 
as this population's history indicates; 2) it was unfair to the public to 
drastically alter management objectives at such a late date, without time for 
the public to comment on the changes; and 3) this action seemed to steer far 
away from the consensus process involved in the Wolf Management 
Planning Team, which recommended wolf control be done only on a short­
term basis.
In conclusion, the GMU 20A moose population has experienced an 
upward trend since 1976. The most recent population estimate suggested 
moose numbered ~ 11,072 in 1991. ADF&G identified that the management 
direction for this population intended to reduce wolf numbers from an 
estimated 220 - 296 down to a minimum of 55, continue increasing the moose 
population up to 15,000, and harvest between 800 - 1,500 animals. This moose 
harvest level is two to three times greater than the average harvest since 1982. 
Harvests between 1969 - 74, which averaged 617 when the moose population 
numbered between 20,000 - ~2,800, almost extirpated GMU 20A moose. In 
light of this history, the Department's aggressive harvest objectives are 
questionable and appear overzealous.
Additionally, it is unclear whether wolf control will significantly affect 
the moose population during a time when it is expanding its numbers, and
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appears to be a healthy and strong population. It appears that wolf control is 
not proposed in this area to enlarge the moose population, but more 
accurately, its purpose is to eliminate wolf predation so that human hunters 
can take a greater percentage. Harrington elaborates on this in the following 
passage:
ADF&G's widespread use of predator control, however, is more than a 
"quick fix" intended to rescue "prey populations in peril." It is also 
being proposed as a means to inflate human harvest levels, over the 
long term, for populations that are not now in danger or residing 
within a "predator pit." For example, in GMU 20A, the objective of 
wolf control is not to increase the moose population at all, but simply 
to shift the bulk of the harvest from wolves to humans. This approach 
is chillingly articulated in ADF&G's proposal: "To maintain high 
harvest levels for people, predator numbers will usually have to be 
reduced frequently or regulated at some level below that the prey 
populations would naturally support if there were no human harvest" 
(p.72). Clearly, the gunning down of a valued wildlife species, not for 
food or fur or even sport, but merely to get it out of the way, is an 
unacceptable practice for a state wildlife agency as we approach the 21st 
century. 1̂ 0
Eliminating wolves simply to get them out of the way so that human hunters 
can pursue a larger take is a different use of predator control than the one 
intended by the Wolf Management Planning Team. The state's actions here 
also seem questionable considering the first goal listed in the Strategic Wolf 
Management Plan is, "To ensure the long-term conservation of wolves 
throughout their historic range in Alaska in relation to their prey and 
habitat."i6i As Harrington indicated above, this practice was unacceptable to 
many involved in the debate.
léOpreci Harrington, PhD, Review of 1992 ADF&G wolf plans, Haber critique and Dittman 
Survey, Mount St. Vincent University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, January 14, 1993, p. 4. 
^^^Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife Conservation, Strategic Wolf 
Management Plan, October 30,1991, p. 5-6.
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Wolves in GMU 20A:
Federal predator control programs began in the Unit 20A area in 1954 
and lasted through 1960. Wolves were considered plentiful in die 1950's 
prior to federal control, and P. Shepherd, a predator control officer in the area, 
observed that wolves were scarce by 1958.^^2 Biologists believe wolves 
rebounded and reached a peak abundance in the late 1960's. By 1972, A. 
Wright, a wolf hunter and guide doing aerial surveys for the ADF&G noted 
that wolf numbers had declined.i^^ The first estimate of the wolf population 
considered to be accurate, based on many hours of flight time doing aerial 
surveys, occurred in 1975. It yielded an estimate of 239 wolves and 23 packs in 
GMU 20A. Between 1976-1979, Gasaway et al. (1983) removed up to two- 
thirds of the population, and estimated there were eighty wolves in GMU 
20A in 1978. Wolf control continued in GMU 20A through 1982, and was 
implemented again in 1984. Since then wolves have been regulated by 
human harvest and natural causes. In 1991-92 the ADF&G Area Specific Plan 
indicated the wolf population estimate in GMU 20A was 220 - 300 wolves. 
ADF&G stated the population has, "fully recovered from wolf control 
programs which ended in 1982."i^4
For the three years prior to Gasaway et al.'s (1983) experimental wolf 
removal program (which started in 1976), 20% of the wolves in GMU 20A 
were harvested by public trappers and hunters. Thirty-eight to 61% of the 
wolf population was eliminated between 1976-1979, with ADF&G using 
helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft to shoot entire packs and individual
l^^Gasaway et al., "Interrelationships of Wolves, Prey and Man in Interior Alaska," Wildlife 
Monographs, Vol. 47, No. 3, July, 1983, No. 84, p. 11.
163ibid., p. 12.
Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife Conservation, Area Specific 
Wolf Management Plan for South Central /  Interior Alaska, September 9,1991; p. 26.
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wolves when possible (Gasaway et al., 1983). Public harvest also contributed 
significantly to the removal of wolves in the area during the control period, 
and by 1978, the wolf population had been reduced by two-thirds.^^s in their 
study, Gasaway et al. (1983) stated that harvesting GMU 20A wolves at > 20% 
of their population had significant effects on the GMU 20A population. They 
clarified:
Sustained annual harvests > 20% of early winter wolf populations 
have had significant effects on wolf numbers in North America where 
wolf productivity was low. Populations have not grown at harvest 
rates of about 25% (Pimlott et al. 1969; Van Ballenberghe et al. 1975; R. 
Peterson unpubl. data). In our experimental area [GMU 20A], an 
approximate harvest rate of 20% by trappers during 3 winters before 
wolf removal was significant in limiting wolf numbers. With pups 
composing 30% of our population during 1975-76, the population could 
not have been stable if natural mortality had exceeded 10%, and 
generally, natural mortality rates exceed 10% (Van Ballenberghe et al. 
1975; Mech 1977a; Ballard et al. 1981&; R. Peterson, unpubl. data).
Keith’s review indicates harvest rates in excess of 30% generally have 
caused wolves to decline.i^^
This paragraph indicates that with a harvest rate > 20% of the wolf population
in addition to natural mortality levels above 10%, the wolf population in
GMU 20A has been limited by harvest pressure and declining for some time.
Harvest rates have equaled 20% or more on and off since at least the 1970's.
However, discrepancies elsewhere in the study indicated that the wolf
population in GMU 20A is "naturally regulated, " and not limited by human
hunting pressure. For example, in the abstract which identifies the study's
objectives, Gasaway et al. (1983) wrote:
Objectives of this study were to define factors limiting a moose and 
caribou population; to review moose-wolf relationships in ecosystems 
where wolf populations are, to a large extent, naturally regulated; to
l^^Gasaway et al., "Interrelationships of Wolves, Prey and Man in Interior Alaska," Wildlife 
Monographs, Vol. 47, No. 3, July, 1983, No. 84, p. 5.
166ibid., p. 28.
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demonstrate the effects of man's harvest of prey species on the wolf- 
prey relationship; and to identify problems of managing prey 
populations for hunting and nonconsumptive human use where wolf 
populations are naturally regulated.
Gasaway et al. (1983) further emphasized the notion that wolves are naturally
regulated in GMU 20A and in general in Alaska's interior when they state in
their final sentence of their concluding statements:
Therefore, great caution must be exercised in harvesting ungulates in 
ecosystems where wolves are harvested lightly or are essentially 
naturally regulated.i^*
By their own admission, Gasaway et al. (1983) found that wolves were
regulated by harvest pressure prior to their wolf removal program, and this
population has a history of being regulated by harvest pressure. In light of
this, it is interesting to note that wolves were held responsible for taking
between 13 - 34 % of the moose in GMU 20A between 1973 - 75.1̂  ̂ However,
in 1988 - 89, wolves killed only 9.9% of moose in 20A.170 it seems likely that
this decrease is the result of an already significantly harvested and reduced
wolf population in GMU 20A.
If ADF&G is suggesting to the public that wolf populations in Alaska are 
"naturally regulated" when in fact they are significantly impacted by human 
harvest, such that their populations are fighting to remain stable or perhaps 
declining, this should be classified as misinformation. There is a critical 
difference between a population which is naturally regulated and one which 
is receiving continuous pressure through population reductions from
167lbid., p. 1.
168ibid., p. 46.
^^^Gasaway et al., "Interrelationships of Wolves, Prey and Man in Interior Alaska," Wildlife 
Monographs, Vol. 47, No. 3, July, 1983, No. 84, p. 32.
1̂ ‘̂ Susan M. Abbot, ed.. Moose. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife 
Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration, Survey-Inventory Management Report, 1 
July 1989 - 30 June 1991, Projects W-23-3 and W-23-4, Study 1.0, February 1993, p. 235.
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hunting and/or control. It is unfair to the public to suggest otherwise, and 
discriminating between the two situations — natural versus harvest 
regulation — is important so that the public and others involved in wildlife 
management decisions have accurate information and a legitimate reference 
point from which to base decisions. It is these kinds of discrepancies 
regarding wolves which ultimately lead many wildlife experts and members 
of the public to question ADF&G's published information and credibility 
regarding wolves.
Finally, in spite of all of the studies, biologists and ecologists are still 
searching for understanding of prey : predator relationships. Gasaway et al. 
(1983) writes:
The influence of wolf predation on ungulate population growth 
remains poorly understood in spite of many comprehensive studies on 
wolf-ungulate relationships during the past 20 years . . .
The influence of bear predation is also often not understood. In GMU 20A,
bears have been harvested beyond sustainable levels since 1982. ADF&G's
1992 Area Specific Plan outlines:
The numbers of grizzly bears in Unit 20A is lower than normal because 
a study of the effects of harvests on grizzly populations required high 
harvest rates since 1982. The reduction in caribou hunting opportunity 
is expected to reduce the number of grizzly bears harvested because 
many bears are taken incidentally by caribou hunters. Over the life of 
this plan, bear numbers should increase slowly.1^2
Both bears and wolves have received significant harvest pressure in GMU
20A.
GMU 20A needs careful scrutiny, for it is the one unit which ADF&G 
highlights as an example of successful wolf control programs. The
171lbid., p. 2.
Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife Conservation, Area Specific 
Wolf Management Plan for South Central /  Interior Alaska, September 9,1991; p. 36.
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Department supports decisions for wolf control, citing that wolf control has 
successfully increased the Delta herd in the 1970's, and that moose calf 
survivorship increased after wolf control in 1976. Upon closer inspection, 
however, one leams that caribou may have increased in the '70's as a result of 
wolf control, but pregnancy rates dropped, and now it appears the herd is 
limited nutritionally. Both cows and calves are small, and the population has 
rapidly declined by 50%. Whether wolf control was beneficial to the herd in 
the long term is arguable. Certainly at this time it appears the Delta herd is 
undergoing nutrition and habitat - based stress. Regarding the 1992 wolf 
control plans to benefit moose, it seems as though the Department intends to 
eliminate wolves in order to abolish competition for human hunters, not to 
enhance the moose population.
UPPER TANANA, FORTYMILE CONTROL AREA, GMU 12,20B, D & E:
The Upper Tanana, Fortymile control area is a 9,700 square mile area in 
the northeastern, interior region of Alaska. It is north of the Alaska range, 
south of the Ray and White mountains and abuts the Canadian border to the 
east (please see Haber map for location clarification). Alaska's interior 
contains both alpine, sub-alpine and forested regions, with primarily tundra, 
extensive flats, rolling hills and glaciated mountains in the Alaska range. 
Tree species in the interior include: black spruce, white spruce, paper birch, 
aspen, balsam poplar and tamarack. Large shrubs include alder and a variety 
of willow species.
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Fortymile Caribou Herd:
The Fortymile Caribou Herd (FCH) is a unique herd in Alaska because it 
shares its range between Alaska and the Yukon, with portions of the herd 
often wintering in Canada (please see appendix 3.4 for range clarification). It 
was possibly the largest herd in Alaska during the earlier part of this century, 
and was significant for providing food initially to Athabascans and miners, 
and now to various settlers in its range. The FCH is considered an important 
herd for other reasons as well: it is thought that movements of the herd 
during this century effected population dynamics of adjacent herds, and the 
FCH may have been responsible for originating a number of small herds in 
neighboring areas. Several emmigrahons of the FCH northeast to the 
Porcupine herd have been reported. Apparently during the 1920's, the 
Fortymile herd, "swamped the Nelchina herd during many winters in the 
1920's, but the effect on Nelchina herd numbers is not known (Skoog
1968)."173
Ronald Skoog, Commissioner of Fish and Game in Alaska between 1977 
- 1983, devoted twelve years of research to Alaskan caribou and concentrated 
much of his efforts on the FCH. Before the turn of the century, Skoog 
indicated that the FCH was moderate in size. Between 1900 -1925, the herd 
expanded to peak numbers, reaching a size of ~ 568,000+ (Murie, 1935). 
Evidence suggests, "that in the early 1900's, this herd was . . .  substantially 
augmented by an influx of animals from the eastern arctic, or what is now 
called the Porcupine herd.' i^  ̂ Olaus J. Murie describes the enormity of the
l^^james L. Davis, Robert E. LeResche, Richard T. Shideler, "Size, Composition and 
Productivity of the Fortymile Caribou Herd", Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Federal 
Aid in Wildlife Restoration, Final Report, Project W-17-6 and W-17-7. Juneau, 1978, p. 1. 
^^^James W. Brooks, "Perspectives on the Forty Mile and Delta caribou herds relative to 
predation by wolves for discussion at the Wolf Summit Conference," Comments presented at the 
Wolf Summit, Fairbanks, AK, January 16 -19, 1993, p. 2.
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herd, and what a spectacle it must have been to watch in the following 
passage:
In 1921 the author estimated the numbers in the Yukon-Tanana herd 
during the migration in the fall of 1920, using data obtained directly 
and from reports of other observers. The southeast migration of the 
herd covered a strip approximately 60 miles wide, 40 miles 
representing the part traversed by the main body and 20 miles that 
covered by scattered bands. The herd took about 20 days to pass one 
spot. During 8 of the 20 days about 1,500 animals in the main herd 
passed each day over a 1-mile strip and during the remaining 12 days 
about 100 animals a day.^^^
From this siting, Murie estimated the herd size to be greater than 500,000,
which he thought was a conservative estimate. He actually thought it may
have been closer to a million.^^^ Thus, the FCH was considered the biggest
herd in Alaska and one of the largest in the world.
The Fortymile herd first experienced a decline during this century in 
1928. This decline was not continuous, though marked a turning point for 
the population.i^^ During the early 1930's, "a decline in numbers 
commenced and the herd’s pattern of movements changed drastically. No 
migrations through the Alaska Range occurred after 1931. Caribou became 
scarce in many districts that had recently enjoyed a bountiful presence.
Alaska Game Commission reports of this period comment on large numbers 
of caribou from this herd joining the Porcupine Herd whose numbers then 
reached levels not seen before."i78 By the mid 1930's, the herd had reached its
^^^Olaus J .Murie, "Alaska - Yukon Caribou,” North American Fauna, No, 54, United States 
Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Biological Survey, Washington D C., June 1935, p. 6. 
176ibid.
l^^Patrick Valkenburg, James L. Davis, "Status, Movements, Range Use Patterns, and Limiting 
Factors of the Fortymile Caribou Herd," Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of 
Wildlife Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Research Progress Report, Project 
W-23-1, Juneau, December 1989, p. i.
l^®James W. Brooks, "Perspectives on the Forty Mile and Delta caribou herds relative to 
predation by wolves for discussion at the Wolf Summit Conference," Comments presented at the 
Wolf Summit, Fairbanks, AK, January 16 -19,1993, p. 3.
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fastest rate of decline, and in the early 1940's, it was estimated to contain 
between 10,000 - 20,000 animals. Causes for the decline are unknown, though 
market hunting as a result of the mining boom significantly impacted the 
herd.
Sometime during the 1940’s, the herd began to grow again, which some 
have suggested was a result of federal wolf control programs. However 
information is insufficient to accurately determine what caused the recovery 
of the herd size.i79 R. Skoog reported that the herd increased to ~ 50,000 by 
1953, though other estimates suggest it was closer to 40,000.1^0 Emigrations 
north-northeast of the FCH to the Porcupine caribou herd were reported 
during both 1957 and 1964. Up to 30,000 animals may have emigrated during 
either movement, though it is unclear how significant or long-term the 
reduction was for the FCH. Some evidence suggests that the caribou may 
have later returned to the Fortymile herd.i*i
Given the available information, one can only speculate about why the 
FCH decreased during the 1930's, increased during the 1940's, and why 
portions of it joined the Porcupine herd. Possible explanations include that 
the herd had reached the carrying capacity of the habitat, which was likely 
depleted during the herd's peak numbers in the early part of the century. 
Nutrition levels likely were reduced for the caribou, which could have 
resulted in a decrease in herd size, possibly through failing health of the herd.
l^^Patrick Valkenburg, David G. Kelleyhouse, James L. Davis, and Jay M. Ver Hoef, "Case 
History of the Fortymile Caribou Herd, 1920 -1990," Rangifer, Nordic Council for Reindeer 
Research, P.O. Box 378, N-9401, Harstad, Norway, 14 (1), 1994, p. 12. 
l^^James W. Brooks, "Perspectives on the Forty Mile and Delta caribou herds relative to 
predation by wolves for discussion at the Wolf Summit Conference," Comments presented at the 
Wolf Summit, Fairbanks, AK, January 16 -19,1993, p. 3.
James L. Davis, Robert E. LeResche, Richard T. Schideler, "Size, Composition and 
Productivity of the Fortymile Caribou Herd," Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Federal 
Aid in Wildlife Restoration, Final Report, Project W-17-6 and W-17-7. Juneau, 1978, p. 6.
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This may have triggered emigration. While federal wolf control in the 1940's 
may have temporarily reversed the herd's decline by easing predation 
pressure, ultimately other prevalent environmental factors likely overcame 
the herd. This situation may be an example of how wolf control might 
provide short-term relief in certain situations, but ultimately does not 
stabilize or increase a herd, because wolf predation is not the overriding cause 
for decline. Other prevailing environmental factors determine the health 
and size of a herd. Valkenburg et al. (1994) reviewed this section of the herd's 
history and reported:
Both Skoog (1968) and Davis et al. (1978) noted historical correlations 
between wolf numbers and caribou numbers, but neither proposed 
predation as a causal factor. Skoog (1956) also discounted hunting but 
thought that it may have become an important suppressing factor once 
the herd had declined to a lower level. The FCH survived the gold 
mining boom and the market hunting that accompanied it. The herd's 
decline in the 1930's occurred after mining peaked. Other caribou 
herds throughout interior Alaska also declined during the 1930's 
(Skoog, 19689) suggesting the influence of widespread phenomena.i^z
This passage suggests that human encroachment played a role in herd size
reduction as well as other environmental phenomena.
Population estimates between 1955 - 1960 indicated the FCH had grown 
to approximately 65,000 (Davis et al. 1978), and then declined steadily through 
the 1970's. No accurate population estimates actually exist between 1961 - 
1973, and it is now thought that estimates during this time were much higher 
than actual herd size. In 1969, biologists thought the herd numbered 20,000,
l®2patrick Valkenburg, David G. Kelleyhouse, James L. Davis, and Jay M. Ver Hoef, "Case 
History of the Fortymile Caribou Herd, 1920 -1990," Rangifer, Nordic Council for Reindeer 
Research, P.O. Box 378, N-9401, Harstad, Norway, 14 (1), 1994, p. 17 -18.
143
and between 1970 - 1972 less than 15,000. More recent data suggests the herd 
numbered between 8 -10,000.1*3
Overestimation of the FCH had significant management repercussions, 
when as a result harvests were greater than the herd could withstand.
Between 1950 - 1975, the average harvest varied from 270 - 2,300. In 1970 - 
1972, harvests of the FCH, "greatly exceeded the yearling recruitment rate and 
contributed greatly to the population decline during this period, Davis et 
al. (1978) attributed the herd's decline from 1960 - 1975 to high human 
harvests and wolf predation, though biological information is inadequate to 
discount other causes such as lowered productivity, nutritional limitations 
and/or adverse w eather.V alkenburg  et al. (1989) reported:
It is clear that overharvesting of caribou, especially during the late 
1960's and early 1970's, contributed to the 1960 - 75 decline.. . .  In 
addition, the status of the FCH was inadequately monitored and its size 
was grossly overestimated.̂
Davis et al. (1978) also noted that the age structure of teeth from over seven
hundred FCH jaws collected was similar to that of the Nelchina herd when it
was declining, as opposed to when it was increasing in 1960.̂ *  ̂ This may
indicate that the age demographics of the herd played a role in its decline.
l*3james L. Davis, Robert E. LeResche, Richard T. Schideler, "Size, Composition and 
Productivity of the Fortymile Caribou Herd," Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Federal 
Aid in Wildlife Restoration, Final Report, Project W-17-6 and W-17-7. Juneau, 1978, p. i. 
IS^ibid., p. ii.
185patrick Valkenburg, James L. Davis, "Status, Movements, Range Use Patterns, and Limiting 
Factors of the Fortymile Caribou Herd," Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of 
Wildlife Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Research Progress Report, Project 
W-23-1, Juneau, December 1989, p. 2.
186patrick Valkenburg, James L. Davis, "Status, Movements, Range Use Patterns, and Limiting 
Factors of the Fortymile Caribou Herd," Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of 
Wildlife Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Research Progress Report, Project 
W-23-1, Juneau, December 1989, p. 2.
l*^James L. Davis, Robert E. LeResche, Richard T. Schideler, "Size, Composition and 
Productivity of the Fortymile Caribou Herd," Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Federal 
Aid in Wildlife Restoration, Final Report, Project W-17-6 and W-17-7. Juneau, 1978, p. 1.
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The lowest population estimate on record for the FCH occurred in 1974 - 
1975, when the herd was thought to number 4,000. Estimates in succeeding 
years indicated a steady increase in herd size, and by 1981 and 1988 herd 
estimates were 10,192, and ~ 20,000, respectively.
During the mid 1980's, when the FCH was increasing, researchers found 
that the natality rate of radio-collared females (> 3 years) was 90%, which was 
similar to the Delta and rapidly growing Western Arctic herd at the time. The 
mean calf : female ratio was 34 :100 between 1985 - 87. Based on available 
information and conjecture, Valkenburg et al. (1989) attempted to compare 
predator : prey ratios in the 1980's with the 1970's, supposing the wolf 
densities were similar during 1986 and 1976. They found that in 1986, when 
the population estimate totaled 15,303, the wolf : caribou ratio was 1 : 53, and 
the wolf : prey ratio was 1 :103 - 111 caribou equivalents (including moose 
and Dali sheep). For 1976, they suggested the wolf : caribou ratio was 1 : 23, 
and the wolf to caribou equivalents ratio was 1 : 72. This latter ratio is 
considered a low prey biomass level, one where, "wolves are considered 
likely to control ungulate numbers (Pimlott 1976, Mech 1970, Parker 1972, 
Bergerud 1983.)"!̂ ® In spite of this supposed low prey biomass level and 
unfavorable wolf : prey ratios, the FCH increased in the 1970's. Valkenburg et 
al. (1989) came up with two possible explanations for this. The first was that 
biases within the estimates may have confounded the results, and also that 
spacing of wolves and caribou is critical. They clarified:
As our understanding of predator-prey systems increases, we are 
recognizing that simple ratios alone do not explain the response of prey
ISSpatrick Valkenburg, James L. Davis, "Status, Movements, Range Use Patterns, and Limiting 
Factors of the Fortymile Caribou Herd," Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of 
Wildlife Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Research Progress Report, Project 
W-23-1, Juneau, December 1989, p. 9.
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populations to their predators. Perhaps greater emphasis should be 
placed on spatial, functional, and behavioral aspects for predator-prey 
relationships. . . [Further,] contrary to moose (Crete and Messier 1984, 
Van Ballenberghe 1987), caribou may not become trapped in a 
"predator pit", even when they are at historic low levels (i.e., when 
wolf : caribou ratios are proportional to "predator pit" wolf : moose 
ratios) (Singer 1985).̂ ®̂
This information is critical to future wolf control debates for this area, and
ADF&G still needs to research the different aspects mentioned above and
determine if the situation referred to as "predator pit" pertains to caribou
before implementing future wolf control programs.
In addition, Valkenburg et al. (1989) estimated the average wolf kills 
approximately 8.2 caribou / year. Thus the total amount of caribou eaten by 
wolves between 1986 - 87 was estimated at 2,228, or 16% of the population.!^® 
With this level of predation, and with an average calf : 100 cow ratio of 39.4 
between 1976 and 1981, the FCH increased by approximately 10% per year.
This trend, where the FCH increased at a mean annual rate of about 7 -10%, 
was consistent for all years between 1975 - 1990. In 1990 the population 
estimate was 22,700.!^!
Because the FCH has the greatest potential for growth of any reasonably 
accessible caribou population in Alaska, ADF&G has advocated and 
implemented predator control — both grizzly bear and wolf — from 1981 - 
1987. After reviewing a wolf reduction program that lasted from 1980 - 1983, 
Valkenburg determined that wolf control did not increase the fall caribou calf 
: cow ratio. He clarified the following:
IS^ibid., p. 9 - 11.
190lbid., p. 10.
!^!Patrick Valkenburg, David G. Kelleyhouse, James L. Davis, and Jay M. Ver Hoef, "Case 
History of the Fortymile Caribou Herd, 1920 -1990," Rangifer, Nordic Council for Reindeer 
Research, P.O. Box 378, N-9401, Harstad, Norway, 14 (1), 1994, p. 21.
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It is not possible to determine the effect of the 1980 - 1983 wolf control 
program on either the growth rate of the FCH or on the mortality rate 
of adult females because no reliable caribou census or adult mortality 
estimates are available for the years immediately preceding the control 
program. It is apparent, however, that the removal of wolves in 1981 -
1982 did not increase the calf : 100 cow ratio in September - October 
during 1982 -1985 (Table 2), perhaps because wolves were only 
removed from a portion of the caribou winter range. Wolf packs 
within the summer range of the caribou herd were largely unaffected 
by harvest or control because the FCH summer range was inaccessible 
and because the primary goal of wolf control was to increase moose 
numbers in the southeast comer of the FCH winter range.. . .  In 1982-
1983 and 1983-1984, virtually the entire FCH spent the winter within 
the wolf control area.^^^
Several important aspects of the wolf control issue in this area surface in the
above passage. They are: 1) if a management goal is to determine whether or
not wolves are limiting Fortymile caribou, it appears that research needs to be
focused on calving and summer range. This is evident from the past
reduction program, when the majority of caribou spent their winters during
the control program within the parameters of the control program, and there
was no resulting increase in the growth rate of the herd; 2) the next logical
step for research in this area would be to try to answer the following question:
are wolves impacting caribou enough at the calving grounds or during the
summer so as to significantly slow their growth rate? If not, then we know
that wolf control probably will not improve the growth rate of the herd,
because it has proven to be ineffective in the winter range.
Further, the above passage reveals that wolves are inaccessible to both 
hunters and agency personnel in the caribou summer range. This probably 
indicates that forest cover is deterring aerial hunters from accessing wolves in 
the area. Haber (1992) clarifies that extensive forest cover in the
192lbid„ p. 21.
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Tanana/Fortymile area limits Same-Day-Airbome hunting.i^^ Unless some 
radical alteration of the habitat occurs, which likely would threaten the 
caribou, this situation will not change, and wolf control efforts will continue 
to be ineffective in the summer range.**** Thus we can deduce that, since 
wolf reduction in the FCH winter range did not effect caribou growth rates, 
and if it is not possible to effectively access wolves in the summer range, wolf 
control does not appear to be a reasonable management alternative for 
enhancing caribou in this area.
One additional and significant point the above passage makes is that 
appropriate information does not exist in order to determine if wolf 
reduction efforts positively impacted the Fortymile herd. ADF&G's literature 
is filled with examples of control programs being implemented without 
adequate information to determine their effectiveness. One other example of 
this, discussed in this paper, occurred with the Delta herd, when, in 1976 - 
1979, wolf control was initiated to increase the declining herd. In this 
example, there were no censuses done between 1973 and 1979, and therefore 
effects of the wolf reduction program were not possible to ascertain.1^4 More 
recently, in the 1991 Area Specific Plan for South Central/Interior Alaska, 
ADF&G was positioning itself to undertake yet another wolf control program
l^^Gordon C. Haber, "Wildlife Management in Alaska: Southcentral-Interior Wolf Control 
and Related Issues," Review Commissioned by Wolf Haven International, Tenino, WA, and The 
Alaska Wildlife Alliance, Anchorage, AK, November 1992, p. 71.
****If it is determined that wolf control must be done to alleviate pressure on an ungulate 
population, then aerial control is the most efficient and effective method of wolf population 
reduction. Ground-based trapping programs are arguably less humane, and are somewhat 
random, as are ground-based hunting efforts using snow machines. Haber (1988) outlines that 
selective pack removal is the most effective way to do wolf control.
1^4james L. Davis et al., "Demography of the Delta Caribou Herd Under Varying Rates of 
Natural Mortality and Human Harvest and Assessment of Field Techniques for Acquiring 
Demographic Data," Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife 
Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Research Final Report, January 1991, 
Projects W-22-5 through W-23-3 Study 3.33, p. 33.
148
in GMU 13 in order to benefit caribou, without knowing the effects of wolves 
on the Nelchina herd^^^ (please refer back to GMU 13 section of this chapter). 
Many opposed to ADF&G's wolf control programs, and the circumstances 
under which it has historically implemented wolf control, have criticized the 
Department for using wolf control in an arbitrary and capricious fashion.
Wolf reduction programs have been implemented without proper research 
prior to, during or after the control. As a minimum it seems appropriate to 
carefully census a herd before implementing control, and determine if 
predators are truly limiting the herd in any significant way. Censusing must 
also occur during and after predator control so that any results of the program 
may be established. As a result of ADF&G's haphazard approach to predator 
control, there exists no substantiated evidence that predators have impacted 
the growth of the FCH in any significant way.
In a paper published just last year, a group of prominent FCH biologists 
(including then ADF&G Director of Wildlife Conservation, David 
Kelleyhouse) admitted biologists are only now beginning to realize that 
perhaps factors other than wolves have affected the FCH recruitment rates. 
They wrote:
The possibility exists that weather also could have been a factor in low 
recruitment during the early 1970's. In the FCH, calf percentage in 
September - October was correlated with climactic factors during 1952 - 
1990 . . . Biologists are only just beginning to investigate these 
relationships in caribou, but it seems likely that there are periodic 
climatic conditions that are unfavorable for growth in caribou herds. 
Possible mechanisms include nutritional stress through insect 
harassment . . . lower summer nutrient content of plants . . . and
l^^Susan M. Abbott, ed.. Caribou. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife 
Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration, Management Report of Survey - Inventory 
Activities, 1 July 1990 - 30 June 1992, Projects W-23-5 & W-24-1, Study 3.0, December 1993, p. 92- 
95.
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winter stress leading to increased early summer mortality of calves and 
increased vulnerability of caribou to predation. . .
By turning its focus away from wolf predation and its effects on caribou,
ADF&G could open themselves up to a whole new world of information —
one which has the potential of truly bringing in accurate information about
ungulate ecology, and how it does or does not relate to predation. This new
direction in research is worth advocating for and supporting in the future.
In 1991, when ADF&G recommended wolf control to increase the FCH, 
the herd had been increasing continuously for over a decade, at a rate of >
10% per year. Valkenburg et al. (1994) reported that, "unless major adverse 
environmental changes occur, the current numerical and functional 
relationships between wolves and the FCH should not severely limit 
recovery of the FCH."i^^ Former Commissioner of Fish and Game, James 
Brooks critiqued ADF&G's 1991 proposed wolf control plans by stating the 
following;
It seems to me very probable that caribou do have physiological and 
behavioral sensitivities to forage composition and availability that 
simply are not evident from the gross nature of our observations. . . . 
The lately proposed wolf reduction program was premised on the 
assumption that ranges utilized by tire Delta and Forty Mile herds have 
the capacity to produce and maintain at least two or three times the 
number of animals now present based on higher population sizes that 
have occurred periodically in the past. Unfortunately, we do not know 
the conditions that gave rise to past population eruptions, but it is clear 
that they were preceded and followed by long intervals of relative 
scarcity. Severe weather with heavily crusted snow prior to and during 
the critical calving period could play an important role in reducing
l^^Patrick Valkenburg, David G. Kelleyhouse, James L. Davis, and Jay M. Ver Hoef, "Case 
History of the Fortymile Caribou Herd, 1920 - 1990," Rangifer, Nordic Council for Reindeer 
Research, P.O. Box 378, N-9401, Harstad, Norway, 14 (1), 1994, p. 21.
l^^Patrick Valkenburg, James L. Davis, "Status, Movements, Range Use Patterns, and Limiting 
Factors of the Fortymile Caribou Herd," Alaska Department of Fish and Came, Division of 
Wildlife Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Research Progress Report, Project 
W-23-1, Juneau, December 1989, p. 12.
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populations and predation could extend the times of scarcity, but 
response to the changing conditions of the range, particularly winter 
range, associated with high population levels must be a fundamental 
regulating mechanism as it was proven to be with reindeer.
Considering that the last two minor expansions of the Forty Mile herd 
in 1953 and 1964 ended with emigrations to the eastern arctic, things 
apparently were not right for a large population increase in the core 
area even though the eastern and southeastern parts of the range in the 
Yukon have probably regenerated to provide excellent winter forage. If 
conditions are now favorable for the onset of an expansive phase in the 
Forty Mile herd, it will occur in the face of wolf predation as it always 
has. If increased utilization by humans could be substituted for wolf 
predation, it would be beneficial, but there is often a wide gap between 
hunting opportunity and harvest success where caribou are concerned. 
Because wolves themselves are a harvested resource of substantial 
value to humans and a prominent ecological element in a complex 
wilderness fauna, their sacrifice in attempts to manipulate greater 
production from the Delta and Forty Mile caribou herds would be a 
certain loss with dubious if any benefits.i^®
Due to lack of information, it is unclear if any past wolf control 
programs in the Fortymile area have boosted growth of the caribou herd. It is 
known, however, that some of the most recent control efforts in the area did 
not increase the calf: 100 cow ratio between 1982 -1985. At a > 10 % growth 
rate for more than the last decade, the FCH seems to be a healthy and strong 
herd at this time. Given the information we have on past wolf control 
programs in this area, and the effects of wolf predation on caribou herds in 
general, there is little if any supporting evidence which favors implementing 
wolf control. The Fortymile herd is increasing at its own pace, and it seems 
prudent to allow the herd to continue to do so. This action seems particularly 
appropriate given the costs and controversy surrounding wolf control.
With tremendous foresight, Olaus J. Murie stated that habitat 
encroachment by humans and economic developments would present the
l^®James W. Brooks, "Perspectives on the Forty Mile and Delta caribou herds relative to 
predation by wolves for discussion at the Wolf Summit Conference," Comments presented at the 
Wolf Summit, Fairbanks, AK, January 16 -19,1993, p. 4 - 5 .
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great caribou herds of the north with their most daunting threats. He wrote 
in 1935:
The caribou's greatest menace is not the wolf, nor the hunter, but 
man's economic developments. . . . Caribou require much territory, 
because of the nature of their winter food, and it would not be wise to 
permit overcrowding of the range. A serious decrease in numbers 
should also be guarded against as Alaska becomes more thickly settled 
and many of its frontier conditions pass. In the more densely 
populated parts of the United States we are learning that in the 
agricultural development of this country we have made inadequate 
provision for big-game range. Such a condition should be forestalled 
in the course of the economic development of Alaska.
In support of Murie's statement, it seems appropriate for ADF&G to turn its
attention more to habitat encroachment issues which continue to affect the
herd, and away from targeting wolves as the primary threat to caribou. In
addition, ADF&G should ensure that human hunting will never again
compromise the herd the way it did in the late '60's and 70's.
Moose in the Upper Tanana/Fortymile Area, GMU 20E:
Moose in GMU 20E were not systematically surveyed until 1981.
Though ADF&G often reports that the moose population and other ungulate 
populations in southcentral Alaska irrupted in the 1950's as a result of federal 
predator control programs, these statements often cannot be substantiated. In 
the 1960's it is suggested that the moose population in the Tanana / Fortymile 
area declined rapidly when control programs ended. Gasaway et al. (1992) 
indicated that following this decline, moose were in a "low density 
population"200 which continued through the 1970's. Between the mid-1970 s
l^^Olaus J .Murie, "Alaska - Yukon Caribou," North American Fauna, No, 54, United States 
D^artm ent of Agriculture, Bureau of Biological Survey, Washington D C., June 1935, p. 7 - 8. 
ZOOyyiiiiam C. Gasaway, Rodney D. Boertje, Daniel V. Grangaard, David G. Kelleyhouse, 
Robert O. Stephenson, and Douglas G. Larsen, "The Role of Predation in Limiting Moose at Low
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and early 1980's moose densities continued to remain low, and this stasis 
prompted experimental predator control programs and research.
Haber and Walters (1980) refute ADF&G's population trend claims for 
wolf - ungulate populations prior to 1981. Haber writes:
Although there were no organized attempts to census wolves in 
the upper Tanana-Fortymile region prior to winter 1981 - 82, and 
despite Gasaway et al.'s (1992) emphasis that ADF&G did not begin 
"accurately estimating " wolf numbers until then, various ADF&G 
reports and publications - including at least four by Gasaway and co­
authors . . . still reach detailed conclusions about changes in wolf 
abundance all the way back to the late 1940's.
It is claimed that federal wolf control (including poisoning) 
beginning about that time and continuing through the 1950's reduced 
wolf abundance to low levels, and that this triggered major moose and 
caribou increases in the 1950's - that the wolves "responded " by 
increasing to high numbers in the 1960"s, whereupon by the mid 1960"s 
the moose and caribou populations began "declining steadily" and 
reached low abundance by the mid 1970"s, with the wolves tiien 
"declining precipitously." At least two ADF&G reports (ADF&G, 1989a, 
1991a) even make the claim that there were "about 600" wolves in 
GMU 20E during the alleged mid 1960s - early 1970"s wolf population 
high.
These claims, together with similar non-census claims about 1940"s- 
1970"s upper Tanana-Fortymile ungulate population trends (later), are 
reminiscent of the unfounded claims by Gasaway et al (1983) as to pre- 
1970s wolf-ungulate trends in GMU 20A. In both cases it is a nice, tidy- 
sounding story of cause and effect, but one which has little scientific 
basis, for which numerous discrepancies and other problems can be 
identified upon closer scrutiny (e.g., as Haber and Walters [1980] 
pointed out regarding claims about early wolf-caribou correla tion s).^ ^ !
It is true that much of the studies and literature cited in this paper contain
information which suggests that ungulate populations irrupted following
federal predator control programs in the 1940"s, and that as soon as they
Densities in Alaska and Yukon and Implications for Conservation," Wildlife Monographs, Vol. 
56, No. 1, January, 1992, No. 120, p. 14.
^(^Gordon C. Haber, "Wildlife Management in Alaska: Southcentral-Interior Wolf Control 
and Related Issues," Review Commissioned by Wolf Haven International, Tenino, WA, and The 
Alaska Wildlife Alliance, Anchorage, AK, November 1992, p. 71.
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stopped, wolf numbers increased and predator numbers decreased. While 
perhaps some of these claims may be legitimate, Haber's point rings true. 
ADF&G does present this information to the public in a nice tidy package of 
cause and effect (please see ADF&G Survey Inventory Reports, the 1992 Area 
Specific Wolf Management Plan, and other literature cited in this paper for 
illustrations of this), which belies the more complex truths involved in these 
multi-predator/multi-prey systems.
The number of prey per predator in the Upper Tanana / Fortymile area 
is currently very low, which is one of the primary motivating factors behind 
predator research and control in this area. Gasaway et al. (1992) reported, "the 
numbers of prey per predator in the [Tanana/Fortymile] experimental area in 
1981 are among the lowest reported in North A m e r i c a . " 2 0 2  These biologists 
suggest that the predator/ prey system in the area is an example of the "low- 
density dynamic equilibrium" (LDDE) model. They suspect the combined 
predation of wolves and grizzly bears, which they indicate are lightly 
harvested, have been maintaining the moose population at a low level for an 
extended period of time.
Gasaway et al.'s (1992) research on the effects of wolves on moose in 
GMU 20E included an experimental area (Mosquito Flats) consisting of 
approximately 9,200 sq. kilometers, and two adjacent control areas (please 
refer to appendix 3.5). One of the control areas bridged both Alaskan and 
Yukon land, and predator numbers were reduced in the experimental area.
In 1966 a large fire created prime moose habitat in the Mosquito Flats area.
202william C. Gasaway, Rodney D. Boertje, Daniel V. Grangaard, David G. Kelleyhouse, 
Robert O. Stephenson, and Douglas G. Larsen, "The Role of Predation in Limiting Moose at Low 
Densities in Alaska and Yukon and Implications for Conservation," Wildlife Monographs, Vol. 
56, No. 1, January, 1992, No. 120, p. 27.
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supporting primarily willow and birch, which provides critical winter and 
summer habitat for moose. During their research, caribou also spent portions 
of three seasons (spring, autumn, and winter) in the experimental area, and 
less time in the control areas.
Sixteen wolf packs ranged either partially or entirely in the 9,200 sq. km. 
experimental area, and wolf removal efforts covered all of the pack's ranges 
— an area totaling 15,500 sq. km. It was estimated that a total of 125 wolves 
made up those sixteen packs, which were reduced to 52 wolves after the first 
year of control (1981-2), and 34 wolves after the second year (1982-3).203 Over 
the course of the next five years with public hunting and trapping continuing 
but no ADF&G wolf control, the wolf population recovered to approximately 
76 - 83 (late winter surveys), where it remained until the early 1990's. ADF&G 
also liberalized grizzly bear harvest regulations in 1981 - 87, in an effort to 
reduce bear predation. Grizzly bears were harvested at a rate of 8% annually, 
which is "sufficient to cause the population to decline slowly."204 For the 
majority of the 1980's, then, wolves were maintained at much lower densities 
than the habitat can withstand, and bears were declining at a slow rate.
Gasaway et al. (1992) concluded that wolf removal did not effect moose 
calf survival, and did not increase moose abundance in the area. They wrote:
The 1981-83 wolf removal in a portion of the experimental area 
allowed us to conclude that wolf predation on calves was not a 
detectable source of additive mortality when grizzly bears were 
abundant. Reducing wolf numbers from 85 during early winter 1981 to 
19 during April 1982 in and around the Mount Veta-Mosquito Flats 
survey area produced no treatment effect on calves per cow or yearlings 
per cow for the 1982-86 cohorts . . . Failure of calves per cow to increase 
during the 1980's wolf removal indicates either grizzlies were the 
predominant predator on young calves before and after wolf numbers
p. 19.
204ibid., p. 20.
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were reduced, or increased grizzly bear predation compensated for 
reduced wolf p r e d a t i o n . ^ o s
Once again, wolf removal was not successful in producing the results that the 
Department had hoped to accomplish. Their experiments indicate that bear 
predation plays a primary role in the Tanana/Fortymile area.
Further, Gasaway et al. (1992) concluded that nutrition was not a 
limiting factor of moose in the experimental area, for size of moose, body fat, 
and pregnancy rates were all comparable to six other moose populations in 
AK. There was no starvation observed during their study, and Gasaway et al. 
(1992) found there was low competition for browse — only 6 - 7% of the 
preferred willow twigs were browsed in the experimental area. They 
determined that, "because indicators of strong nutritional stress were not 
observed during the low-density period, we concluded that moose density 
was well below KCC [ecological carrying capacity]."206
Lastly, Gasaway et al. (1992) judged that human harvests of moose were 
not limiting the population, which accounted for only 1.5% of the total 
annual mortality rate, whereas other causes were responsible for 37% during 
the mid-1980 s. However, high caribou harvests which radically decreased 
the alternate prey source may have affected the moose population by boosting 
the effects of predation.
Gasaway et al. (1992) found that grizzly bears were the predominant 
predator on moose in the Tanana/Fortymile area, and had they been,
"severely reduced along with wolves, we would have observed increased calf 
s u r v i v a l . " 2 0 7  Apparently 92% of the prey biomass killed by grizzlies during
2 0 5 i b i d . ,  p .  3 1 - 3 2 .  
2 0 6 l b i d . ,  p .  2 0  - 2 1 .  
2 0 7 l b i d . ,  p .  3 2 .
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1985 - 86 was composed of moose.208 As an alternative to aggressive bear 
control, the biologists experimented by altering food availability in the area. 
They air-dropped up to fifteen tons of train-killed moose and other meat 
during May and June of 1985. They observed many predators — wolves, 
grizzly and black bears — on the carcasses. They found this to be a very 
effective alternative, for, "the early winter calves per cows in the Mosquito 
Flats increased to 53/100 cows... compared with a range of 11-15/100 . . .  
during the preceding 3 years and 26 - 36 / 100... during the following 2
years. "209
In their final recommendations, Gasaway et al. (1992) advised that when 
future predator manipulation occurs for the purpose of increasing moose, it 
should include a plan which would reduce bear and wolf predation 
simultaneously. They outlined:
Plans for manipulating predation should consider altering wolf and 
bear predation simultaneously rather than intense management of 1 
predator species. Nonlethal means, e.g., diversionary feeding and 
habitat management, may reduce predation by both wolves and bears 
simultaneously. . . . Reducing predation of only 1 species may result in 
compensatory predation by another species, hence diminishing the 
effects of intense single-species management. . . ."2io
While wolf control did not work to increase moose, diversionary feeding
techniques did achieve short-term, positive results. Neither wolf control or
diversionary feeding techniques contain long-term solutions, which
ultimately all wildlife policy-makers should be seeking. Given a choice
between the two options, however, this paper recommends that diversionary
feeding be given priority attention in future management plans for this area.
208ibid., p. 27.
209ibid.
210lbid., p. 49.
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The most recent moose census done in GMU 20E occurred in 1988, and it 
suggested the moose population had increased to 4,400 from a population of 
2,530 in 1981.2H This accounts for a steady increase in the population at a rate 
of approximately 4-5% per year since 1981, and a population density increase 
of 88 moose/1,000 sq. km. in 1976 - 81 to 157/1,000 sq. km in 1981 - 88.212 Calf 
survival has also increased, which ADF&G attributes to the reduced grizzly 
bear population in the area. The 1993 ADF&G Survey Inventory report 
specifies that, "grizzly bears are the predominant predator on moose calves in 
this s u b u n i t . " 2 i 3  It further clarifies that there is a rising wolf population in 
GMU 20E, and along with this trend, the number of yearling bulls has 
increased:
The 1991 yearling:cow ratio, estimated by doubling the number of 
yearling bulls observed, was 33:100 exceeding the 5-year average of 
25:100. The cause of increased survival for this age class is unknown as 
the wolf population increased 30% the past 2 years. Caribou availability 
has probably contributed to reduced wolf predation on moose.2^4
This information further supports the notion that wolves are not limiting 
the moose population in the Tanana/Fortymile area. In addition, it is likely 
that steadily increasing caribou numbers will further ease moose predation 
pressure without future predator manipulation. Since both wolf and bear 
control are not well accepted by the public and do not necessarily achieve
211Susan M, Abbot, ed.. Moose. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife 
Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration, Survey-Inventory Management Report, 1 
July 1989 - 30 June 1991, Projects W-23-3 and W-23-4, Study 1.0, February 1993, p. 303.
2l2vvilliam C. Gasaway, Rodney D. Boertje, Daniel V. Grangaard, David G. Kelleyhouse, 
Robert O. Stephenson, and Douglas G. Larsen, "The Role of Predation in Limiting Moose at Low 
Densities in Alaska and Yukon and Implications for Conservation," Wildlife Monographs, Vol. 
56, No. 1, January, 1992, No. 120, p. 15.
213susan M. Abbot, ed.. Moose. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife 
Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration, Survey-Inventory Management Report, 1 
July 1989 - 30 June 1991, Projects W-23-3 and W-23-4, Study 1.0, February 1993, p. 303.
21%id.
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desired results, and since we know that both moose and caribou numbers are 
increasing, one very good alternative for future management of this area 
would be to let the current trend play itself out. If Department and public 
pressure force quicker results than naturally will occur at this time, a short­
term diversionary feeding program should be considered. Using diversionary 
feeding as an alternative, the current unsustainable level of grizzly bear 
harvesting by humans could be halted.
In the 1992 Area Specific Plan for South Central/Interior Alaska, the 
ADF&G reports they intend to increase hunting in GMU 20E dramatically.
The average number of moose hunters in GMU 20E over the past five years 
has been 300. The Department states that, "harvest goals have called for 
increasing hunter participation from 300 to 800 hunters by the year 2000, with 
a hunter success rate of 35 percent. "215 This statement suggests the 
Department is actively seeking to increase hunting in this area, and nowhere 
do they substantiate that such a demand for it exists. It appears here as 
though ADF&G is perhaps taking on the role of advocating for hunting (just 
as it is currently doing with trapping*), which seems inappropriate.
Further, as outlined in the Area Specific Plan, ADF&G wants to increase 
the moose population from its current estimate of ~4,000 to between 8-10,000. 
They state this goal will not be obtained with current growth rates by the year 
2000. Thus the Department’s justifications for implementing wolf control to 
benefit moose in the Tanana/Fortymile area include: 1) so that hunting 
participation can increase from 300 to 800 hunters by the year 2,000; and 2) to
215Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife Conservation, Area Specific 
Wolf Management Plan for South Central /  Interior Alaska, September 9,1991; p. 32 - 33.
*ADF&G announced in early February, 1995, that it is producing a video which will be sent all 
over the world to try to educate people about trapping in Alaska, which is done primarily with 
"leg-hold" traps. The European community has agreed to ban furs trapped with leg-hold traps, 
which are considered inhumane.
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increase the moose population from ~4,000 to 8-10,000. However, ADF&G 
researchers have determined that wolves are not limiting moose, and past 
wolf control programs have not increased the moose population in GMU 20E.
Wolves in the Upper Tanana/Fortymile area:
Murie reported that wolves were "common" in the Tanana/Fortymile 
area until about 1908, "rare" between then and after 1923, and increasing 
during the late 1920's. They are thought to have reached a stable population 
size in the 1930's and '40’s. Separate observations during the 1940's and 50's 
yielded differing opinions of tiie abundance of wolves. Skoog (1956) indicated 
wolf populations were low during this time, while Kelly (1951) suggested they 
were plentiful.^i^ Federal control maintained the wolf population at low 
numbers during the 1950's by using poison baits, "getters " and aerial hunting. 
Gasaway et al. (1992) reported:
The high density of wolves in the region (Murie 1944) was rapidly 
reduced by a federal predator reduction program during 1948 - 60. . . .  
Wolves were killed by strychnine-laced baits dropped from airplanes, 
cyanide guns (coyote-getters), shooting from airplanes, year-round 
trapping, and snaring . . . .  Bounties encouraged public harvest using 
the above methods, except that poisons were restricted to government
use.217
Grizzly and black bears also experienced substantial losses during the federal 
control programs. Gasaway et al (1992) reported:
Grizzly bears were "intensively exploited during the 1950's. Poisons 
and snares used during the wolf reduction program (1948 -1960) killed
216patrick Valkenburg, James L. Davis, "Status, Movements, Range Use Patterns, and Limiting 
Factors of the Fortymile Caribou Herd," Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of 
Wildlife Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Research Progress Report, Project 
W-23-1, Juneau, December 1989, p. 15-16.
217william C. Gasaway, Rodney D. Boertje, Daniel V. Grangaard, David G. Kelleyhouse, 
Robert O. Stephenson, and Douglas G. Larsen, "The Role of Predation in Limiting Moose at Low 
Densities in Alaska and Yukon and Implications for Conservation," Wildlife Monographs, Vol. 
56, No. 1, January, 1992, No. 120, p. 18.
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grizzly and black bears incidental to killing wolves . .  . Also, miners 
shot bears to minimize conflicts, and bears were killed in snares that 
were set year-round to catch wolves for bounty .218
In the 1960's, after federal predator control programs ended, ADF&G's
observations suggest wolves became plentiful again, and then decreased
during the mid-1970 s, shadowing ungulate numbers.
In 1981, when ADF&G began accurately estimating the wolf population 
in this area, Gasaway et al. (1992) simultaneously began a wolf reduction 
program. Gasaway et al. (1992) determined that wolves in their experimental 
area (~125) were near ecological carrying capacity (KCC) before wolf removal. 
Wolf productivity levels increased significantly after wolf reduction occurred. 
Also, Gasaway et al. (1992) learned that wolves in the area remained within 
their territories and did not follow migrating c a r i b o u . ^ i ^
While discrepancies of wolf population estimates for the latter 1980's 
exist within ADF&G publications, the range of estimates provided include 173 
- 235 wolves. The past three years have seen a decline in wolf numbers in 
this area: the fall 1991 estimate was 175 - 206, spring 1992 estimates were 136 - 
147 and the spring 1993 estimate was 110 - 120. A harvest of 28-32% of the 
population in 1992-93 exceeded the sustainable <25%, and caused the 
population to decline.
When interviewed by the New York Times, Wildlife Conservation 
Director, David Kelleyhouse highlighted the Department's justifications for
218lbid., p. 20.
219lbid., p. 19.
^^^Susan M. Abbot, ed.. Wolf. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Wildlife 
Conservation, Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration, Annual Performance Report of Survey- 
Inventory Activities, 1 July 1991 - 30 June 1992, Projects W-23-5 and W-24-1, Study 14.0, 
December 1992, December 1993, p. 14, p. 13, respectively.
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the plan. He stated, "We feel we are going to create a wildlife spectacle on a 
par with the major migrations in East Africa,. . . Mom and pop from Syracuse 
can come up here and see something that they can't see anywhere else on 
E arth ."22i Kelleyhouse's remarks were followed by the Board of Game 
indicating that local economies would benefit from tourist dollars through 
this action. They wrote:
People who wish to view the wildlife spectacle of massive Fortymile 
caribou migrations are unable to do so because of the small size of the 
herd. The local economy suffers from the lack of cash that would be 
brought into the communities by people coming to view or hunt the 
FCH.222
These combined remarks caused an avalanche of criticism and ultimately led 
to a tourism boycott of the state.
Conclusion:
Existing literature discussing wildlife and related issues regarding the 
three areas targeted for wolf control in 1992 does not provide strong support 
for the wolf management plans proposed and adopted by the state. Each area 
— Nelchina/Susitna Basin, Tanana Foothills and Flats and Upper 
Tanana/Fortymile — comes with its own natural history, environmental 
considerations and human encroachment concerns. The situation in one 
area regarding ungulates is quite different from that of other areas, and thus 
generalizations are difficult to make regarding predator/ ungulate 
management. However, it is apparent that ADF&G's own scientific
22lTimothy Egan, "Alaska to Kill Wolves To Inflate Game Herds," New York Times, 
November 19,1992, A16 L.
222state of Alaska, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Findings of the Board of Game, 
"Finalization of the Area Specific Wolf Management Plan for SouthCentral/Interior Alaska, 
No. 92-62-BOG, 1992, p. 30-31.
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information does not fully support their control proposals. ADF&G's 
biological justifications are neither foolproof nor are they widely accepted by 
other wolf experts. Much controversy still surrounds ADF&G’s proposals. 
Further, biological necessity does not appear to be the major driving force 
behind the control programs.
The studies highlighted in this chapter also clarify that Alaskan wildlife 
managers are still missing pertinent threads of information regarding 
Alaska's complex wildlife tapestry. These deficiencies have limited the 
breadth of the debate which, up to now, has revolved around predators and 
predator/prey relationships. Wolves have been a primary focus of most of 
the studies relating to ungulates within ADF&G research. ADF&G's tendency 
to dwell on the potential negative effects of wolves on ungulate populations 
has left existing literature and human understanding of other critical 
ecological components of these systems inadequate. Research on wolves, for 
example, has taken precedence over research on habitat, nutritional needs, 
climate-related concerns and other predators, such as bears. ADF&G's focus 
on wolves appears to be part of an age-old, western cultural bias against 
wolves.
The scientific focus of this controversial wildlife policy debate needs to 
shift so that it includes aspects other than predator/prey relationships. For 
example, the number of predators per ungulate population does not 
necessarily determine whether or not predators are adversely affecting prey. 
Alaskan wildlife managers must look beyond the traditional predator/ prey 
studies and begin to gather more information on climactic, habitat and 
nutritional effects on ecosystems so that predator/prey relationships can be 
understood within their larger context.
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An additional disturbing element of this debate is that there are 
currently no operating guidelines, standards or determined biological 
thresholds which trigger consideration of predator control. Right now, the 
state of Alaska can implement predator control whenever the political mood 
is favorable. For example, a "predator pit" situation does not have to be 
identified before wolf control is implemented. Ungulate numbers can be 
high and wolf control can still be proposed, as was the case in GMU 13. There 
are also no research guidelines in place during predator control programs. 
Thus, Alaska has experienced a multitude of wolf control programs and, in 
many cases, has not been able to assess their positive, neutral or negative 
effects due to lack of monitoring and analysis. It is time for the state to 
establish these standards so that future wildlife management programs can 
appear to be more credible.
Finally, since biological necessity seems not to be the major driving force 
behind the 1992 proposed wolf control, political pressure and differing values 
must be addressed as core areas of the controversy. It is perhaps toward the 
arena of ethics and values that Alaska must turn most of its attention 
regarding wolf management at this time. A change has occurred amongst the 
majority of people in Alaska, and ADF&G and the hunting-advocate 
community must begin to accept these new views and incorporate them fairly 
into future wildlife management.
Appendix 3.1 Map of Alaska s Caribou Herd Ranges
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Chapter 4
THE WIDER VIEW: Ethical Considerations in Alaska's Wolf Issue
But I want to emphasize in no uncertain terms 
that this is not an issue of biology: it is an issue of 
values and ethics. It matters not at all whether or 
not wolves are reducing ungulate numbers if 
people find the concept of killing such highly 
evolved social animals repugnant, and they object 
to your concept o f managed "wilderness" where 
predators are managed in favour of prey. . . .  I 
sincerely hope that the idea of providing a wildlife 
viewing spectacular in Alaska by killing predators, 
as described by Mr. Kelleyhouse in the New York 
Times, is viewed by both the majority of Alaskans 
and others throughout the U.S. and Canada as 
inappropriate, cowboy wildlife management, 
regardless of whether or not, by killing wolves, you 
can achieve such a purpose.
Values set the broad parameters for 
environmental management, a fact I believe you 
have not adequately assessed.^^^
John Theberge, Letter to Governor Hickel,
December 7, 1992
In discussing the Alaskan wolf issue from an ethical and value-based 
perspective, this chapter will use ideas presented in an essay entitled, "Ethics, 
Science and Environmental Regulation," by Donald A. B r o w n . 2 2 4  Brown's 
essay identifies inadequacies which exist at the environmental policy-making 
level due to a reluctance on the part of policy-makers to include the ethical 
and value-based concerns in environmental debates. Brown outlines how 
ethics and values are central to most environmental policy debates, and that
223john B. Theberge, PhD, Professor of Ecology, University of Waterloo, "Brief Comment on 
G.C. Haber's "Wildlife Management in Alaska ", January 14, 1993, p. 4.
224Donald A. Brown, "Ethics, Science, and Environmental Regulation," Environmental Ethics, 
Winter 1987, Vol 9, p. 331 - 349.
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they should be of primary concern during environmental policy discussions. 
He asserts that science and technical expertise, at the exclusion of ethical 
inquiry, has dominated environmental controversies. This assertion 
certainly applies to the Alaskan wolf controversy.
Wildlife management in Alaska involves many political, ecological and 
ethical complexities, each with their own values-related concerns. In order 
for policy-makers to begin discussing values regarding the wolf issue, the 
complexities involved must first be identified and addressed. Following this, 
an ethically based system can be devised which can allow for a legitimate 
process of decision-making to occur. While it is not in the scope of this 
chapter to discuss all of Alaska's values-related issues regarding wildlife in 
detail, this chapter will attempt to introduce some of the broader ethical 
concerns surrounding the wolf debate. To better relate Brown's ideas to the 
specifics of the Alaskan wolf debate, this chapter also utilizes the writings of 
environmental ethicists Paul Taylor and Eugene Hargrove, among others, to 
help inform the discussion.
In Brown's essay. Brown clarifies that ethics and value systems are 
essential to determine whether or not to go ahead with an environmental 
project. In addition, the author contends that ethics and value systems 
should be a focus of environmental policy debates. Brown also distinguishes 
the roles of ethics and science in these debates, suggesting they both are 
critically important, but that science should be used as a tool in order to make 
what are ultimately ethical decisions. Brown states, "ethics is concerned with 
the ends that should be chosen by people. Science is extremely important in 
most environmental ethical discussions because, once a particular goal is 
chosen, science can evaluate various means that are available to achieve the
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goal. Science can also analyze which ends are f e a s i b l e . " 2 2 5  Thus Brown 
considers science an important tool in determining the feasible outcomes of 
projects, but it is secondary to the necessary ethical discussions revolving 
around community decisions. He further clarifies:
It is generally accepted that science cannot deduce prescriptive 
statements from facts. That is, one cannot deduce "ought" from "is" 
without supplying a new minor premise. One cannot introduce an 
evaluative term, such as "optimal solution," into the conclusion of an 
argument if the prior premises of that argument are entirely 
nonevaluative . . . .  Therefore, on this largely traditional view of the 
logic of ethics, science cannot answer ethical questions all by itself.226
For example, in order to determine if society should choose to use nuclear
power, science is critical in clarifying what risks are involved in such a
decision. Whether or not those risks are worth taking, however, is a value-
based decision.
Belief in science is at a peak in western culture, and science and 
objectivism has in many ways replaced religion as the primary belief system. 
One example of this is that science is held in highest esteem during 
environmental policy forums. Brown, however, outlines significant 
shortcomings within science, stating that the narrow focus of the scientific 
method has limitations and causes value distortions. Brown writes:
Because of the primacy given to scientific truths by technically 
trained persons, issues that can be dealt with on quantitative terms are 
more sympathetically considered than issues that involve more 
difficult qualitative or ethical concerns. . . . Scientists are trained to 
report impersonal data from which all subjective elements have been 
removed, to reduce all issues to a scale that can be quantitatively 
manipulated, to think of nature as lifeless substance with measurable
225Donald A. Brown, "Ethics, Science, and Environmental Regulation," Environmental Ethics, 
Winter 1987, Vol 9, p. 334.
226ibid.
172
analytic parameters, and to transform social questions into technical
questions.227
In Alaska’s wildlife management debate, the transformation of wolves — a 
species which elicits intense emotions, which for some enter a spiritual realm 
— into "lifeless substance with measurable analytic parameters, " immediately 
positions the Alaskan wolf debate in conflict. Limiting the wolf discussion to 
a narrow, scientific scope, as has been done, stifles, flusters and distorts the 
dialogue at the policy-making level. Brown further suggests that attempts by 
those pursuing the scientific method to separate values and facts are often 
difficult or impossible, for human values determine the direction of scientific 
research. He outlines:
Philosophers who have been concerned about how people understand 
facts, a topic studied within a branch of philosophy called 
hermeneutics, have come to realize that what one sees is usually a 
product of cultural tradition; there are no acts of pure perception that 
are not dependent on prior value choices. In this context, the decision 
about which "facts" to focus on in the analytical stage of research 
cannot avoid value questions. For example, should the 
environmental impact analysis of a dam consider protection of the 
habitats of deer and elk or should it consider potential destruction of 
the habitats of skunk or coyote? The decision of what to study is 
frequently a question of value, not of fact.228
Brown further clarifies how limited the technical community can
become. He states:
The technical community often focuses on those aspects of a problem it 
knows something about while ignoring others. . . . What the public 
usually sees, however, is a debate about a narrow range of the technical 
issues with the participants in the debate acting as though they 
understand and are dealing with all issues that should be of concern to 
the public. In this way, the public policy debate is often a language 
game in which the jargon of the specialty of the analysts sets the 
allowable limits of where to start and stop the investigation. Value
227lbid., p. 347.
228lbid., p. 335.
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conflicts which should be resolved politically are then hidden in what 
look like rational and objective calculations.229
As Brown suggests, the value conflicts surrounding Alaska's wolf
controversy were not formally discussed in 1992 and thus were hidden within
a limited scope of technical information outlined in Chapter 3. Certainly
Alaska's wolf control controversy is an example of a debate where only a
narrow range of the technical issues have been considered.
Throughout his essay. Brown delineates failures which commonly occur 
within the environmental decision-making process related to the inability of 
decision-makers to discuss inherent value and ethical concerns. The first 
such failure Brown describes exists within the regulatory setting. He outlines:
Failure #1: The assumption that environmental dilemmas can be decided 
through technical terms, while value concerns are left un discussed.
"In this way, agency technicians apply science derived "facts" to 
politically derived rules. The model envisioned in this conventional 
view of administrative decision making assumes that the technical 
problems under consideration can be dealt with in technical, analytical 
terms and that the values of the administrator and the value problems 
embedded in the environmental controversy can be eliminated from 
the administrative process. Does the relegation of these "fact-value " 
questions to "technical " experts systematically distort the important 
values and ethical questions that are necessarily embedded in the 
environmental questions under consideration? I believe the answer is 
clear.230
As Brown points out, the question of whether or not wolf control is an 
ethically acceptable alternative to the public was not discussed by government 
appointed or agency personnel at any stage of the 1992 - '93 wolf controversy
229Donald A. Brown, "Ethics, Science, and Environmental Regulation," Environmental Ethics, 
Winter 1987, Vol 9, p. 341.
230ibid., p. 333.
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— not during the Wolf Management Planning Team meetings as is reflected 
in the Team’s recommendations, ADF&G organized public meetings, or 
November '92 Board of Game meeting. After the wolf control plans were 
temporarily canceled, some discussions at Governor Hickel's Wolf Summit 
mentioned briefly that values were a part of the debate.
During the Summit, groups comprised of people from all over the 
country holding a variety of perspectives on wolf control attempted to discuss 
and summarize consensus-based points about wolf management. Nine 
groups created a total of ninety-two summary points, three of which 
recognized differing values, beliefs and philosophies to be part of the debate. 
These summary points read as follows:
* Some philosophies do not allow for a consensus solution (Group 2)
* Avoid biases, disrespect for differing values (Group 3)
* People should tolerate other life styles, beliefs and values (Group
8 ) 2 3 1
While these summary points were intended to help guide the state in future 
wolf management decisions, there has yet to be any formal discussion 
regarding values related to wolf management.
Failure #2: There is no accepted consensus among environmental policy­
makers regarding which ethical value system to use.
The second failure Brown outlines is the failure on the part of those 
involved in environmental policy-making to reach a consensus on which 
ethical value system to apply to environmental problems in question. Brown 
clarifies that ethics is concerned with prescriptive statements. It is the.
231 Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Summary, Alaska Wolf Summit -1993.
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"domain of inquiry that attempts to answer the question 'What is good?' . . . 
[whereas science is a] discipline that attempts to make descriptive statements 
about the nature of reality through analysis of facts and e x p e r i e n c e .  "̂ 2̂ 
Brown points out that the philosophical community has not reached 
consensus about ethical approaches to environmental problems, though the 
most commonly used approach is a utilitarian one, where the, "underlying 
assumption . . .  is that an option should be chosen that creates the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number of p e o p l e , "233 and all other sentient life.
Utilitarianism, was not the approach used by the state during the 1992 
wolf conflict. Had the state chosen a utilitarian approach, it may have 
avoided national outcry, but also risked changing the face of wildlife 
management in Alaska. With the formation of the Wolf Management 
Planning Team (WMPT), the state attempted to create a wolf management 
plan which included something for everyone — a plan that everyone could 
live with. While initially this may sound utilitarian, the WMPT did not 
actually apply a utilitarian approach.
In a situation where the majority of people oppose the idea of wolf 
control, a team might have produced results which created the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number of people if the majority of team members 
opposed wolf control and the starting point for discussions was determining 
whether or not wolf control is acceptable in any circumstance. This was not 
the case with the state's team. The state brought a group of team members 
together which attempted to have all interests fairly equally represented. The 
purpose of the team was to hammer out a compromise over when wolf
232Qonald A. Brown, "Ethics, Science, and Environmental Regulation," Environmental Ethics, 
Winter 1987, Vol 9, p. 333.
233ibid., p. 337.
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control would be acceptable, not if it would be acceptable. Thus right from the 
onset, neither the team nor the state were headed toward recommendations 
which could be considered utilitarian. That a utilitarian approach was not 
used is supported by the Dittman poll, as outlined in Chapter 2.
A challenge to Alaska's policy-makers, along with the philosophical 
community’s at large, will be to determine which ethical value system to use 
in the wolf and other wildlife debates. This challenge will not come without 
hardship and fundamental change in the state's approach to wildlife policy­
making.
Failure #3: Facts and values are not necessarily distinguishable to humans 
because humans are a product of their culture and environment.
Another failure Brown identifies is an inability among humans to 
separate facts from values. He identifies that fact and value are not 
necessarily distinguishable because people are a product of their culture and 
environment. He writes:
Analysis of environmental "facts " usually requires prior value 
decisions about level of detail, burden-of-proof, and quality of data. 
Thus, a value choice is implicit in almost every choice the technical 
analyst makes. . . these value choices are rarely identified in the 
technical analyses or in the public policy debate.
Regarding wolves, western cultural biases, which have included devaluing
wolves, have led scientific hypotheses and research to feature wolves in a
negative light. Historically, the field of wildlife biology and, more specifically,
ADF&G have not been excluded from these biases.
Underlying value choices which have existed throughout much of the 
history of wildlife management in Alaska include that: wolves are
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understood or perceived to negatively impact prey populations; both 
individual and packs of wolves are replaceable or disposable; ungulates hold 
greater value than wolves or other predators; a priority of wildlife 
management is to make ungulates available for human hunting, often at the 
expense of predator species. These approaches to wolves and prey are value- 
based.
Wolves often are not portrayed favorably or given the benefit of the 
doubt even in objective terms in ADF&G research. For example, ADF&G 
publications rarely discuss the ecological benefits of wolves within an 
ecosystem. Another example is that wolves were hypothesized to be the 
limiting factor of the moose population in GMU 13 and 20E, when in reality 
brown bears have a greater impact. This misled hypothesis was likely the 
result of a cultural bias against wolves. Additionally, that biologists are only 
now beginning to research the effects of climate, habitat and nutritionally- 
based effects on herds, such as the Fortymile caribou herd, is an example of 
how cultural limitations have narrowed the scope of scientific research.
No ADF&G research has tried to analyze the impacts of wolf control on 
the social behavior of wolves and their packs, for example, as Robert Crabtree 
has done in Yellowstone regarding coyotes (please see chapter 1). When 
Gordon Haber suggests the state should explore the impacts of wolf control on 
pack social behavior, he is often publicly ridiculed.
Most of the ADF&G studies referred to in chapter three portray the wolf 
as a primary cause for the decline of ungulates. Even in situations where not 
enough data exists to determine if wolves are actually limiting ungulate 
populations, ADF&G biologists suspect wolves. For example, in Ballard et 
al.'s, "Ecology of an Exploited Wolf Population in South-Central Alaska,"
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(1987) which focuses on GMU 13, the authors state that, "Relatively low wolf 
densities in both the SRSA [Susitna River Study Area] and remainder of 
GMU 13, combined with lack of moose population estimates before wolf 
control and biases associated with annual moose sex and age composition 
transects (Caughley 1974), provided inadequate data for evaluating the 
impacts of wolves on the moose population. However, there were other 
indicators that suggested reduced wolf densities may have increased moose 
s u r v i v a l . " 2 3 4  Though by no means definitive, the authors discuss how wolf 
densities in the SRSA were negatively correlated with subsequent autumn 
moose calf ; cow ratios from spring during the study, and offer that this 
suggests "reduced wolf densities may have contributed to increased calf 
survival." Simply the suggestion of such a correlation, given the limited 
technical data, suggest a cultural bias and helps perpetuate an age-old bias 
against wolves
On the other hand, when the authors of the above study have an 
opportunity to down-play the perceived negative impacts of wolves on prey 
populations, they remain quiet. For example, in their conclusion the authors 
discuss litter sizes. They state, "Mean litter size per pack in late summer 
varied from 3.7 to 7.3 pups with smallest litters occurring during years of 
highest wolf and lowest moose densities." (Ballard et al. 1 9 8 7 ) . 2 3 5  This 
statement may suggest that wolf populations could be naturally regulating 
themselves depending on prey availability and their own population size. 
Rather than exploring this possibility, or offering this as a suggestion, no 
comment is made by the authors relevant to this observation.
234BalIard et al., "Ecology of an exploited wolf population in south-central Alaska, " Wildlife 
Monographs, Blacksburg, VA, July, 1987, No. 98 p. 40.
235ibid. ,p. 43.
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The only statement that is made about natural wolf population 
regulation comes prior to the conclusion when the authors cite studies from 
other biologists (which their own research does not appear to support) which 
suggest that, "no sensitive, fast-acting feedback mechanism regulates numbers 
of wolves relative to declining prey densities (Packard and Mech 1980). . . . 
[which, in conjunction with bear predation] could increase the frequency and 
severity of predator-sustained declines in ungulate populations and decrease 
the likelihood that ungulate populations would escape control by predators 
under natural conditions (Ballard et al. 1987).236
The 1992 Area Specific Management Plan also portrays wolves as the 
primary cause of ungulate number declines. The description of Unit 20A 
provides a good example. ADF&G wrote:
In Unit 20A, the moose population had fallen from a high . . . Caribou 
numbers had also dropped . . . .Wolf control was initiated in late winter 
of 1976, and by fall 1978 the wolf population had been reduced by two- 
thirds. In response, the moose population grew to the present level of 
11,100.. . The Delta caribou herd also grew rapidly, reaching a peak in 
1989. Then between 1989 and 1992, adverse weather caused poor 
caribou calf survival. At the same time, wolf predation on adult 
caribou increased and the caribou population declined from 10,700 
caribou in 1989 to 5700 caribou in 1992. The wolf population has been 
increasing in recent years in Unit 20A and has fully recovered from 
wolf control programs which ended in 1982. There are presently 220- 
300 wolves in Unit 20A.23?
Just as Gordon Haber has pointed out in other examples (please see chapter 3),
ADF&G has painted a neat, tidy package of cause and effect between wolves
and prey species; however, these wolf/ ungulate relationships are
oversimplifications. While adverse weather is mentioned as a factor
impacting caribou calf survival, the primary cause for ungulate decline
236ibid., p. 42-43.
237Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Area Specific Wolf Management Plan for South 
Central/Interior Alaska, 1992, p. 26.
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outlined by ADF&G above is wolf predation. Assumptions are made here by 
the Department which many scientists, environmentalists and others 
involved in the debate do not believe are fully accurate.
Through ADF&G's singular approach in the Area Specific Plan and 
other publications, strong, "anti-wolf" messages go out to the public. For 
many, this type of information is too close to "anti-wolf" propaganda for 
comfort.
The challenges ahead for the scientific community and specifically 
ADF&G will be to: 1) recognize the cultural biases associated with research 
and management actions regarding wolves; and 2) begin to incorporate 
differing value systems within those approaches. In Alaska, this should start 
with ADF&G changing its research focus so as to include the positive aspects 
of wolves within ecosystems and the myriad of other factors outlined in 
chapter three which influence ungulate species.
Failure #4: Almost all value discussions within environmental debates are 
limited to some variant of utilitarian approach which is incapable of 
adequately processing all ethical questions surrounding those debates, such as 
individual rights issues or values which are not quantifiable.
When value questions are recognized within the environmental policy­
making arena. Brown critiques technical analysts for discussing values in 
quantitative, economic terms. He outlines that almost all value discussions 
within environmental debates are limited to some variant of utilitarianism, 
an approach that is assumed without clarification or discussion. Brown 
asserts that utilitarianism is incapable of adequately processing all ethical
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questions surrounding many environmental debates, such as individual 
rights. He writes:
Many economists, for example, assert that the option that makes the 
most efficient use of resources ought to be the preferred option. . . .
Most contemporary philosophers hold that utilitarian approaches must 
be supplemented by other ethical approaches, such as a Kantian 
approach, which stress such concepts as rights, justice, and due process 
as fundamental. The Kantian would resist many developmental 
strategies that may be justifiable on utilitarian grounds. More 
importantly, the utilitarian approach often assumes that various 
question can be reduced to a quantifiable amount. Quantification of 
environmental or health benefits, however, is often difficult and 
sometimes impossible. For instance, what is the value of human life? .
. . As a result, most commentators agree that a utilitarian analysis must 
be supplemented by concepts of distributive j u s t i c e . 2 3 8
As Brown discusses, Alaska's wolf issue can and does reach beyond the
boundaries utilitarianism provides. Several concepts such as "rights, justice
and due process," have played significant roles within the debate, with the
inclusion of animal rights perspectives, cultural and biological justice, and
representation on the Board of Game with regards to due process. One
significant and in m ^ y  ways unquantifiable question surrounding this issue
is: what is the value of the life of a wolf? Utilitarianism cannot adequately
assess the true value of a wolf's life which includes intrinsic and spiritual
aspects among other non-quantifiable realms. In spite of the shortcomings of
utilitarianism, it is relevant to note that had the state utilized a utilitarian
approach, the outcome of the 1992 wolf plans may have been viewed as much
fairer and more appropriate by the public.
A Brown, "Ethics, Science, and Environmental Regulation," Environmental Ethics, 
Winter 1987, Vol 9, p. 337.
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Failure #5: Cost-benefit analyses are used as "paradigmatic decision-making 
tools/' however, many ethical questions are not reducible to economic 
quantifications.
Brown continues to develop the idea that the traditional approach taken 
in environmental debates, which attempts to quantify and weigh all values, is 
inadequate. He suggests that cost-benefit analyses are used as the 
"paradigmatic decision-making tool" in environmental debates, at the 
expense of ethical concerns. Brown states:
Although most academic observers agree that cost-benefit analyses 
as a descriptive tool may initially be helpful to decision-makers, 
provided that the ethical limitations of this approach are understood, 
most philosophers agree that mandatory cost-benefit analyses should 
not be used as a prescriptive decision-making tool.
Pricing mechanisms measuring preferences measure only the 
intensity of wants; they cannot evaluate which beliefs are morally 
superior. . . . ethical questions are not reducible to questions of 
economics understood as efficient markets.
Brown's point here is well taken. Cost-benefit analyses should be used as
tools for improved decision-making, however they should not be the
ultimate framework for basing decisions.
In the case of Alaska’s wildlife debate, a comprehensive cost-benefit 
analysis has never been completed for Alaska's wolf control programs. Some 
opposed to wolf control in Alaska have advocated for the state to complete a 
cost-benefit analysis because they feel confident the results will determine 
that wolf control is not economically viable. It cannot be argued that 
economics is the primary impetus motivating wolf control in Alaska, for the 
cost of wolf control is enormous — probably significantly greater than the
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recently determined $2,000 per wolf239 figure suggests when all hidden costs 
are considered.
The economic and tourism sanctions placed on the state during wolf 
control programs carmot be economically out-weighed by the benefit of 
theoretically a few hundred extra caribou and moose for hunters. The Alaska 
Tourism Marketing Council projected that the overall loss to their industry 
from the tourism boycott resulting from the state's wolf control plans in 1992- 
3 was between 100 - 150 million dollars. Tourism is Alaska' third largest 
industry, and generated approximately 1.1 billion dollars in 1992.̂ 40 The state 
revenue generated by hunting , however, equals approximately 67 million 
dollars per year, which does not counter-balance the losses felt by the tourism 
industry. Since the economic impacts of Alaska's wolf control programs 
would deter even the most novice economists from supporting such 
measures, it appears that a cost-benefit analysis would only help make wolf 
control obsolete in the state.
When elected in November '95, Governor Tony Knowles instigated a 
cost-benefit analysis of wolf control in Alaska which has not yet been 
completed. The results of this cost-benefit analysis will help the state discuss 
wolf control in quantifiable terms. It will also increase the pool of 
information from which the state can base decisions. It will not, however, 
help the state move toward including ethical values which are not 
quantifiable in the debate. In order for value questions to be included in 
environmental debates. Brown clarifies that, "persons concerned about 
environmental ethical issues should vigorously include themselves in
239"Wolf Kill is Off,” Anchorage Daily News. 12/2/94, p. A-1.
240\Yolf Management: Perspectives on the Impact to the Tourism Industry, panel presentations 
at the Wolf Summit in Fairbanks, 1993.
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debates about public policy and refuse to accept a narrow utilitarian calculus 
as the sole basis for a rational c h o i c e .  ' ^ ^ i
Failure # 6: Incomplete technical analyses distort values in environmental 
policy-making.
Brown focuses on yet another problem related to the use of technical 
analysis and clarifies how often it is incomplete. This further distorts values 
in environmental regulation. He states:
The technical community often focuses on those aspects of a 
problem it knows something about while ignoring others. . . .What the 
public usually sees, however, is a debate about a narrow range of the 
technical issues with the participants in the debate acting as though 
they understand and are dealing with all issues that should be of 
concern to the public. In this way, the public policy debate is often a 
language game in which the jargon of the specialty of the analysts sets 
the allowable limits of where to start and stop the investigation.^^z
The 1992 Alaskan wolf debate is an example of how an exclusive focus on a
small range of the technical issues precluded a comprehensive discussion of
all the relevant concerns involved in the debate. For example, chapter three
outlines that technical analyses of multi-prey/multi-predator systems in
Alaska have focused primarily on the potential negative effects of wolves on
ungulate species. Research of this nature has been done at the exclusion of
gathering other pertinent biological information regarding these systems,
such as critical habitat and climate related factors.
The focus on wolves and their impacts on ungulate populations in 
research has limited policy debates to a set of narrow parameters at the 
exclusion of discussing other pertinent technical factors impacting these
'̂^^Donald A. Brown, "Ethics, Science, and Environmental Regulation," Environmental Ethics, 
Winter 1987, Vol 9, p. 348.
242ibid., p. 341.
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systems. In addition, value concerns are not identified or included in the 
debates. In other words, Alaska's policy discussions have focused on wolf 
control due to wolf control proposals created by the technical experts. This 
situation illustrates Brown's point, where the public policy debate is a 
language game created by the jargon of the specialty of the analysts who set 
the allowable limits of where to start and stop an investigation.
Not only did technical experts fail to identify and discuss all relevant 
factors regarding multi-prey/multi-predator systems and how best to manage 
them, they also failed to provide supporting baseline data for wolf control in 
the three areas targeted. In all three GMU's proposed for control in 1992, 
technical information was lacking regarding the effects of wolves on the 
ungulate species in question, and wolves were not identified as the primary 
impact on ungulates. Similar circumstances have existed during past studies 
and control programs.
While this paper has criticized ADF&G wolf research for its approach 
and narrow focus, it must also identify the failures of those leading public 
policy debates, namely administrators, department heads and policy-makers. 
Often researchers and biologists do produce sound information regarding 
wildlife populations, but the way their information is portrayed to the public 
and used in policy debates is skewed. For example, field biologists cannot be 
held responsible for the way Alaska's 1992 Area Specific Plan was written, and 
how its information was portrayed to the public. This was the job of those 
involved in public relations and marketing for ADF&G and ultimately its 
department heads.
Time constraints also affect policy decisions, and often limit available 
technical information. Limiting available technical information due to
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scheduling is a failure at the policy-making level. For example, wildlife 
policy decisions in Alaska are usually decided during predetermined dates, at 
times when the benefit of critical and conclusive data needed to make sound 
decisions is not necessarily available. Again, this is not the responsibility of 
field biologists and researchers, but of those setting the schedule. Ultimately 
scheduling in Alaska for wildlife policy decision-making is the responsibility 
of the Board of Game.
Decision-making without appropriate information will not insure the 
long-term conservation of wildlife populations. More accurately, making 
decisions without pertinent information is a way to critically compromise 
wildlife populations, which in the end serves no entity — human or animal. 
If, for example, a census study is in progress but has not been completed, then 
critical decisions regarding the population in question should wait until the 
results are completed. ADF&G and the state have already learned this from 
past mistakes, a few of which are outlined in Chapter 3. However, decisions 
continue to be made at times without critical information.
For example, during its March, 1995 meeting, the Game Board decided to 
further liberalize grizzly bear hunts in GMU 13 even though the results of a 
recent and ongoing census of the bear population is not complete. The last 
completed population census for bears in this area occurred in 1987. ADF&G 
biologists suspect the bear population has declined significantly in GMU 13, 
due to hunting beyond calculated sustainable levels in all five sub-units of 
GMU 13 for the past fifteen years. In spite of this, the Board of Game voted to 
lengthen the bear season so that it also takes place during moose and caribou 
hunting season, when more hunters will be in the field. In addition, the 
Board's action increases bear harvests five-fold, from a possible 1 bear per 4
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years per hunter to potentially 5 bears per four years per hunter. Such a 
significant increase in bear harvests in GMU 13 is not biologically justifiable at 
this time, and it is not the desire nor the fault of the field biologists that this 
decision occurred. This is the result of the Board of Game making a decision 
prematurely, without the information necessary to make a sound decision. 
This is a common scenario in Alaska's wildlife policy arena. The state of 
Alaska must start to make responsible decisions for its wildlife by including 
all necessary technical information needed to make appropriate decisions, 
and other pertinent concerns such as value-related questions.
Failure # 7: Value questions are distorted through the improper placement of 
the burden of proof.
Lastly, Brown discusses the distortions caused by improper placement of 
burden of proof. He outlines how problematic it is to repeatedly shift the 
burden of proof to the analyst and writes:
Because most environmental impact analysis is discussed in "science­
like" terminology, notwithstanding the fact that the scientific 
predictive basis is sometimes so weak that prediction is not much 
better than untutored intuitive speculation, there is, nevertheless, 
nearly always a strong, but unfounded, belief in the credibility of the 
analysis that shifts burden of proof to the analyst. Since scientists in 
environmental agencies are usually not in a position to suspend 
judgment until all of the proof is in, nor to wait out the long latency 
periods that may be necessary to determine whether the project will 
create the expected outcomes, the "scientific-like " jargon of the analysis 
is misleading. Environmental impact analysis should be distinguished 
from other areas of science in which the scientist can selectively focus 
on problems that can be settled by verifiable scientific p r o c e d u r e s . 2 4 3
The " scientific-like jargon " which is misleading in the Alaskan wolf 
debate is the perpetuation of the notion that if Alaska kills wolves, ungulate
243lbid., p. 346.
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numbers will automatically increase. That is the message sent in ADF&G's 
description in the Area Specific Plan of GMU 20A quoted earlier in this 
chapter. Because necessary research on wildlife-related ecological 
relationships other than wolf/ungulate relationships has yet to be conducted 
in many areas in Alaska, including those charted for wolf control in 1992, 
substantiating evidence for this hypothesis is lacking. Since the burden of 
proof is delegated to the technical analysts, in this case ADF&G biologists, and 
ADF&G has perpetuated the myth that by removing wolves ungulate 
numbers will increase, this notion has become part of an Alaskan belief 
system surrounding wolves. Advocates of wolf control honestly believe that 
by removing wolves there will be more caribou and moose for them to hunt, 
and it is a perpetuation of this belief system which has brought the state to its 
present impasse. As soon as ungulate numbers are down, or hunters are 
frustrated by inaccessibility to ungulates, there comes a cry for wolf control. 
Questioning other factors potentially inhibiting ungulate populations is not a 
part of the question. This brings us back full circle to the realization that the 
1992 wolf control proposals were a function of value-based as opposed to 
scientifically-based decisions.
GENERAL VALUE-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING 
WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN ALASKA:
Predator reduction has been a commonly used wildlife management 
tool throughout the United States since the early 1600's, and only within the 
last few decades has scrutiny of this management technique gained significant 
momentum. In Alaska, not only has wolf control been used as a 
management tool, but it has become, some would argue, part of a "cultural
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tradition" for a portion of public hunters. In Alaska, private and state 
sponsored aerial wolf control is considered a traditional, acceptable practice to 
several groups involved in the debate. However, in reviewing both the 
Dittman and AVA (Alaska Visitor Association) polls, it is evident that those 
favoring such traditional wolf control programs comprise a small minority of 
the Alaskan public.
In agreement with Brown's first point, which suggests that technical 
experts and environmental policy-makers must expand environmental 
policy discussions beyond technical, scientific jargon and openly discuss the 
value-based decisions inherent within their work, it is evident that Alaska 
must begin to discuss the ethical choices involved in wildlife and wolf 
management. Wildlife management in Alaska involves complex and 
diverse interests. Sifting through these layers to establish the best options for 
the state begs for the involvement and insights of ethical considerations. 
Ethical discussions regarding predator management incorporate a wide 
spectrum of values, including the value of wolves, the rights of wolves, the 
value and rights of caribou and moose, sport and subsistence hunting ethics, 
cultural traditions and more. Environmental ethi cist Paul Taylor writes 
regarding complex situations such as Alaska's:
These are the cases where the competing claims are so complex and so 
powerful on both sides that no solution by reference to the principles 
alone can be reached. These inevitable gaps in our decision-making 
procedure, however, need not mean that we must then become 
arbitrary in our choice of what to do. We must take another step in 
seeking a fair resolution of the conflict. This step involves appealing to 
the ethical ideal that underlies and inspires (defines the "spirit" of) the 
whole structure of priority relations . . . .  244
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The "spirit" or essence of Alaska's wildlife situation is not about whether or 
not citizens should be able to hunt, but rather it is about when and to what 
ends can they hunt. The Alaskan wolf controversy is primarily a conflict of 
values surrounding what some understand to be extreme measures taken to 
allow for increased hunting opportunity. If Alaska can come to agreement 
about when and to what ends people are allowed to hunt, the structure of 
priority relations which Taylor discusses would unfold from this point of 
reference, or ethical ideal. As Taylor suggests, Alaska must appeal to an 
"ethical ideal" to prioritize relations if positive dialogue and change is to 
occur.
Instrumental and Intrinsic Value Systems Regarding Wildlife
There are many approaches to valuing wildlife. Two wildlife value- 
systems that have been described in the field of environmental ethics, by 
Eugene C. Hargrove, help inform the Alaskan wolf controversy. In, 
Foundations of Environmental Ethics. Hargrove distinguishes these value 
systems as the "instrumental " and "intrinsic" approaches. He writes 
regarding wildlife:
Two kinds of value must be considered. The first is instrumental 
value. An entity is instrumentally valuable if its existence or use 
benefits another entity, usually a human being. The second is intrinsic 
value. An entity has intrinsic value if it is (1) valuable for its own sake 
or (2) valuable without regard to its use. These kinds of value may, 
moreover, be either anthropocentric or nonanthropocentric. An 
anthropocentric value is basically a human value. It is often customary 
to assume that all anthropocentric values are also instrumental, that is, 
valuable because they benefit human beings. It is nevertheless possible 
for values to be anthropocentric and intrinsic. An art object, for 
example, is appreciated and preserved in terms of human aesthetic 
values but is not regarded as being valuable instrumentally. Most 
environmental ethi cists, however, have been critical of
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anthropocentric values of any kind and have attempted to develop 
some Idnd of nonanthropocentric value theory that can be used to 
establish environmental or ecological value independent of human 
judgment. It is within this framework — instrumental versus 
intrinsic and anthropocentric versus nonanthropocentric — that the 
value of wildlife must be sought.245
Hargrove's definitions appear similar to the systems in conflict in the
Alaskan wolf issue. In Alaska, those involved in a value system similar to
the instrumental approach are a group which often places the worth of prey
— moose, caribou and sheep in most cases in Alaska — above wolves and
other predators because of their benefit to humans when hunted. This group
includes those who support state sponsored predator control programs which
kill wolves and perhaps other predators in order to boost available prey
numbers for the benefit of human hunters.* Those advocating for this
approach in Alaska seem to believe it is not their privilege, but rather their
right to hunt. Their interests lie in manipulating game populations so as to
attempt to produce abundant numbers available for human hunting. This is
an anthropocentric, speciesist and hierarchical approach; humans and their
needs and desires are positioned above those of other animals.
Positioned on the other side of the conflict is a group with a value 
system similar to the intrinsic system described by Hargrove. This group 
recognizes a critical relationship and interconnection between predators and 
prey, and elevates the wolf and other predators from creatures lacking in 
relative worth to those that are equally respected for their significant role 
within ecosystems. This group recognizes a circular or balanced relationship
245Eugene C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1989) p. 124.
* This is not to be confused with predator control implemented to remedy the potential collapse 
of an ungulate population which is threatened with local extinction. In this latter case, 
predator control is used in a true conservation effort, where the ungulate population ideally 
benefits. In the former case, it is human hunters who benefit.
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between predators and prey. As Hargrove points out above, this approach can 
be either anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric. In Alaska's situation, the 
group closest to the intrinsic value system approach includes individuals 
who do not support state sponsored predator control programs which kill 
wolves and other predators in order to boost available prey numbers for the 
benefit of human hunters. This group includes the majority of people 
commenting on the wolf plans who have made their position known that 
killing wolves in order to benefit human hunting is not an ethically 
acceptable alternative.
The state of Alaska's wildlife management system has traditionally been 
biased toward an orientation similar to the "instrumental " wildlife value 
approach identified by Hargrove. The Hickel administration has not strayed 
from this trend. During Hickel's governorship, wildlife management has 
primarily benefited "sport " hunters. Sport hunters are represented by 
hunting advocates through local Fish and Game advisory committees and, 
among others, a group called the Alaska Outdoor Council (AGO). The AOC is 
the largest and most effective hunting advocate group in the state, which also 
represents the Alaska chapter of The National Rifle Association. The AOC 
supported all three wolf control proposals in 1992, and key members of this 
group helped influence these proposals.
Sport hunting advocates, who ascribe to an approach similar to the 
"instrumental" wildlife value system, testify at Board of Game meetings and 
during legislative hearings. Their words fall on sympathetic ears, especially at 
Board of Game meetings where many seated on the Board and within the 
ADF&G, including David Kelleyhouse, former Director of Wildlife 
Conservation, ascribe to parallel value systems. For example, the last Board
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of Game Governor Hickel seated included four "life" members and past 
officers of the ACXT: Dick Burley, Chairman, Sue Entsminger, Ernie Polley and 
A1 Franzman. Out of seven seats, these four represented the majority of the 
Board. It is likely that, under the Hickel administration, virtually any 
proposed wolf control plan had a good chance of passing due to the make-up 
of the Board of Game, ADF&G's Wildlife Conservation Department and the 
majority of the Advisory Committees.
Testimony from the Executive Director of the Alaska Outdoor Council at 
the November 1992 Board of Game meeting provides a good representation 
of the values system and approach taken by the Alaska Outdoor Council. The 
statements made were as follows:
Mr. Chairman and members of the Board thank you for the 
opportunity to testify.. . .  My name is Dick Bishop. I live at . . .  
Fairbanks, Alaska. . . I'm testifying on behalf of the Alaska Outdoor 
Council and the Tanana Valley Sportsmen's Association. The Outdoor 
Council is a statewide coalition of outdoor oriented individuals and 
groups. It's dedicated to promoting sound scientific management and 
use of fish, wildlife and otiher renewable resources, and public access to 
public resources consistent with the Alaska state constitution. And 
obviously our membership is very diverse. It's open to virtually 
everyone. The Tanana Valley Sportsmen's Association is a local 
outdoor group with similar goals. The Association is a member club of 
the Alaska Outdoor Council. It was formed in 1937, from local hunting 
and shooting groups dating back to 1911. TVSA has actively promoted 
sound management and ethical use of resources throughout its history. 
I'd like to make some general comments and then go on to some 
specific areas.
We support the management planning effort, and we have 
supported it since its inception. We think it does offer the possibility of 
success in overcoming chronic impasses that have precluded good 
management for a long time. . . . One myth that I'd like to address is 
the myth that there is an inherent conflict between hunting and non­
consumptive uses. There is no inherent conflict between consumptive 
uses and non-consumptive uses. One does not preclude or necessarily 
diminish the other. Finally, as far as general comments overall, people 
kill a very small percentage of the big game of the state, whereas
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predators — other predators — kill a substantial percentage. We 
believe that this is unacceptable in a state with a tradition of hunting as 
an integral part of Alaskan lifestyles. And where sweeping 
accommodations of non-consumptive uses have been made by federal 
law. There is no justification for further restraints such as closed areas 
or buffer zones.
With regard to Game Management Units 13 and 20, those are areas 
that historically have provided a major portion of moose and caribou 
hunting opportunities for a substantial number of a large proportion of 
Alaskans and to non-residents. Intensive management should be 
applied in Game Management Units 13 and 20 to substantially increase 
moose and caribou allocations for people's consumptive uses. With 
intensive management it is biologically feasible to increase most moose 
and caribou populations and increase harvests by people five to ten 
fold, and maintain viable populations of wolves and grizzly bears, and 
other bears. We support a human use consumption allocation goal of 
thirty to thirty-five percent of the annual moose and caribou 
production available after mortalities due to weather and other non­
predation type factors.
We are pleased to see that today the department brought out 
intensive management options and data related to them and numbers 
related to goals and potential harvests, etc.. It's absolutely essential that 
the board and the public be aware that those are biologically feasible 
alternatives. And, we support those. There is an extensive historic 
public record documenting the high degree of public interest in and 
support for higher prey populations and harvest opportunities for 
people, and the background of biological information from ADF&G 
management plans illustrating the feasibility of intensive 
management.
We urge the board to approve intensive management in the 
geographic areas proposed as zone 6 and 7 in GMU's 13 and 20.
Intensive management should include, as necessary, reduction and 
regulation of bear and wolf populations, habitat improvement and 
prey population management. Methods authorized should include 
necessary wolf hunting and trapping, public land-and-shoot, and public 
aerial shooting of wolves, ADF&G wolf shooting and trapping, liberal 
brown and black bear seasons and bag limits, fire and mechanical 
habitat manipulation and prey population manipulation.
Management of the Delta caribou herd is critical and should be declared 
an emergency to enable timely population recovery.
In his testimony, Mr. Bishop has outlined the conflict between predator and
human hunter as perceived by some individuals in the debate who
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incorporate a value system similar to the instrumental approach. From the 
perspective outlined in Mr. Bishop’s testimony, predators are viewed as 
competitors for game meat. Individuals incorporating this approach often do 
not accept the disproportionate amount of game which goes to feeding 
predators. In their eyes, if hunter demand is not satisfied, then predator 
populations should be depleted to allow for greater human hunting 
opportunity. The value system as outlined here places the rights of humans 
above those of other living creatures, and positions the value of prey over 
predators. Predators are devalued to the extent that they are worth little other 
than to be disposed of if human hunting desires are not fulfilled.
The AOC's approach, outlined above by Dick Bishop, is significant and 
deeply intertwined in Alaska's wolf debate. The AOC recently has gone 
beyond the realm of the Board of Game and increased pressure on the state by 
influencing legislation which will benefit their interests. The suggestions in 
the final paragraph of Mr. Bishop's testimony are the tenets of a bill that was 
introduced in '92 to the Alaska state legislature. Members of the AOC and 
others helped to inspire the creation of this bill, introduced by Senator Bert 
Sharp, R. Fairbanks, called the "Intensive Management" bill. The Intensive 
Management bill mandates that the state of Alaska manage its wildlife and 
habitat intensively through predator control, habitat manipulation (including 
mechanical crushing of river banks and other potential prime moose habitat), 
and other aspects mentioned in the final paragraph of the above testimony. 
While ADF&G and the Board of Game initially opposed the bill because it 
removed their discretionary abilities regarding decision-making and 
intensive management, the bill became law in the spring of '94. Right now, 
the state of Alaska is grappling with the consequences of the Intensive
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Management bill, and during its spring '95 meeting, the Board of Game will 
be reviewing proposals which recommend intensive management for a host 
of areas in the state. This ardent and aggressive approach on the part of 
members of the AOC and other hunting advocates is quite extreme. This 
group has taken it upon themselves to force the state to pursue predator 
control in order to benefit a hunting minority. So far, they have been 
successful. Clearly their allegiance is to themselves, and to creating high prey 
numbers at the expense of predators and people with differing value systems.
Alaska's minority group of hunting advocates, who traditionally have 
advocated for wolf control in order to provide a greater hunting opportunity, 
need to begin to accept that traditional hierarchical and instrumental 
approaches to wildlife management are no longer necessarily accepted by the 
majority of the public. If wolf control is to occur, the public wants to be 
assured that there are valid reasons for it. There is at present plenty of 
caribou and moose potentially available to hunters in the state (the Western 
Arctic Caribou Herd, population estimate ~ 415,592, Porcupine Caribou Herd, 
population estimate ~ 160,000, and the Mulchatna Caribou Herd, population 
estimate ~ 110,000; herds are currently close to peak numbers), and hunters 
from Fairbanks and Anchorage may have to travel further to obtain caribou 
and moose if the ungulate populations adjacent to these urban areas are 
insufficient to meet hunting demands.
The Role of Ethics in Wildlife Science
The Board of Game claimed their decisions to support wolf control in 
the three areas discussed were based on science. From a purely scientific, 
"objective " perspective, which theoretically does not include ethical
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considerations, the argument could be made that ADF&G's proposals were 
"scientifically sound." In support of this view, one could argue that the plans 
did not intend to completely exterminate wolves in Alaska, and, therefore, 
manipulating wildlife populations without intending to cause irreversible 
damage, is scientifically valid. However, this perspective evades the fact that 
cultural values and ethical parameters do influence and limit science. If 
cultural values did not limit science, then, for example, scientific experiments 
would often involve human subjects. John Theberge clarified this point 
when addressing Alaska's wolf control plans:
Values set the broad parameters for environmental management, a 
fact I believe you have not adequately assessed. For example, to anyone 
who subscribes to the idea of sustainability in environmental 
management, in any country where demand for food exceeds 
production, the world would be better o ff^  you shot the population 
down to a sustainable relationship with resources. But we don't do it. 
We don't keep slaves either, which would have obvious economic 
benefits in times of worldwide recession. I would like to think that we 
don't mass-slaughter wolves, either.246
As Theberge suggests, the deliberations of the Board of Game were limited to
technical language and discussion, which did not allow for any discussion of
the ethics involved. However, the decision to move forward with wolf
control was not simply a scientific decision; rather it appears it was an attempt
to apply technical, scientific information to a value-based and politically
driven goal. By omitting any mention of this or a similar intent, ADF&G and
the Board were deluding themselves and the public. Theberge discusses how
management actions express values:
I like to insist that there are two issues here. One is biologically 
trying to understand the role of the wolf and the other is an
2^John B. Theberge, PhD, Professor of Ecology, University of Waterloo, "Brief Comment on 
G.C. Haber's "Wildlife Management in Alaska," January, 14, 1993, p. 4.
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ethical issue. I still do objective research. But to people who 
question my taking a stance of values, I come back with the 
opinion that if they work for a management agency that is 
killing wolves, then by virtue of their actions they too are 
making an explicit statement of values.^̂ 7
Alaska's Web of Value Systems Related to Wildlife:
Additional complexities associated with Alaska's wildlife management 
complicate the suggestion that primarily two value systems are in conflict in 
the Alaskan wolf debate. In truth, many more value-related concerns are 
involved in the this issue. If Alaska is to responsibly address the ethical 
dilemmas within the wolf controversy in order to find appropriate solutions, 
some of these other broad, value-related issues will also have to be 
considered. It is necessary for the state to address these issues in order to build 
an "ethical ideal " which will help define a structure of priority relations, as 
Taylor suggests needs doing above. Wolf control is only one, small piece of a 
much larger wildlife management puzzle. The following list outlines some 
of the value-related concerns facing future policy-makers:
The value o f a wolf. Perhaps the best place for Alaska to start is to 
determine the value of a wolf to the state. Questions such as the following 
should be addressed: How significant are the spiritual and symbolic aspects of 
having wolves in Alaska? Do wolves have intrinsic value? How are wolves 
valued compared to other wildlife? How much does the public at large value 
wolves? How much does the tourism industry value wolves? How much do 
hunters and trappers value wolves? Is it possible to determine the value of 
wolves on any scale?
247john B. Theberge, quoted from film interview with David Suzuki, "The Nature of Things 
Crying Wolf."
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Some of the above questions are quantitative, some are not. As Brown 
suggests, quantitative analysis is often good for informing debates, but 
reducing all values to quantitative measures is not necessarily the most 
productive way of determining solutions. Non-quantitative aspects, such as 
the spiritual aspects or rights of wolves, play a significant role; yet to be 
included in the debate an agreement must be forged, or system developed, for 
how to incorporate non-quantitative aspects of wolves and wolf control.
Once these fundamental questions become clearer, and some sort of 
agreement is reached regarding the value of wolves in Alaska, the state can 
move on to the myriad of related subjects with an informed perspective.
How wolves are valued by Alaskans and others outside of the state can and 
should be a primary reference point and measuring stick to inform other 
decisions related to wolves in Alaska.
Values related to hunting: Value considerations related to hunting are 
also part of this debate. Paul Taylor discusses hunting in Respect for Nature. 
and highlights the notion that in order to hunt and trap ethically, one must 
first consider the weight of responsibilities related to entrapment. He 
underlines that breaking trusts with animals by luring them closer with the 
intent of killing them is an action which often betrays a respect for nature. He 
argues there must be significant moral reason driving this activity in order 
for it to be done in an ethical manner. Further he states recreational hunting 
cannot be done compatibly with the attitude of respect for nature. He writes:
The Rule of Fidelity. Under this rule fall the duties not to break a trust 
that a wild animal places in us (as shown by its behavior), not to 
deceive or mislead any animal capable of being deceived or misled, to 
uphold an animal's expectations, which it has formed on the basis of 
one's past actions with it, and to be true to one's intentions as made 
known to an animal when it has come to rely on one. Although we 
cannot make mutual agreements with wild animals, we can act in such
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a manner as to call forth their trust in us. The basic moral 
requirements imposed by the Rule of Fidelity is that we remain faithful 
to that trust.
The clearest and commonest examples of transgressions of the rule 
occur in hunting, trapping, and fishing. Indeed, the breaking of a trust 
is a key to good (that is, successful) hunting, trapping, and fishing. 
Deception with intent to harm is of the essence. Therefore, unless 
there is a weighty moral reason for engaging in these activities, they 
must be condemned by the ethics of respect for nature. The weighty 
reason in question must itself be grounded on disinterested principle, 
since the action remains wrong in itself in virtue of its constituting a 
violation of a valid moral rule. Like all such violations, it can be 
justified only by appeal to a higher, more stringent duty whose priority 
over the duty of fidelity is established by a morally valid priority 
principle.
. . .  It may be the case that in circumstances where the only means 
for obtaining food or clothing essential to human survival is by 
hunting, trapping, or fishing, these actions are morally permissible.
The ethical principles that justify them could stem from a system of 
human ethics based on respect for persons plus a priority principle that 
makes the duty to provide for human survival outweigh those duties 
of nonmaleficence, noninterference, and fidelity that are owed to 
nonhumans. But when hunting and fishing are done for sport or 
recreation, they cannot be justified on the same g r o u n d s . ^ ^ 8
Taylor clarifies that without a weighty moral reason, hunting should be
condemned by the ethics of respect for nature. While Taylor's ethical
approach to hunting may be questionable to many hunters, he raises a central
issue in the debate currently underway over hunting in America. That
question is: when is it ethically and morally permissible to hunt? Alaska is
struggling with this very question. This question is deeply entwined in the
debate over predator control. □
Alaska does include what Taylor would describe as legitimate
subsistence hunting, trapping and fishing pursuits, whereby these activities
allow for human survival, are millenia-old "rights," and are thus morally
248paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature. (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1986) p. 179 
-183.
201
permissible. But there are also cases in Alaska where this distinction is less 
clear. In some situations these activities are perhaps not needed for survival, 
but are done to maintain significant cultural traditions. Examples of this 
include natives and/or non-natives who live in towns, perhaps accessible by 
road or boat (such as the towns in Southeast Alaska), which have functioning 
economies and provide many or all modem comforts, such as grocery stores. 
Other examples might include urban Alaskan natives and non-natives, 
living in Fairbanks or Anchorage, for example, but who continue to depend 
on fish and ungulate meat to feed themselves and their families throughout 
the year.
Author Ted Kerasote develops a thoughtful and ethically concerned 
argument which supports what he describes as the "privilege" of hunting in 
America. The issues raised in Kerasote's thesis regarding hunting are 
extremely relevant to Alaska's situation. He discusses the energy costs and 
animal lives lost in producing food without hunting. He determines that, if 
managed properly, hunting produces no greater harm to wildlife than other 
forms of food production. Additionally he determines that the experience, 
attachment and knowledge gained from hunting in his bioregion is not only 
ethically and environmentally justifiable, but perhaps bears a greater moral 
responsibility than obtaining food in other ways. This is so because the 
hunter is directly involved, must realize and take ownership in the cycle of 
deaths that occur in order for each life form to survive. Kerasote describes 
why, after a long search which included seeking information and advice from 
Buddhist spiritual leaders, he has chosen to go back to hunting:
Once in an attempt to outwit this pain, I became a vegetarian, and 
stayed one for quite a while. But when I inquired about the lives lost 
on a mechanized farm, I realized what costs we pay at the supermarket.
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One Oregon farmer told me that half the cottontail rabbits went into 
his combine when he cut a wheat field, that virtually all of the small 
mammals, ground birds and reptiles were killed when he harvested 
windrow crops like rye and sugar beets, and that when the leaves were 
stripped from bush beans all the mice and the snakes who were living 
among them were destroyed as w ell.. . .  Because most of these 
mammals have been seen as expendable, or not seen at all, few 
scientific studies have been done measuring agriculture's effects on 
their populations. Those that have been done demonstrate that 
agricultural lands often act as "ecological traps," attracting birds, for 
instance, who begin their nesting only to have machinery pass over the 
land, destroying tiieir nests and often the birds themselves. . . . When 
one factors in the lives lost to pesticides, the toll is enormous . . . .  
Raised on a farm in Iowa, he went on to say that current agricultural 
practices, particularly combining, left the earth a "biological desert. "
Our fields might be brimming over with wheat and com and soybeans, 
but unless we begin to leave habitat for wildlife — stubble, hedgrerows, 
and ditches — we were going to find our selves in an austerely quiet 
world, as silent as the silent spring about which Rachel Carson warned.
Such data, scanty as it is, addresses only the lives lost on the farm 
itself. When our produce is transported along the interstate highway 
system, birds . . .  deer . . .  skunks . . .  raccoons all get flattened.. . .  And 
this doesn't even begin to count the animals lost to the development 
of the oil fields themselves, the transportation of petroleum across 
tundra, mountain ranges, and the oceans, and in tiie wars fought over 
that oil. In short, being a supermarket vegetarian didn't take me out of 
the web in which animals are constantly dying to feed humans, it 
merely put their deaths over the horizon, making them, in the 
bloodless jargon of cost-accounting, externalities.
When I looked into that web, so full of pain, I came to see that 
killing an elk each year did less harm, expressed in animal lives who I 
believe count equally, than importing the same amount of vegetable 
food to my bioregion. That didn't ease my conscience; but it did make 
the choices clearer.
. . .  I would argue that making clearer, more compassionate choices 
from such a multitude of daily options is the most important task of 
our lives . . . .  The elk in the forest, the tuna at sea, the myriad of small 
creatures lost as the combines turn the fields, even the Douglas fir 
hidden in the walls of our homes — every day we foreclose one life 
over another, a never-ending triage, a constant choice of who will 
suffer so that we may live, bending a blue note into the neatness of 
morality. It is this tender pain between species that is the plasma 
bearing us all along.
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Given this condition and my final inability to escape from it, I 
decided to go back to hunting . . .  hunting because it attaches me to this 
place and die animals I love, asking me to own what each of us ought 
to own in some personal way — the pain that runs the world. And 
hunting elk in particular because they are the loved totem of my home. 
. . because this home makes them and leaves them free . . . and because 
eating them does nothing to increase the aggregate pain of the world.
In fact, by attaching me lovingly here, the relationship between elk and 
me decreases it.^^9
Kerasote has made a strong case for a weighty moral reason to hunt, and his 
information about energy and animal costs can be directly correlated to 
Alaska's situation. As will be discussed later in this chapter, because of 
Alaska's distant location, the energy costs related to obtaining food which is 
not produced within Alaska's bioregions are perhaps even more draining 
than those spent to produce and ship food to other portions of the United 
States. So while entrapment of fish and animals may be, in Taylor's words, a 
"violation of a valid moral rule," the harm done to wildlife in these pursuits 
within one's bioregion may be less significant, as Kerasote suggests, than 
obtaining food in other ways. Kerasote's position, of course, assumes that 
certain items are in place, such as a huntable population within one's 
bioregion which is managed for hunting on a sustainable level.
There are many Alaskans who hunt, fish and trap recreationally. Taylor 
contends that the pursuit of hunting or fishing for recreation cannot be 
justified. Kerasote appears to agree with this. He is arguing for a change in 
the approach to hunting across America, so that hunting may survive the 
intense scrutiny it appears to be undergoing. In a recently published article, 
Kerasote suggests that hunters are in part to blame for the current backlash 
against hunting. He writes regarding the term "recreational hunter":
249xed Kerasote, Blood ties: Nature. Culture and the Hunt. (New York, N.Y., Random House, 
1993) p. 232 - 240.
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. . . managers and communicators need to reshape their terminology. 
Sport and recreation, the terms that distinguished conservationist 
hunters like Roosevelt from the market hunters who participated in 
the decimation of buffalo and waterfowl, have become pejorative 
terms when used with reference to killing animals. They are 
unacceptable to many in the environmental movement, who are not 
opposed to hunting if it is done with care, and many nonhunters, 
including vegetarians, who have been ambivalent about hunting but 
who can understand the activity as a "least harm option" when 
compared to agribusiness and the domestic meat industry. Perhaps 
hunters can call themselves simply hunters.^^^
Terminology aside, Taylor and Kerasote may agree on a basic tenet, which is
that hunting should be pursued in an ethical, respectful and meaningful way.
As Taylor delineates, morally permissible hunting and the ethical principles
which justifies it can stem from a system of human ethics based on respect for
persons. Creating a system of human ethics related to hunting is the
challenge that Alaskan policy-makers need to pursue. Alaskan policy-makers
need to address from a broader ethical spectrum how they hope to
accommodate all of those interested in hunting in Alaska. In addition, they
need to determine what the limits are to these accommodations, because
wildlife is a renewable but also limited resource. If the state chooses to
distinguish between subsistence and recreational/sport needs, for example,
the state will have to determine limitations for providing for subsistence vs.
recreational hunting.
Questions that Alaskan policy-makers need to address include: Can the 
state justify predator control in order to provide for subsistence hunting 
purposes when there is biological evidence that predators are limiting prey 
numbers? Can the state justify this when there is no biological evidence?
Can the state justify predator control for recreational hunting needs when
25076(1 Kerasote, "To Preserve the Hunt," Orion, Winter 1996, Vol 15, Number 1, p. 13 -19.
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there is biological evidence that predators are limiting prey numbers? Can 
the state justify this when there is no biological evidence?
Values related to native subsistence, cultural traditions: Another related 
value-based concern focuses on the indigenous, human populations in 
Alaska. Approximately one third of Alaska's population is native — either 
Eskimo or Indian — whose culture, history and survival has been and, in 
many cases, still is dependent upon hunting, trapping and fishing. Questions 
such as the following need to be addressed: Can the state continue to provide 
fish and wildlife for traditional and customary uses for a rapidly growing 
native population? Should it? How will limits to this be determined? How 
far is the state willing to go in order to provide for subsistence uses of 
wildlife? If the state is willing to manipulate wildlife populations in an 
attempt to provide for customary and traditional uses, how much is it willing 
to manipulate those populations? How will it address long-term solutions in 
the face of increasing human populations? What kind of limits will be placed 
on wildlife habitat encroachment, given the increase in both native and non­
native populations in Alaska? What is the value of "tradition? " Of belief 
systems? How can they be weighed against the power of acculturation?
These and many other related questions are very sensitive and central 
issues facing Alaska's wildlife policy makers. Critics of Alaska's policy­
makers have suggested that Alaska has not fairly included or made a priority 
of native subsistence concerns. If this is true, it must be rectified. Careful, 
ethical attention needs to be given to questions regarding subsistence and 
cultural wildlife uses in future policy-making efforts.
Values related to rural vs. urban hunters: A second, but related issue 
involves a conflict in the state between urban and rural hunters. Since 1978,
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when an Alaska statute (chapter 151, section 4 SLA 1978) was passed giving 
preference to subsistence hunting and fishing over sport or commercial 
fishing or sport hunting, the state has provided a rural preference for access to 
fish and wildlife. In 1986 the Alaska House of Representatives adopted a 
subsistence act, which was introduced by a letter of intent which identified the 
following:
This limitation of the definition of "subsistence uses" recognizes that 
Alaska is unique, and unlike any of the other forty-nine states, the 
economy of many rural communities in rural areas in Alaska is 
significantly dependent upon participation by the residents of these 
communities in the taking of fish stocks and game populations for 
personal and family consumption. Further, the legislature finds that 
the general health and welfare of these citizens is significantly tied to 
their participation in these activities.^^i
Both the 1978 and 1986 subsistence statutes distinguish two tiers of subsistence
users. They delineate that when fish or game populations are adequate to
meet the demand of all subsistence users, then hunters falling under the first
tier category, which presently includes hunters from both urban and rural
areas, can hunt. In a situation where fish and game populations are
inadequate to meet the demands of all subsistence hunters, then only a
restricted group falling under the second tier category can hunt. Criteria for
the second tier considers the needs of local, rural, human populations over
those of non-local and urban hunters. The 1980 federal Alaska Interest Lands
Conservation Act (ANILCA) also recognizes the importance of subsistence
activities and uses to the rural people of Alaska, and echoes the need for a
rural preference regarding fish and wildlife. When ANILCA was enacted, the
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs determined that:
251 Alaska House of Representatives, Letter of intent accompanying subsistence bill, 1985 House 
Journal 1246.
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After consideration of the testimony at the subcommittee's hearings 
and town meetings throughout Alaska and review of studies done by a 
variety of federal, state, academic, and other agencies and groups, the 
Committee has no doubt about the importance of subsistence uses to 
the rural people of Alaska. Reliable evidence was given to the 
Committee demonstrating that fifty percent of the food for three- 
quarters of the Native families in Alaska's small and medium villages 
is acquired through subsistence uses, and 40 percent of such families 
spend an average of 6 to 7 months of the year in subsistence activities . .
. .  (H.R. Rep. NO. 1045, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 181 (1978))
While none of these statutes are limited to only natives as beneficiaries of
these actions, native cultural and traditional uses have been to a large extent
protected under these laws. In 1989, a group representing non-native sport
hunter interests (Sam E. McDowell, Dale E. Bondurant, Ronald Mahle and
Harold Eastwood) sued the state for providing a rural preference. In this
landmark case, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that, "granting
preference to rural residents to take fish and game for subsistence purposes
violates Alaska constitutional provisions prohibiting exclusive or special
privileges in the taking of fish and wildlife."252 This decision undermined
the premise that rural residents should receive preferential access to fish and
wildlife. It eliminated the vitally important distinction between sport and
subsistence hunter. As a result, any resident of Alaska is potentially a
subsistence hunter — even someone who resides in Anchorage, Alaska's
largest urban center. Needless to say, this decision has threatened the
protection of cultural traditions of native Alaskans and non-natives living in
rural areas who depend on local fish and wildlife for their subsistence. Since
the 1989 McDowell vs. State case, the federal government has taken control of
wildlife management on federal lands in order to comply with ANILCA and
insure a rural, subsistence preference. The McDowell case decision therefore
252McDowell vs. State, 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska , Dec. 22,1989).
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affects only state and private lands. A final twist to the current situation is 
that there is presently an influx of natives to urban centers, and by providing 
a rural preference, natives could theoretically be denied privileges to hunt or 
fish in certain areas, depending on availability of wildlife populations.
Within the framework of rural and urban, native and non-native, and 
increasing populations concerns, two significant aspects of the 1992 - '93 wolf 
controversy rise to the surface. The first is that wolf control was proposed in 
areas which would primarily benefit urban hunters from Anchorage and 
Fairbanks, the majority of which would have been considered "sport 
hunters" prior to the McDowell case. The second is that three caribou 
populations in Alaska — the Western Arctic, Porcupine and Mulchatna 
herds are currently close to peak numbers and potentially offer plenty of 
caribou for hunting. These large populations of caribou, however, are not 
adjacent to Fairbanks and Anchorage, and are for the most part in areas which 
are inaccessible by road. Knowledge of this further crystallizes another subset 
of value-based questions facing Alaska, which includes questions such as: 
During times when there exists enormous numbers of prey in the state, is 
Alaska willing to kill wolves and other predators in order to boost prey 
populations close to urban centers to benefit primarily urban hunters? Is 
Alaska willing to do this when there is no apparent biological justification?
Values related to farm ing vs. w ild  stocks: In addition, agriculture in 
Alaska is not prevalent, and overall has not been tremendously successful 
due to short growing seasons, extreme cold temperatures and soil types. Most 
of Alaska's land is untamed, wild land which often is not suitable for 
cultivating food crops. Thus producing alternative foods, such as vegetable, 
fruit or grain crops, at sustainable levels statewide in Alaska does not appear
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to be feasible. Because of Alaska’s distance from major food producing areas 
in the world, the energy needed to ship food, such as grains, vegetables and 
fruits, to Alaska is considerable and takes an environmental toll. From an 
energy conservation perspective, the argument exists that eating indigenous 
food, namely fish and game, is ultimately less i m p a c t i n g . ^̂ 3
Again, Alaska must determine how far it is willing to go to provide fish 
and game for its residents by addressing difficult, ethical questions such as: 
What are the intrinsic values of moose and caribou? Do they have rights to 
live wild and free lives? Is the same true for predators? Is moose and caribou 
farming a direction the state wants to move toward? If so, will ungulate 
farming ever be able to meet the demands of its meat consuming population? 
How far would predator manipulation go? If ungulate farming is not a 
direction the state wants to move toward, how will Alaska determine who 
can obtain available prey and be in compliance with the state constitution? 
Thus far, the state has made it clear that it is not supportive of farming moose 
and caribou. However, they have implemented policies related to wolf 
control which are perceived by some critics as defacto ungulate farming.
Because of Alaska’s large native population, its many rural-based 
communities which are inaccessible by road, its relatively large percentage of 
individuals who continue to live a subsistence-oriented lifestyle, and its low 
agricultural production, Alaska’s wildlife management incorporates many 
complexities. It also includes many ethical considerations which have yet to 
be discussed in wildlife management policy forums. As Alaska’s population 
continues to grow, some new and creative methods of accommodating people
Harbo, author of "Historical and Current Perspectives on Wolf Management in 
Alaska," presented a paper at the 1993 Wolf Summit discussing the energy-efficiency of 
indigenous eating in Alaska.
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will have to surface. Former Commissioner of Fish and Game, James Brooks, 
lent some perspective to this situation when he stated at the January, 1993 
wolf summit:
I want to point out to you that when I came to this country some 53 
years ago, there were 32,000 native people. There are now 86,000.
There were 64,000 residents in Alaska; there are now 500,000 more than 
that. I think it's futile to expect that new Alaskans, be they immigrants 
or home-grown, can expect to find the same wilderness experience and 
bounty off the land that was available just a few decades ago. I think 
the expectations have to be toned down a little bit.
Brooks's statement regarding hunting opportunity is especially convincing
when one considers the future management of areas adjacent to urban
centers. Alaska is going to have to face that at some point in the future it will
no longer contain sufficient ungulate numbers to provide for the increasing
numbers of hunters — subsistence and/or sport — and hunting will have to
be restricted. Without a recognition of the ethical conflicts existent within the
Alaskan hunting allocation and wolf management debates, predator
management will continue to endure controversy at the expense of wildlife,
habitat and the state of Alaska.
Conclusion:
Wildlife policy-makers in Alaska must address many difficult, ethical 
questions regarding wildlife and people management as the state faces the 
future. Alaska needs to search for long-term, sustainable solutions which are 
sensitive to cultural values and address the population increases occurring in 
the state. It is time for the state to begin a process regarding wolf management 
which is understood to be credible by all those involved. A system needs to 
be developed through which various value concerns can be meaningfully
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addressed regarding wolf management. One challenge will be to determine if 
wolf control is still an acceptable wildlife management tool under any 
circumstance, and if the value systems of the majority of Alaskans can 
support wolf control.
If the public decides wolf control is still acceptable under certain 
situations, then those instances will have to be clearly delineated. Biological 
and operational guidelines must be created for when predator control may be 
considered and implemented. Also, acceptable methods of control must be 
determined as well. Will the public accept aerial gunning, land and shoot 
hunting, poisoning or bounties during any control circumstances? If so, 
which? Questions surrounding these activities will be difficult to answer. 
However, only through an honest attempt at finding and creating solutions 
will the state of Alaska redeem itself in the public's eye and be able to manage 
wildlife in a credible manner that is agreeable to the public.
Finally, the minority hunting advocates who insist that wolf control is 
necessary to provide for greater hunting opportunity must begin to accept that 
the traditional hierarchical and instrumental approaches to wildlife 
management are no longer necessarily accepted by the majority of the public. 
If wolf control is to occur, the public wants to be assured there are valid 
reasons for it. Plenty of caribou and moose are available to hunters in the 
state, including the Mulchatna, Western Arctic and Porcupine caribou herds. 
Hunters from Fairbanks and Anchorage may have to travel further to obtain 
caribou and moose, if the ungulate populations adjacent to these urban areas 
are insufficient to meet hunting demands. As Alaska's population continues 
to grow, some new and creative solutions for wildlife management will have 
to surface.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The following is a list of recommendations to the state of Alaska for how 
to proceed in future wildlife management decisions. While these 
recommendations do not cover every aspect discussed in the preceding 
chapters, these recommendations are intended to be a starting point for future 
policy makers. Wildlife management in Alaska needs some fundamental 
reform. The recommendations below are intended to help bridge the path 
toward a new and fairer system:
Ethical Concerns:
1) The state should begin to acknowledge that choosing to implement wolf 
control is foremost an ethical choice. Discussion of the values involved in 
the debate needs to begin to meaningfully incorporate differing values in 
decision-making. This will encourage informed discussions where actual 
conflicts are honestly disclosed, rather than continuing to misrepresent the 
debate as solely scientific.
2) The state should initially commit to a consensus decision-making process, 
and fully review the use of predator control. This process must determine 
when, if ever, predator control is ethically acceptable to the public. Questions 
such as the following must be asked:
Is predator control acceptable when:
— predators are found to be the limiting factor of an ungulate 
population and the population is decreasing enough to warrant 
management action?
— an ungulate population is threatened with local extinction 
and predators are found to be the limiting factor?
— subsistence hunting needs are not being met?
— cultural and traditional uses are not being met?
— recreational hunting needs are not being met?
— the public is conducting defacto predator control through 
regular hunting and trapping methods?
3) If it is determined that predator control is acceptable under certain 
circumstances, then the state needs to determine ethically acceptable methods 
used in control. Will aerial gunning, land-and-shoot hunting, aerial assisted
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trapping, ground hunting or trapping, poisoning, bounties, or denning be 
acceptable? If so which method? Should these techniques be used by ADF&G 
only, the public only, or a combination of ADF&G and the public for control 
programs?
Alaska's Wildlife Management Structural System:
1) Alaska Board of Game members should fairly represent all public user 
groups, and their must be a balance between non-consumptive and 
consumptive users of wildlife on the Board.
2) The Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) needs to work to 
restore the public’s confidence. The Governor should appoint a balanced 
candidate to head the Department of Wildlife Conservation — one whose 
strengths include consensus building and mitigation among interest groups. 
Research and projects should be refocused so as to look beyond the traditional 
predator/prey studies and include: habitat conservation as a primary goal; 
researching habitat, climate and nutritional conditions of wildlife within 
multi-prey / multi-predator systems and how these conditions affect these 
systems; consideration of biodiversity and ecosystems management plans; 
determining biological thresholds which indicate compromised wildlife 
populations for both predators and prey; establishing research and 
information standards before, during and after management actions; 
representing all "user" groups within staff expertise and programs; giving 
non-consumptive wildlife use a strong position; improving enforcement.
3) Local Fish and Game Advisory Committees need to be restructured so as to 
better represent diverse interests such as non-consumptive, native 
subsistence, tourism and other interested user-groups.
Biology and Research:
1) Future efforts of the state should move away from single species 
management and develop sound, comprehensive guidelines for ecosystem 
management, which in Alaska includes multi-prey/multi-predator systems, 
habitat and climactic factors. This is the best way to approach management 
and assure the long-term conservation of wildlife in Alaska. Some of the 
aspects of the Strategic Wolf Management Plan (i.e. zones, hunting 
guidelines, etc.) could be incorporated into a multi-prey/multi-predator 
management plan. Also a discussion of how the public wants its ungulate 
populations managed — i.e., attaining certain population objectives and 
trying to maintain them (static herd management), as ADF&G has tried to do, 
or allowing natural population fluctuations to occur and adapting human use 
to areas with high ungulate numbers (fluctuating herd management) — 
should ensue.
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2) The state must put a stop to implementing wolf control when biological 
information indicates that wolves are not the limiting factor of a targeted 
ungulate population. In none of the three control programs proposed in 1992 
were wolves found to be limiting ungulate populations. That the state would 
vote to eliminate relatively high percentages of wolves and wolf packs in the 
target areas without any substantive biological justifications indicates that 
Alaska — specifically tiie Alaska Department of Fish and Game and those 
who guide this agency, who are charged with ensuring, "the long-term 
conservation of wolves throughout their historic range in Alaska in relation 
to their prey and habitat," — is willing to kill wolves arbitrarily. Arbitrary 
and capricious killing of wolves is an inappropriate management approach, 
especially when wolves are highly valued as they are today.
3) Technical information should be comprehensive and complete before 
intrusive management discussions even begin. The following areas must be 
researched:
a. The state needs to compile sound wolf and bear population statistics. 
Statewide predator population estimates are based primarily on hunter 
trapper reports, sealing records, track counts, and sightings. Statewide 
radio telemetry studies and comprehensive stratified random sampling 
surveys from aircraft need to be completed for all of Alaska.
Implementing wolf and bear control programs on weak population 
estimates is not responsible wildlife management.
b. The state needs to map out geographic areas where wolf populations 
have been either significantly reduced without recovery or eliminated. 
ADF&G promotes the notion that wolf populations are healthy and 
thriving throughout Alaska, however information exists that suggests 
otherwise. For example, reindeer herding areas, much of the north slope, 
northern Bristol Bay, Denali State Park, and some areas of the interior 
including eastern regions where the Fortymile caribou herd range exists, 
among others, have been highlighted as areas with significantly reduced 
wolf populations. The public needs to be made aware of these population 
statuses and trends in order to help make better informed decisions 
regarding wolf management.
c. Information needs to be gathered regarding spatial, functional, and 
behavioral aspects of predator-prey relationships, and less emphasis 
should be placed on simple predator/prey ratios. The amount of predators 
per ungulate population does not necessarily determine whether or not 
predators are adversely affecting prey. Spatial, functional and behavioral 
information is critical to future predator management debates in Alaska.
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Also, the state should work to determine if the situation termed "predator 
pit" is relevant to caribou populations.
4) All other socially, ethically and biologically acceptable options should be 
exhausted before predator control is discussed as an option, including 
transporting hunters to areas where there are abundant numbers of ungulates 
and diversionary feeding techniques. Human hunting of the ungulate 
population in question should stop for two years prior to initiating predator 
control, while pertinent biological information is gathered. Subsistence 
hunting from local residents could be allowed at a reduced level under 
certain circumstances if alternatives to providing meat sources can not be 
found. Predator control should be a last resort, and different areas should be 
treated carefully and individually, taking special interests into consideration 
(i.e. subsistence needs, tourism, non-consumptive uses, sport hunting, etc.).
If in the event predator control is chosen, the following items must be in 
place:
a. establish a biological trigger for each ungulate species within a habitat 
type which may catalyze the consideration of predator control as a 
management option if predators are the primary limiting factor;
b. determine if predator control should be initiated when a population of 
ungulates is threatened with local extinction, and predation is limiting 
herd growth;
c. predator control should be limited to predetermined discrete, distinct 
areas with specific wolf packs targeted in the case of wolves, so that wolves 
are not killed randomly or indiscriminately;
d. prior to implementing predator control, biological and local 
information about the ungulate species to benefit from predator control 
should be collected for two years. Information concerning the ungulate 
species that will benefit from a proposed wolf control program will 
include:
(i) the status of the habitat
(ii) annual calf recruitment rates for ungulate populations
(iii) annual yearling birth rate for ungulates
(iv) annual calf survival for ungulate populations
(v) annual twinning rates for moose
(vi) health of other wildlife populations
(vii) positive identification that predators are limiting
ungulate populations, and specifically which species of 
predator
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(viii) status of predator populations and annual harvest rates 
of predators
(ix) climactic effects on wildlife populations
(x) condition of habitat as a food resource for ungulates
5) When predator control is in progress, ungulate populations identified as 
beneficiaries of the control should be monitored for:
(i) annual calf recruitment
(ii) annual calf and yearling survival
(iii) nutritional status indices (i.e., pregnancy rates, body 
weights of adults and calves, etc.)
(iv) climactic effects on population
(v) behavioral indices (i.e., movement out of traditional 
range, etc.)
6) Following a control program, studies should be conducted for at least two 
years after the program is terminated to determine if the program met desired 
objectives. These should include:
(i) all indicators outlined in # 5 (above) for ungulates
(ii) status and recovery of predator control
(iii) population censuses for all predators and prey involved
(iv) effects of predator control on social behavior of predators 
(i.e. wolf pack dynamics, reproductive rates, etc.)
Geographic and Demographic Related Concerns:
1) The state should work with a consensus-based group to develop non­
hunting corridors and zones in appropriate places, such as highways, roads, 
waterways, areas within and buffers surrounding national, and state parks, 
and other designated conservation areas. ADF&G and the Board of Game 
should treat management of wildlife within state parks with particular care to 
improve stewardship and better conserve wildlife in designated park areas. 
The state must develop wildlife viewing opportunities as part of the ADF&G 
management strategy.
2) Policy-makers will have to address wildlife management problems related 
to increasing native and non-native populations in Alaska, and identify ways 
to determine limits regarding providing opportunity for consumptive uses. 
Wildlife populations have a finite ability to sustain consumptive uses, and 
the state will eventually have to make some potentially unpopular decisions 
regarding limiting consumptive use for the benefit and conservation of these 
species.
3) Alaska's wildlife policy-makers should broaden the scope of their work to 
ensure that policy is not created to benefit primarily one interest group. In
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addition, the state must begin to look at the big picture, including 
demographic changes, hunting near urban areas and how these and other 
aspects will affect future wildlife management.
Cost Benefit Analysis:
1) The state should complete its comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of wolf 
control, and include its findings in future predator control debates. This 
analysis should review the cost of predator control programs including 
related costs such as tourism boycotts, etc., the achieved results of past 
programs, the economic benefits of past programs, an estimated value of wolf 
and bear viewing to the tourist industry and the public, and the collective 
losses incurred as a result of wolf control. Information gleaned from this 
analysis should be used to better inform the discussion, but should not 
necessarily be used as the primary decision-making tool.
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